Policy Briefs

Over centuries, advances in science and technology have made possible new kinds of weapons that often provided an advantage in war. Sometimes qualitative change is so big that one can speak of military-technological revolutions. For about thirty years, the term “revolution in military affairs” has been used for the rise of electronics, sensors, precision weapons, networked communication, combined to a “system of systems”. Now we are on the verge of a more fundamental revolution, characterised by cyber warfare, autonomous weapon systems, general military use of artificial intelligence, with new possibilities in the fields of genetics, of manipulation of the human body and mind, and more wide-spread access to technologies of destruction. Preventing the rush to destabilising technologies requires nothing less than a fundamental re-orientation of the political and military strategies of the main actors.

The EU seems to be at a watershed in its foreign, security and defence policy. A number of broad trends—the migration to Europe, Brexit, the Trump Administration’s “America first” policy, the re-emerged geopolitical rivalry and the Corona crisis—suggest that the EU is confronted with tough decisions to find its role in this changing environment when the multilateral world order is crumbling. The ambition of strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been put in second place by national interests and foreign policy contradictions. Many indicators point in the direction of realpolitik and an intensified military role for the EU. In this process it is essential to design and agree upon a realistic EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, so that the priorities are clear: first the political concept, followed by the necessary civilian and military capacities.

The world order is in a state of flux with, amongst other factors, sovereign states as the new building blocks of international affairs, trade and technology wars at the top of the international agenda, and a tense relationship between the US and China. Such a world does not leave many options for cooperative action. In the military field, states have returned to unilateral security policies as primitive as those of the Cold War. There is one overriding common concern, however—to avoid nuclear war. To this end, stability measures are of the essence. In such a turbulent world, where big powers compete for positions and influence in the face of an unpredictable future, what are the prospects, if any, for cooperative security policies, arms control, and disarmament?

In 2020, we live in a reality where arms control, rather than being seen as sacrosanct, has been reduced by some experts to “nuclear identity politics” while others claim that it is “practically exhausted”. Disconcerting as these sentiments may be, they contain a kernel of truth. Arms control in 2020 is still oriented to realities of the past. But if the arms race spirals into full force, it is humans who will be the losers. Hence, it is unhelpful to dismiss arms control as an obsolete manifestation of Cold War nightmares. But it is time for an update to address new global challenges, in particular quickly evolving geopolitical realities and emerging technologies. Furthermore, the silos in the debate on arms control need to be overcome.

Until very recently, China has been seen as an important and constructive force in the crisis management in South Asia in the event of an India-Pakistan military crisis. However, due to the shifting power balance in the region and the trilateral interactions between China, the United States and India, this view has become increasingly challenged. China’s Belt and Road investments and infrastructure development is also likely to draw it into third-party crisis management. Although China is interested in preventing a nuclear war, its interest in crisis management is constantly subject to its definition of its national interest in the changing regional power balance and great power dynamics. With the deteriorating U.S.-China relations and great power competition, China’s instinct is to preserve its strategic leverage. In addition, with the border skirmishes between China and India continuing to flare up, China itself might become a party to the regional conflict.