Policy Briefs on Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament

This Policy Brief discusses Russia’s assessment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which seems grosso modo similar to the approaches of other opponents to this endeavour. Moscow is by no means a leader in forging the common front against the nuclear ban; however, to a certain extent, Russia puts forward its arguments even more consistently. This Policy Brief explores four clusters of arguments against the TPNW, and the options open to Russia as the TPNW comes into force. Is there an opportunity for Russia to play a constructive role in the nuclear-weapons debate?

In this Policy Brief, Jorge Hersschens considers the pioneering role that Belgium has taken historically on nuclear issues and what this might mean for its future stance on the TPNW. Belgium is a small country and a military minnow, but it is the only NATO member state to recognise the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). For a number of reasons it would be wrong to conclude that this country’s actions—or inaction—with respect to the TPNW are irrelevant for the Atlantic Alliance.

On 21 September 2020, 56 former leaders of 22 umbrella states published an open letter in support of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW or the Ban Treaty). The Treaty obliges member states to never, under any circumstance, assist or encourage use, threats of use or possession of nuclear weapons. The fact that so many leaders were ready to support such a radical departure so shortly after leaving government suggests that they had developed a certain restiveness and discomfort with the state of affairs during their time in office. Now, with the NPT in miserable shape and the TPNW about to come into force in January, it is hoped that the wrangling between the respective treaty supporters will calm down and enable a new consensus on the normative basis for non-proliferation and disarmament.

After three years of an erratic approach to North Korea, the Trump administration has made little progress in reducing the nuclear threat and enhancing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The Kim Jong Un regime not only maintains its stockpile of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but these capabilities have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. The next US president will have to address this grave situation. This Policy Brief examines what might work and outlines four steps on a practical path to building a new framework for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. This article was first published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/a-practical-approach-to-north-korea-for-the-next-us-president/

The shared understanding of the rules and the premise of International Humanitarian Law is challenged by the accelerated development of new military technologies. Is the existing IHL framework robust enough to protect civilians, combatants and the environment in the face of new military technologies? The judicial remedy of IHL is oriented to the past in the sense that its main task is to resolve cases that have already occurred. Therefore, it also tends to ex post relief, as is typical for paying “compensation” for damages. The challenge posed is to address the questions about what may happen in a risk society today. This paper addresses the question of how existing and emerging technologies impact IHL rules in order to consider how legal challenges posed will be responded to in the future.