Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
Stop Muddying the Waters on the Appointment of the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO
Policy Brief No.109 - May, 2021 • By Tariq Rauf
This Policy Brief examines the controversy surrounding the election of the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). For the better part of a year, diplomats from more than 180 countries have been feuding over this appointment. Together with the IAEA, the CTBTO contributes to preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and furthering nuclear disarmament. It is too important an organisation to be left to the whims of feuding States or quarrelling diplomats.
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
The Humanitarian Initiative and the TPNW
Policy Brief No.104 - February, 2021 • By Alexander Kmentt
This policy brief outlines the rationale of the Humanitarian Initiative which underpins the TPNW and responds to the counternarratives and critiques against the TPNW presented by nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-umbrella states. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference State parties agreed by consensus to express their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons". In the following years, non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society representatives focused increasingly on the humanitarian impact and the risks associated with nuclear weapons in what became known as the Humanitarian Initiative. The latest iteration of the initiative’s joint statement in 2015 has been subscribed to by 159 States. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) builds on the Humanitarian Initiative.
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
Where Next for the TPNW?
Summary Report No.101 - January, 2021 • By Hugh Miall
This is a summary report of an online meeting of experts and policymakers, convened by the Toda Peace Institute and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), to discuss the way ahead for the TPNW. The discussion examined the role of nuclear allies, the scope for building a regime of verification measures around the TPNW, and whether the differences between TPNW supporters and nuclear weapons and umbrella states are best met by bridge building or by contentious engagement.The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 22 January 2021. So far, the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear umbrella states have dismissed its significance, but there are signs of dissent in the chorus of rejection.
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
The TPNW: Russia’s Perspectives
Policy Brief No.100 - January, 2021 • By Vladimir Baranovsky
This Policy Brief discusses Russia’s assessment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which seems grosso modo similar to the approaches of other opponents to this endeavour. Moscow is by no means a leader in forging the common front against the nuclear ban; however, to a certain extent, Russia puts forward its arguments even more consistently. This Policy Brief explores four clusters of arguments against the TPNW, and the options open to Russia as the TPNW comes into force. Is there an opportunity for Russia to play a constructive role in the nuclear-weapons debate?
Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament
The Nuclear Ban Treaty is a Fact
Policy Brief No.99 - January, 2021 • By Jorge Hersschens
In this Policy Brief, Jorge Hersschens considers the pioneering role that Belgium has taken historically on nuclear issues and what this might mean for its future stance on the TPNW. Belgium is a small country and a military minnow, but it is the only NATO member state to recognise the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). For a number of reasons it would be wrong to conclude that this country’s actions—or inaction—with respect to the TPNW are irrelevant for the Atlantic Alliance.