Policy Briefs on Cooperative Security, Arms Control and Disarmament

This report examines the fall of the House of Assad—a regime built on terror, ruled by fear and sustained by foreign and proxy forces—which can be traced back to Hamas’s attacks on southern Israel more than a year ago. Except that instead of a Free Palestine, a Free Syria has come into being. It raises the puzzle: how does one impress upon nationalistically inflamed consciousness the enormous disparity between the goals sought, the means used and the results obtained? The second part of the article references the same discrepancy of goals, means and outcomes as a note of caution against the first instinct to euphoria over the downfall of the much-hated Assads. The third and fourth sections look at the implications for regional and global actors with significant footprints in Syria.

This report posits that the combination of emerging and disruptive technologies and strategic conventional weapons may have a revolutionary impact on the future of nuclear weapons. While emerging and disruptive technologies may yield additional arguments to keep relying on nuclear weapons to defend against them, they are often regarded as destabilizing for the global nuclear order, which makes it more likely that nuclear deterrence will fail and nuclear weapons will be used. At the same time, strategic conventional weapon systems (including hypersonic missiles) have deterrence characteristics comparable to nuclear weapons.  Because they could be used in a way that at least seeks to comply with jus in bello principles, by minimizing civilian harm (in comparison with nuclear weapons), they are also more credible as a deterrent. This may in turn increase political willingness to seriously consider fully delegitimizing nuclear weapons, and eventually replacing them with the default option: modern conventional weapons.

This Policy Brief provides a distillation of a recent Small Arms Survey report that examines the Arms Trade Treaty (2013) in relation to the Indo-Pacific region. The report focuses on the different attitudes of states in the Indo-Pacific toward the Treaty: it explores how armament dynamics in this region shape states’ perceptions when defining their own security requirements and attitudes toward an instrument that aims to regulate the conventional arms trade. Further, it identifies the main challenges and obstacles to ATT universalisation and compliance in the Indo-Pacific region, and provides insights into opportunities for enhanced engagement with the Treaty by the states in the region.

This report examines the dyadic relationships between the big three in BRICS - China, India and Russia. The XVI. BRICS summit was chaired by Russia in Kazan from October 22 to 24. Over 30 countries expressed an interest in joining the present nine members of BRICS. It can be expected that additional countries will soon join the group. What does this mean for the future of BRICS? Will BRICS become the new voice of the Global South? Or will it remain a loose grouping, a “negating coalition”, that has consensus about what to reject but that lacks a vision? This report argues that rivalries and conflicts among the big three in BRICS (China, India and Russia) prevent a homogenous global governance approach, although the international influence of BRICS is likely to keep growing.

The report addresses what has worked and what is the way forward for the disarmament machinery, when faced with the grim reality that it has been and continues to be undermined by geo-political and economic agendas. For the diplomat or advocate wanting to see progress on disarmament and arms control at this moment, what can be done? Are there routes around the rule of consensus? How can we refocus on protecting civilians and ensure that work in multilateral fora does not replicate a debating society, but instead has an impact on the ground?