The G7 summit of foreign ministers in Japan in mid-April sought to emphasise the need for a unified China policy. However, the diplomatic pronouncements can only gloss over the internal contradictions, but not eliminate them.

The strategic landscape of the Middle East is changing rapidly, but not in favour of the United States as the traditional powerful actor in the region. Continued adversarial US–Iranian relations and regional Arab states’ growing concerns about Washington’s reliability as an ally have widened the arena for Russia and China to expand their strategic footprints in the region.

Whatever the flag, Washington would not sell nuclear-powered boats unless it could count on them in war over Taiwan.

In China-brokered talks, the two oil-rich and rival states of Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year split. Although the two sides need much confidence-building, their rapprochement carries the potential to change the regional geopolitical landscape at the cost of concerns for policy hawks in the US and Israel.

In the shadow of two major geopolitical crises, the competition between China and the USA in the Pacific and the Ukraine war in Europe, a showdown between India and China is taking place in the Himalayas. The two most populous countries in the world have not been able to agree on a common border in the Himalayas for more than six decades. There are often dangerous military skirmishes, with the risk that the conflict will spiral out of control.

In the Ukraine war, both sides are escalating verbally and militarily. To achieve what? To de-escalate, win or freeze the war, create a strong position for negotiations? When is the time ripe for negotiations and are there proven conflict resolution patterns that are relevant for an end to the war?