The following is a brief overview of the nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of the proposal for Australia to build and operate nuclear-powered submarines.

The announcements of Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines have rightly underlined that the project is about the acquisition of a power source and not nuclear weapons and that Australia remains committed to the highest standards for safeguards to ensure non-proliferation, safety and security of nuclear material and technology.

After first suffering a seeming “brain snap” to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) some years back; at long last Australia has been promised a fleet of eight SSNs by the Biden administration under the newly minted and awkwardly named AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom and United States) alliance against China.

Time is ripe for initiatives to reduce global military spending. Global military expenditures are at record levels. The current pandemic is a stark reminder of the financial resources needed to prevent and meet future crises.

On the 71st anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the first time, a global treaty is in force outlawing the bomb. Last month, I completed and dispatched to the publisher an edited book on the nuclear ban treaty (or the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as it’s officially called) with contributions from many familiar people in academia, think tanks, foreign ministries and civil society.

With the advance of algorithmic technologies, the international legal regulation of fully autonomous weapons systems has risen up the international security and humanitarian agenda in recent years. But calls for the outright prohibition of such systems seem both premature and destined to fail.