Global Outlook

The following is a brief overview of the nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of the proposal for Australia to build and operate nuclear-powered submarines.

The German Parliament will be elected on 26 September 2021 after its four-year legislature. The biggest change will be that the new government will definitely be formed without Chancellor Merkel who has held this position for nearly 16 years. No wonder many speculate about politics “beyond-Merkelism”

The announcements of Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines have rightly underlined that the project is about the acquisition of a power source and not nuclear weapons and that Australia remains committed to the highest standards for safeguards to ensure non-proliferation, safety and security of nuclear material and technology.

The defeat of the United States and its allies and return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan have changed the regional landscape. The configuration of forces has shifted in favour of Pakistan as the Taliban’s patron and China as a strategic partner of Pakistan, confronting India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Central Asian Republics and the main power behind them, Russia, with certain policy quandaries. Yet not all is lost, as both Islamabad and Beijing may find that Afghanistan is a very difficult country to govern and sustain.

After first suffering a seeming “brain snap” to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) some years back; at long last Australia has been promised a fleet of eight SSNs by the Biden administration under the newly minted and awkwardly named AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom and United States) alliance against China.

With ANZUS having turned 70, how does New Zealand view the Treaty today? In political opinion, virtually not at all; in terms of its legal, strategic and cultural context, the answer is more complex and nuanced.