Jackson’s Warning and America’s Way Back to the UN
Jordan Ryan
November 20, 2026
Image: Chief American prosecutor Robert H. Jackson addresses the Nuremberg court, 20 November 1945 │ Raymond D'Addariob / Wiki Commons
The International Military Tribunal began its work in Nuremberg on 20 November 1945. The next day, Robert H. Jackson, a US Supreme Court justice serving as America’s chief prosecutor, opened the case against Nazi leaders accused of crimes including aggressive war. The trial brought together judges and prosecutors from the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Jackson said the four powers, “flushed with victory and stung with injury,” had stayed the hand of vengeance and submitted their enemies to law. It was “one of the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason.” He also acknowledged the trial’s vulnerability: judgment by victors over the vanquished could discredit the effort. He supplied the test by which it should be judged: the law, “if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now in judgment.”
Five years earlier, as US attorney general, Jackson had warned federal prosecutors about the power to choose whom to pursue. “The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America,” he told the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys. Because no prosecutor could investigate every complaint, selection was unavoidable. The danger, he said, was to “pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.”
A fourth test
The two warnings are one. When law is applied to selected targets and waived for friends or for oneself, it loses the authority that makes it law. That is the harder test of an American return to the United Nations. The author’s Global Outlook of 13 November, Trust, Not Announcements, Will Bring America Back to the UN, argued that trust rests on commitments that cost something, are difficult to reverse, and respond to what others have asked for. It set out three tests: money, where to begin, and whether Washington listens. There is a fourth: whether the United States accepts the same rule it asks others to obey.
The rule at stake is the Charter’s prohibition on the threat or use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence. In its judgment, delivered on 30 September and 1 October 1946, the Nuremberg Tribunal called aggressive war “the supreme international crime.” Today the prohibition is under strain, including from permanent members of the Security Council. In his brief Restoring Constraint on Aggression, Mark Simonoff cites Russia’s war in Ukraine and Chinese threats against Taiwan. He also argues that the United States has violated Article 2(4) through its war against Iran alongside Israel and its attack on Venezuela and arrest of its president. He records repeated US threats to use force to seize Greenland. These are Simonoff’s legal conclusions, not adjudicated findings. His service at the US Mission to the UN from 2008 to 2025, most recently as its legal adviser, makes this an argument Washington and other governments should address directly.
A standing body on aggression
Simonoff proposes that the General Assembly establish a standing body to address aggression. A cross-regional panel of experts would determine when to investigate. To guard against the selective pursuit Jackson feared, the panel would apply the same published criteria to every state and give reasons for each decision. The body would assemble evidence and case files for possible future prosecutions, recommend economic sanctions and propose barring aggressor states from UN leadership positions. The Assembly’s Syria mechanism offers a limited precedent. Created in 2016 after the Security Council deadlocked over accountability, it collects and analyses evidence and prepares files for future proceedings. It is not a court and cannot prosecute. If the Assembly cannot agree, Simonoff argues, a coalition of states could create a body outside the UN. The design reflects Jackson’s insistence that leaders who use state power to make war must answer for their choices.
What Washington can do
Washington can make a practical difference. It can support an Assembly resolution and ensure that its delegation does not seek to delay or weaken the body’s funding in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, which handles budget questions. Congress, the US legislature, controls federal appropriations and can fund the United States’ assessed contributions to the UN’s regular budget. If the body is funded from that budget, those appropriations would help carry its costs. Congress can also use hearings and war-powers oversight to examine whether American uses of force meet the legal standards Washington invokes abroad. These steps would not compel an administration to support the proposal. They would make clear that accountability applies to the United States as well.
The stakes reach beyond the body itself. The Charter’s restraint on force underpins forms of cooperation from which the United States benefits, including secure trade, public-health surveillance and action on climate. At Davos in January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described the moment as “a rupture, not a transition” and called on middle powers to work together. Carney did not speak of a body on aggression. If Washington declines to support a UN initiative, however, middle powers such as Canada could form the coalition Simonoff describes. Their initiative would be a response to a vacuum and could give Washington a reason to reconsider its position.
The record history will judge
In the same opening address, Jackson warned the victors: “We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.” The charge of victors’ justice cannot be answered by words alone. The country that helped write the rule against aggressive war and carried it into Nuremberg can lead by accepting that the rule applies to itself.
Related articles:
Trust, Not Announcements, Will Bring America Back to the UN (3-minute read)
Reviewing the UN Charter: Diplomatic Groundwork Should Begin (3-minute read)
Washington’s Test Threatens the Next UN Secretary-General’s Independence (3-minute read)