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Latest Policy Briefs and Reports
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament Peace and Security in Northeast Asia
A Practical Approach to North Korea for the Next US President
Policy Brief No.96 - October, 2020 • By Joseph Yun and Frank Aum2
After three years of an erratic approach to North Korea, the Trump administration has made little progress in reducing the nuclear threat and enhancing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The Kim Jong Un regime not only maintains its stockpile of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but these capabilities have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. The next US president will have to address this grave situation. This Policy Brief examines what might work and outlines four steps on a practical path to building a new framework for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. This article was first published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/a-practical-approach-to-north-korea-for-the-next-us-president/
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
Emerging Technologies Challenge International Humanitarian Law: Mapping the Issues
Policy Brief No.95 - October, 2020 • By Kimiaki Kawai
The shared understanding of the rules and the premise of International Humanitarian Law is challenged by the accelerated development of new military technologies. Is the existing IHL framework robust enough to protect civilians, combatants and the environment in the face of new military technologies? The judicial remedy of IHL is oriented to the past in the sense that its main task is to resolve cases that have already occurred. Therefore, it also tends to ex post relief, as is typical for paying “compensation” for damages. The challenge posed is to address the questions about what may happen in a risk society today. This paper addresses the question of how existing and emerging technologies impact IHL rules in order to consider how legal challenges posed will be responded to in the future.
Climate Change and Security: Perspectives from India
Policy Brief No.94 - October, 2020 • By Robert Mizo
While there is no empirical evidence yet to prove that climate change can cause conflict among and within states, there is an increasing agreement among scholars that it can aggravate existing security challenges. India’s future security in a changed climate scenario is uncertain. Tangible alteration in its climatic variables relating to temperature, sea level, and extreme weather phenomena will have far-reaching security implications. The paper seeks to analyse a range of challenges and investigate the state’s efforts to mainstream and factor in climate change within India’s larger security narrative. The paper concludes with key policy considerations to help make India better prepared to deal with the onslaught of climate change impacts before it is too late.
Social Media, Technology and Peacebuilding
25 Spheres of Digital Peacebuilding and PeaceTech
Policy Brief No.93 - September, 2020 • By Lisa Schirch
This policy brief outlines twenty-fives spheres where technology can contribute to peacebuilding goals and describes five generations of thinking related to the evolution of technology’s impact on peacebuilding. Digital peacebuilding contributes to democratic deliberation, violence prevention, social cohesion, civic engagement and improved human security. Digital peacebuilding contributes to the wider field of digital citizenship and “tech for good.” The policy brief concludes with seven recommendations to build social cohesion, civic engagement and improved human security, which emerged out of a recent Peace Direct global consultation and a Toda Peace Institute workshop.
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
On Creating the TPNW Verification System
Policy Brief No.92 - September, 2020 • By Thomas E. Shea
This Policy Brief explores the anticipated role of the TPNW verification system in the emerging international nuclear disarmament regime, which will determine whether or not the Treaty will be successful in addressing the risks posed by nuclear weapons and in achieving progress on nuclear disarmament. It argues in favour of creating a new verification authority responsible only to the TPNW Parties to address the elimination of the existing arsenals, complementing the verification missions assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA) in the text of the Treaty. The author presents a possible framework, methods and techniques to meet the three verification requirements noted.