Policy Briefs on Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament

This policy brief argues that the first standalone arms control white paper released by China in two decades positions China less as a participant in traditional arms-reduction frameworks and more as a rule-shaper in future security governance. The document signals a more assertive Chinese approach to arms control, combining long-standing principles such as no-first-use and UN-centred multilateralism with an expanded focus on emerging domains including artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and outer space. The brief assesses the implications of China’s approach for regional stability and outlines practical options for governments, international organisations, and civil society to engage China on arms control while mitigating escalation risks.

This report asks how the European security order could be imagined once the fighting in Ukraine has stopped and aims to show that there are alternative and more inclusive scenarios. The end of the Ukraine–Russian war could be a historical turning point. Such moments in history open up the possibility to try to do things better than before. The first part of this paper describes the differences between two fundamentally different types of security constellation: balance of power and collective security. The second part asks, what would a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia look like? The third part addresses the questions, what would the post-war security constellation in Europe be? What role is left for NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the EU? Where would Ukraine fit in? And what about Russia?

This report discusses the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war. To end suffering and destruction in Ukraine it is necessary to stop this war. Pathways to peace are urgently required. So far, several proposals and negotiations have not led to any viable result. In Western Europe and the Ukraine there is great scepticism about the type of negotiations that the US administration orchestrates. The report analyses four possible scenarios: (1) Russia’s military victory, (2) War without end, (3) Escalation, both horizontal and vertical escalation, and (4) Successful negotiations. One intervening factor may be the state of Russia’s War Economy. Can Russia's economy continue to bear the burdens of this war?

This is the Summary Report of a conference convened by Toda Peace Institute against the backdrop of the American–Russian relationship—and with it the nuclear arms control regime—which is in tatters, existing agreements such as New START set to expire in February 2026 and no concrete follow-up on the horizon. There are proliferation concerns from North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere, while debates over non-nuclear postures in Europe and Asia increasingly threaten the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Meanwhile, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reflects the ongoing desire for a nuclear-free world but also highlights the lack of progress on long-standing promises. The conference aimed to explore preconditions for incremental progress in arms control, risk reduction, and confidence-building measures, and identify potential entry points for innovative global, regional, or national initiatives.

This report discusses the US’ audacious actions in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 which could be considered a full-frontal challenge to the Westphalian world. The author explains why the US action deserves one, but only one of the traditional three cheers; an amber warning light instead of the second cheer; and possibly even a jeer as the final reaction. Based on the three-part argument, the report concludes by raising the possibility that the US coup in Venezuela might have driven the final nail in the coffin of the liberal international order.