Preventing and Managing Nuclear Risk in Northeast Asia
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Managing First-Strike Pressures, the Nuclear Taboo, and Proliferation Risks in Northeast Asia (2026)
Northeast Asia faces a convergence of nuclear escalation and proliferation risks more acute and interconnected than at any point since the Cold War. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal, with its commitment to No First Use and a purely retaliatory posture increasingly in question. North Korea has codified a first-use doctrine and continues advancing its delivery capabilities, including its first SSBN. Arms control frameworks are eroding, with New START having expired in February 2026 without a replacement, while erratic signals from Washington raise the risk that China and North Korea may come to doubt US restraint. These first-strike pressures coincide with rising proliferation sentiment in Japan and South Korea, where the election of Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae has reopened questions about Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and South Korean public support for independent nuclear armament remains between 70 and 77 percent.
This joint project from the Toda Peace Institute and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) builds on APLN’s Asia-Pacific Flashpoints research and Toda’s Northeast Asia reassurance clusters to examine three interlocking issues: regional threat perceptions in 2026, the drivers of first-strike pressures and the potential role of No First Use policies, and the erosion of the nuclear taboo. An expert group of 10–12 scholars and practitioners will produce six to eight commissioned papers, convene an in-person workshop in Tokyo from 21–24 September 2026, and deliver a synthesis report with concrete policy recommendations for reinforcing restraint and helping Japan and South Korea preserve their non-nuclear status.
Reports and Policy Briefs for this project will be published following the research phase.
