Reviewing the UN Charter: Diplomatic Groundwork Should Begin
Jordan Ryan
November 2, 2026
Image: metamorworks / Shutterstock
Article 109 of the UN Charter provides a mechanism for reviewing the Charter itself. It allows a General Conference of all UN members to be convened by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. As the Article provides, “Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.”
Even if the prospect of amending the Charter is bleak, a review conference could matter. It would give the wider membership a formal forum to set out the changes it seeks and put the five permanent members of the Security Council under public pressure to respond. That political value is reason enough for member states to begin the diplomatic groundwork, despite the formidable obstacles.
Paragraph 3 of Article 109 set a separate, lower threshold for consideration at the General Assembly’s tenth session. If no conference had been held before then, the proposal to call one was to be placed on the Assembly’s agenda, and the conference was to be held if a majority of Assembly members and any seven Security Council members so decided. Acting under that provision in November 1955, the Assembly decided that a review conference “shall be held at an appropriate time,” and the Security Council concurred the following month despite a Soviet vote against. Seventy-one years later, no conference has been held.
The idea has now returned to the diplomatic mainstream. In November 2024 the leaders of Brazil, India and South Africa called for “a wide-ranging reform of the UN Charter, including the convening of a review conference” under Article 109. At the General Assembly this September, Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, told the hall that the Charter, “which is now 81 years old, should also be reviewed.” Advocates grouped in the Article 109 Coalition now present a review conference as the most promising route to structural change.
Recent work published by the Toda Peace Institute and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation on reinventing the United Nations has reached a similar diagnosis. Several of the changes the organisation needs would require Charter amendment: a more representative Security Council, limits on the veto, and a Human Rights Council with the standing of a principal organ. That makes the case for Article 109 worth testing against the strongest objection to it.
That objection sits in the second paragraph of Article 109. Any change the conference recommends takes effect only when two-thirds of members ratify it, “including all the permanent members of the Security Council.” With 193 members, that means 129 ratifications, and every one of the five must be among them. The privilege that reform seeks to constrain thus returns at the moment of decision. Any permanent member could take part in years of negotiation and then decline to ratify the result. Sceptics conclude that a conference would raise expectations it cannot meet and leave multilateralism weaker than before.
That is an exacting rule, and some advocates of review pass over it too quickly. No procedural device removes it. Yet Article 108, which governs ordinary amendments, also requires ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members. The incremental path sceptics prefer offers no escape from the veto; it meets it one proposal at a time.
History suggests that permanent members can change position. In December 1963 the General Assembly adopted amendments that enlarged the Security Council from eleven to fifteen members and the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. France and the Soviet Union voted against, while the United Kingdom and the United States abstained. All five nevertheless ratified, and the amendments entered into force on 31 August 1965. The weight of a membership transformed by decolonisation appears to have altered their calculation. The lesson has limits. Enlarging the Council left the veto untouched, and asking powerful states to surrender privilege is harder than asking them to share a table.
A realistic case for Article 109 therefore has to rest on what a conference can achieve whatever the permanent members decide at the end of the process.
The convening decision itself does not require all five permanent members to assent. Under Article 109(1), a two-thirds majority in the Assembly and votes from any nine Council members can call a conference. The 1955 vote, taken under paragraph 3’s lower thresholds, showed that Soviet opposition did not prevent the Council from concurring. More than 140 of today’s 193 members were not among the 51 states that founded the organisation. A conference would give them a formal voice in reviewing its founding text.
A conference could also generate political commitments that need no Charter ratification. Governments might adopt declarations or agree on interpretations of existing provisions. They could reaffirm Article 27(3), which requires a party to a dispute to abstain from voting on decisions under Chapter VI or paragraph 3 of Article 52, a provision rarely applied in practice. They could build on the General Assembly’s 2022 decision requiring a debate within ten working days after a veto. Such steps would not amend the Charter, but could raise the political cost of obstruction.
The risks run in both directions. Some governments fear that a conference could reopen existing commitments on human rights and gender equality, giving others an opportunity to dilute them. A Charter alteration would require a two-thirds vote in the conference and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent members. Those thresholds would make a regressive amendment difficult to secure, though they would not by themselves prevent non-binding declarations. A careful modalities resolution could define the proposed scope and open the conference by reaffirming the purposes and principles in Articles 1 and 2. Such preparation would take years, which argues for beginning the diplomatic groundwork now.
The strongest argument for Article 109 lies in the alternatives. Security Council reform negotiations have continued since 2009 without agreement on a reform package. Voluntary restraint has not prevented vetoes in the gravest crises. A conference cannot guarantee a revised Charter, but it would give the great majority of states a lawful forum to set out their terms and put each permanent member under pressure to explain its position publicly. The Charter provides this mechanism for review. Member states should decide whether to use it.
Related articles:
Reinventing the United Nations policy brief series (Introduction and eight policy briefs)
At Hammarskjöld’s Grave, Sixty-Five Years After Ndola (3-minute read)
Governing the Ungovernable (3-minute read)
