What Governments Owe the Next Secretary-General
Jordan Ryan
September 24, 2026
Image: UN Secretary-General / Wiki Commons
The Security Council held its third informal poll of candidates on 18 September. Governments expect the next United Nations Secretary-General to lead with independence and courage. They must be prepared to defend that independence when it is challenged. Choosing a strong candidate will achieve little if governments then demand silence, bargain over senior appointments, or withhold the means to act.
This responsibility belongs to every UN member state. Small and middle powers have a particular interest in organising support. They need an international institution whose judgements cannot be dictated by the most powerful capitals. Major powers also benefit from a credible intermediary able to speak with parties they cannot readily reach themselves. An office seen as serving particular governments will struggle to earn that trust.
The starting point is already in the Charter. Article 100 requires the Secretary-General and UN staff to remain independent of governments and commits member states to respect that independence. Governments are entitled to question UN judgements and hold its leadership accountable. They should not seek to make international officials answerable to national capitals.
The distinction matters most when a Secretary-General says something a government does not want to hear. A government can dispute an assessment while defending the Secretary-General’s right to present it. It can disagree with a diplomatic initiative without trying to silence the office. If independence is defended only when the message is welcome, it offers little protection.
Governments should make that protection concrete in three ways.
First, they should give public and diplomatic backing to the Secretary-General’s exercise of independent judgement. When a government tries to silence the office, others should speak up. A joint statement by countries from several regions, reinforced through direct diplomatic engagement, can demonstrate that the Secretary-General is not isolated. Support need not imply agreement with every decision. It should affirm the office’s authority to assess a situation honestly and propose a response.
In October 2024, after Israel declared António Guterres persona non grata and barred his entry, the Security Council affirmed its full support for him and warned that refusing to engage with the Secretary-General was counterproductive. Switzerland, a small state then holding the Council presidency, delivered the statement on behalf of all fifteen members. This was a useful defence of the office by governments with sharply different positions on the conflict. Such backing should extend to practical cooperation with the Secretary-General’s diplomatic efforts.
That support is especially important before a crisis turns violent. Article 99 allows the Secretary-General to bring a possible threat to international peace and security to the Security Council. Governments should take such warnings seriously and consider what action is needed. They should also help envoys gain access to the parties and sustain negotiations when progress is slow. Waiting for universal agreement on the danger can mean losing the opportunity to prevent it.
Second, governments should stop treating senior UN posts as national possessions. Support for a candidate should carry no promise of an appointment in return. Article 101 makes efficiency, competence, and integrity paramount in recruitment, while requiring due regard for geographical diversity. Officials drawn from many countries strengthen the Secretariat, provided they serve the organisation rather than their national governments. The next Secretary-General must be free to choose capable colleagues within the rules established by the General Assembly.
Third, governments should provide the resources and cooperation that independent diplomacy requires. They should pay their mandatory contributions in full and on time and fund the work they authorise. Prevention needs sustained funding even when its results are difficult to demonstrate. Governments should also protect the ability of local peacebuilders and affected communities to give the UN information without fear of retaliation. Independent judgement depends on access to people as well as money.
Governments will not set aside national interests. Some will resist scrutiny; others will hesitate to challenge an ally. Small and middle powers also lean on the Secretariat at times. The case for supporting its independence must therefore rest on a durable interest: preserving an institution that can act fairly when a government’s own security is at stake. A government that helps weaken the office today may need its protection tomorrow.
A coalition of supportive states cannot remove the Security Council veto or compel a major power to cooperate. It can, however, make pressure on the Secretary-General more politically costly, help sustain diplomatic engagement and give other governments confidence to join. Acting together offers more protection than leaving each state to decide whether to object alone.
The Secretary-General has corresponding responsibilities. Whoever holds the office must use the authority available under the Charter, make difficult judgements, and take diplomatic initiatives when warranted. The office’s independence carries a duty to listen, test assumptions, and change course when evidence demands it. Diplomacy requires confidentiality, but governments are owed an honest account of objectives and progress. When an initiative fails, scrutiny should examine both the Secretary-General’s decisions and whether governments provided necessary support.
Small and middle powers from different regions should begin organising this support before the next Secretary-General takes office. They could agree to consult promptly when the office’s independence comes under pressure and to coordinate their diplomatic response. Their credibility would begin with their own conduct on appointments, funding, and cooperation. Participation should remain open to any government willing to uphold the same commitments.
The next Secretary-General will have to earn trust through judgement and results. Governments must give that leadership a fair chance. They cannot reasonably demand an independent Secretary-General while leaving the office undefended when independence is tested.
Related articles:
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century (10-minute read)
At Hammarskjöld’s Grave, Sixty-Five Years After Ndola (3-minute read)
Governing the Ungovernable (3-minute read)
