Policy Briefs on Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament

For the better part of a year, diplomats from more than 180 countries have been feuding over the appointment of the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) located in Vienna, alongside the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Together with the IAEA, the CTBTO contributes to preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and furthering nuclear disarmament. It is too important an organisation to be left to the whims of feuding States or quarrelling diplomats.

At the 2010 NPT Review Conference State parties agreed by consensus to express their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons". In the following years, non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society representatives focused increasingly on the humanitarian impact and the risks associated with nuclear weapons in what became known as the Humanitarian Initiative. The latest iteration of the initiative’s joint statement in 2015 has been subscribed to by 159 States. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) builds on the Humanitarian Initiative. This policy brief outlines the rationale of the Humanitarian Initiative which underpins the TPNW and responds to the counternarratives and critiques against the TPNW presented by nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-umbrella states.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 22 January 2021. So far, the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear umbrella states have dismissed its significance, but there are signs of dissent in the chorus of rejection. In the light of these developments, the Toda Peace Institute and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) convened an online meeting of experts and policymakers to discuss the way ahead for the Treaty. This policy briefs reports on that discussion which examined the role of nuclear allies, the scope for building a regime of verification measures around the TPNW, and whether the differences between TPNW supporters and nuclear weapons and umbrella states are best met by bridge building or by contentious engagement.

Russia’s assessment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) seems grosso modo similar to the approaches of other opponents to this endeavour. Moscow is by no means a leader in forging the common front against the nuclear ban; however, to a certain extent, Russia puts forward its arguments even more consistently. This Policy Brief explores four clusters of arguments against the TPNW, and the options open to Russia as the TPNW comes into force. Is there an opportunity for Russia to play a constructive role in the nuclear-weapons debate?

Belgium is a small country and a military minnow, but it is the only NATO member state to recognise the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). For a number of reasons it would be wrong to conclude that this country’s actions—or inaction—with respect to the TPNW are irrelevant for the Atlantic Alliance. In this Policy Brief, Jorge Hersschens considers the pioneering role that Belgium has taken historically on nuclear issues and what this might mean for its future stance on the TPNW.