Policy Briefs on Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament

This is a summary report of an online meeting of experts and policymakers, convened by the Toda Peace Institute and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), to discuss the way ahead for the TPNW. The discussion examined the role of nuclear allies, the scope for building a regime of verification measures around the TPNW, and whether the differences between TPNW supporters and nuclear weapons and umbrella states are best met by bridge building or by contentious engagement.The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 22 January 2021. So far, the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear umbrella states have dismissed its significance, but there are signs of dissent in the chorus of rejection. 

This Policy Brief discusses Russia’s assessment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which seems grosso modo similar to the approaches of other opponents to this endeavour. Moscow is by no means a leader in forging the common front against the nuclear ban; however, to a certain extent, Russia puts forward its arguments even more consistently. This Policy Brief explores four clusters of arguments against the TPNW, and the options open to Russia as the TPNW comes into force. Is there an opportunity for Russia to play a constructive role in the nuclear-weapons debate?

In this Policy Brief, Jorge Hersschens considers the pioneering role that Belgium has taken historically on nuclear issues and what this might mean for its future stance on the TPNW. Belgium is a small country and a military minnow, but it is the only NATO member state to recognise the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). For a number of reasons it would be wrong to conclude that this country’s actions—or inaction—with respect to the TPNW are irrelevant for the Atlantic Alliance.

On 21 September 2020, 56 former leaders of 22 umbrella states published an open letter in support of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW or the Ban Treaty). The Treaty obliges member states to never, under any circumstance, assist or encourage use, threats of use or possession of nuclear weapons. The fact that so many leaders were ready to support such a radical departure so shortly after leaving government suggests that they had developed a certain restiveness and discomfort with the state of affairs during their time in office. Now, with the NPT in miserable shape and the TPNW about to come into force in January, it is hoped that the wrangling between the respective treaty supporters will calm down and enable a new consensus on the normative basis for non-proliferation and disarmament.

After three years of an erratic approach to North Korea, the Trump administration has made little progress in reducing the nuclear threat and enhancing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The Kim Jong Un regime not only maintains its stockpile of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but these capabilities have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. The next US president will have to address this grave situation. This Policy Brief examines what might work and outlines four steps on a practical path to building a new framework for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. This article was first published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/a-practical-approach-to-north-korea-for-the-next-us-president/