Peace and Security in Northeast Asia By Daiju Wada | 26 August, 2025
Why Is Support for Ishiba Administration Rising Despite Crushing Defeat in the July National Election?

Image: Government of Japan / Wiki Commons
In the July 20, 2025, House of Councillors election, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured 39 of the 52 contested seats but lost 13 seats compared to the previous election, marking a historic defeat. Meanwhile, the emerging conservative Sanseito Party made significant gains, increasing its seats from one to 14, and the Japan Conservative Party debuted in national politics with two seats. Post-election, the prevailing view in Japan, particularly among young people, was that the LDP was increasingly seen as representing entrenched interests, with economically frustrated and angry youth casting their votes for new political forces.
However, a month later, a significant contradiction has emerged. For instance, a nationwide opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on August 16 and 17 asked whether Prime Minister Ishiba should resign in light of the July election results. Only 36% responded that he ‘should resign’ (down from 41% in the July survey), while 54% (up from 47%) said ‘there’s no need for that’, with a majority supporting the continuation of the Ishiba administration. Furthermore, the administration’s approval rating rose to 36% from 29% in the previous survey, approaching the 40% recorded in February this year. Although the disapproval rating remains above 50%, it has decreased from 56% to 50%. What lies behind this trend? Here, we explore three key factors.
Stability in diplomacy and security and international recognition
One major factor in the recovery of the Ishiba administration’s approval rating is its steady stance in diplomacy and security, coupled with international recognition. Prime Minister Ishiba has long been known as a politician well-versed in defense policy, and even amidst domestic political instability following the election, he has demonstrated solid diplomatic moves. For example, during the Japan–US summit in February 2025, Ishiba reaffirmed the strengthening of the Japan–US alliance and the regional security framework, particularly clarifying a firm stance against China and Russia, earning positive evaluations both domestically and internationally. Additionally, in August, during a strategic dialogue with German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas hosted by Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, Ishiba emphasized the promotion of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. These efforts have maintained Japan’s standing in the international community and provided reassurance to conservative voters and those concerned with security issues. Following the LDP’s significant defeat in the election, concerns about political instability arose, but Ishiba’s consistent diplomacy may have been perceived as ‘proof of leadership’. While economic dissatisfaction among young people fueled support for new political forces, it is speculated that the perception of ‘diplomatic stability’ among middle-aged and older voters has boosted approval ratings. Moreover, there may be a psychological factor at play among some citizens: if the Ishiba administration were to dissolve, it could expose Japan’s political instability to the Trump administration, potentially undermining the foundation of Japan’s security.
Recently, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited Japan for the first time and held talks with Prime Minister Ishiba. The two leaders agreed that both sides would make efforts to continue building a constructive and functional Japan–Korea relationship. However, President Lee had repeatedly voiced criticism of Japan prior to the presidential election. If, instead of Prime Minister Ishiba, a figure with a stronger conservative stance such as one from the Sanseito party were in office, today’s stable Japan–Korea relations might face the risk of regression. This also suggests that, even as the Liberal Democratic Party has suffered a significant loss of seats, the Ishiba administration’s balanced diplomacy continues to demonstrate its effectiveness.
Expectations for economic policy and budget achievements
Economic dissatisfaction was a key factor in the LDP’s defeat in the House of Councillors election, but swift post-election responses have contributed to the recovery of approval ratings. The 2025 budget proposal, passed by the House of Representatives in early March with cooperation from the opposition Japan Innovation Party, was ensured to take effect within the fiscal year. Notably, policies such as free high school education aimed at young people and the middle class have raised expectations for reduced economic burdens. The LDP also signaled a response to the ‘1.03-million-yen income tax threshold’ issue raised by the Democratic Party for the People, demonstrating a commitment to tax reform. As a result, some young and middle-class voters may have begun to view the LDP as ‘taking steps toward reform’. The election loss reflected support for new forces advocating the dismantling of entrenched interests, but the passage of the budget and concrete policy measures have partially restored the LDP’s image as a ‘realistic option’. It is likely that some of those frustrated with the economy have shifted back to the LDP’s pragmatic approach, favouring it over the more radical proposals of the Sanseito Party or Japan Conservative Party, contributing to the rise in approval ratings.
Pragmatic judgment for continuation and the ‘underdog sympathy’ phenomenon
Following the significant defeat in the House of Councillors election, pressure for Ishiba’s resignation intensified, but a majority of citizens now believe he ‘should not resign’. This shift is driven by pragmatic assessments of the political situation and an emotional ‘underdog sympathy’ phenomenon. The LDP lost its majority in both the House of Representatives and House of Councillors elections, making governance difficult without opposition cooperation. However, the leading opposition Constitutional Democratic Party, as well as emerging forces like the Sanseito Party and Japan Conservative Party, are widely seen as lacking the policy direction or organizational strength to assume power. Additionally, further fragmentation among opposition parties is a possibility. As a result, many citizens have concluded that ‘there is no realistic alternative to the Ishiba administration’, strengthening support for its continuation. Furthermore, despite the major defeat, concerns that ‘forcing Ishiba to resign would further destabilize domestic politics’ have also played a role. Movements such as the ‘Don’t Resign, Ishiba’ campaign on X and pro-continuation demonstrations in front of the Prime Minister’s Office suggest that some citizens feel empathy for the ‘underdog’. This emotional factor likely contributed to the short-term recovery of approval ratings.
Conclusion
The rise in the Ishiba administration’s approval rating, despite the headwinds of its significant defeat in the House of Councillors election, may seem contradictory, but it is underpinned by stability in diplomacy and security, pragmatic economic policy responses, and a combination of rational judgment and emotional empathy among citizens. Diplomatically, the strengthening of the Japan–US alliance and international recognition have reassured conservative voters, while economically, the passage of the budget and expectations for tax reform have regained some support from young and middle-class voters. Additionally, the lack of viable alternatives for a government change and the underdog sympathy phenomenon have bolstered support for continuation. However, with disapproval ratings still high and the rise of new political forces indicating persistent dissatisfaction with the LDP, the Ishiba administration must continue to deliver tangible economic reforms and diplomatic achievements to sustain this recovery in approval ratings.
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Daiju Wada is an international political scientist, and President & CEO of Strategic Intelligence Inc. He is a Lecturer at Seiwa University. His areas of expertise include international security studies, economic security, and geopolitical risk analysis..