Undoing North Korea's Nuclear Program: Iran is not a Blueprint

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Pyongyang sends mixed signals: It is open to talks – under the condition that the US withdraws its demands to denuclearize.

A trilateral dialogue is currently taking place between the United States and South and North Korea. While the governments are not negotiating with each other, Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang are signalling their willingness to resume serious talks, albeit with reservations from Pyongyang. The immediate trigger is the likely visit of President Donald Trump to Japan and Korea before the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, which will take place from October 31 to November 1 in Gyeongju, South Korea.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is open to meet with Donald Trump. Kim has "good memories" of the talks in 2018 and 2019, although the three meetings between Trump and Kim ended without results. During the visit of new South Korean president Lee Jae-Myung to the White House in late August, Trump said: "I look forward to meeting with Kim Jong-un in the appropriate future."

Is a surprising turnaround in the barely existing US–North Korea relations imminent? Or even an inter-Korean thaw?

Mixed Signals from Pyongyang

North Korea rejected President Lee’s call for inter-Korean dialogue at the end of July, despite the new Seoul government's efforts to reverse the confrontational policies of the previous administration. Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of the North Korean dictator, stated: “No matter what policy is adopted and whatever proposal is made in Seoul, we have no interest in it and there is neither the reason to meet nor the issue to be discussed with the ROK” (Republic of Korea). President Lee nevertheless renewed his offer during the UN General Assembly in September 2025, speaking of an E.N.D. initiative. The acronym stands for Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization.

In this complex regional situation, Japan could be the ‘spoiler’, because much to North Korea's irritation, Japan repeatedly cites the solution to the problem of the abduction of Japanese nationals decades ago as a precondition for a Japanese–North Korean summit.

It remains unclear whether Trump and Kim Jong-un will meet. It is unlikely that Kim will attend the APEC meeting, especially since North Korea is not a member of APEC and neither has Kim received an invitation from Seoul. However, Pyongyang's strongman signalled a willingness to talk if the US stops insisting on dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. On September 21, Kim told North Korea's parliament: “I affirm that there will never, never be denuclearization for us,” but that the North is interested in discussing "genuine peaceful coexistence." Apparently, the nuclear weapons program is irreversible for North Korea and not tradable for sanctions relief.

The future of North Korea's nuclear program is the key disagreement between the United States and North Korea. For roughly four decades, since long before North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, successive US presidents have attempted to persuade North Korea to denuclearize, primarily through economic sanctions but also through negotiations. Trump was the first president to negotiate at the level of heads of government, albeit unsuccessfully. For the United States, North Korea's renunciation of nuclear weapons has so far been a sine qua non. North Korea, on the other hand, views its nuclear weapons and missile program as the regime's life insurance.

Crumbling foundation of US North Korea policy

Whether or not a Trump-Kim summit takes place soon, the US government has every reason to rethink its North Korea policy. Since the 1990s, US policy toward North Korea has been based on three pillars: first, to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs; second, to isolate North Korea internationally and force it to cooperate through economic sanctions; and third, to prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea through a credible strategy of defence and deterrence.

These foundations of US North Korea policy are crumbling. The first two axioms of US policy de facto no longer exist. According to expert estimates, North Korea possesses approximately 50 nuclear warheads and enriched material for additional warheads. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently indicated that North Korea is building new facilities to produce additional nuclear weapons-grade material. In recent years, North Korea has regularly tested different types of missiles successfully, especially ballistic missiles that could reach Japan and even the US. Unlike in the first half of the 2000s, when North Korea agreed to negotiations about denuclearization, the government now has a militarily credible, operational nuclear and missile program and, citing the fate of the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs, considers this a matter of existential importance.

The second pillar of the US North Korea policy, North Korea's international isolation, is also being called into question. For decades, Russia and China have agreed to harsh sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations. Today, we are witnessing increasing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. North Korea has sent soldiers who were used as cannon fodder in the war against Ukraine. In return, Russia provides military technology and economic aid to modernize the North Korean armed forces and bridge supply bottlenecks. This kind of a "coalition of the sanctioned" gives Kim Jong-un room for manoeuvre in possible negotiations and leeway to demonstrate disinterest in South Korean peace initiatives. China’s benevolent approach has strengthened North Korea’s geopolitical position.

The third pillar of the US North Korea policy, credible deterrence, still exists. But President Trump has made it clear to South Korea, as he did to the European NATO countries, that South Korea is responsible for its own security. The US is still militarily engaged in South Korea and, much to North Korea's annoyance, regularly conducts large-scale military exercises. How long this alliance will last remains to be seen. But in its fixation on competing effectively against China, the US is dependent on allies in Asia.

North Korea is not Iran

The US does possess the military capability to attack North Korea's nuclear facilities, but the risks of such an attack are incalculable. Bombing the North Korean nuclear complex was already considered and rejected by the Clinton administration before 1994. At the time, it was estimated that one million people would die in North and South Korea, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans. Aside from the international legal concerns about such an approach, military reasons speak against the use of conventional or even nuclear weapons. The Bush administration adopted a hardline strategy against North Korea. It considered military options but never seriously pursued a pre-emptive attack on their nuclear facilities, because there was no guarantee to disable all North Korea's nuclear facilities.

Following the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities by American fighter jets in June 2025, a dispute erupted over the extent to which the facilities had been completely destroyed. Doubts about the long-term deactivation of the capacities are justified. North Korea's nuclear facilities are even more difficult to attack because they are more heavily fortified and more widely dispersed than in Iran. Furthermore, there is the high political and military risk that a US military strike would trigger a second Korean War. Thus, the option of destroying the nuclear potential by military means could prove very costly.

Given the new geopolitical situation, North Korea is in a better negotiating position than it was at the failed Trump–Kim summit in Hanoi in 2019. The US should therefore consider denuclearization to be hardly feasible at present. North Korea is now a de facto nuclear power. It would make sense to concentrate on persuading North Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), (which it left in 2003), including all on-site verification measures stipulated by the treaty. This boils down to conflict management and requires cooperation from Russia and China, which is not easily achieved. Although the Chinese government is sympathetic to North Korea, for decades it has been interested in ending the North Korean nuclear program. China, too, is concerned about nuclear proliferation in Asia. A freeze on the North Korean nuclear program could potentially be part of a US–China bargain. Such an approach could potentially prevent further nuclear proliferation in Asia.

But Trump's favoured strategy of a personalized foreign policy and emotional diplomacy ("I like Kim") is unlikely to produce any results different to the three summits in 2018 and 2019.

Herbert Wulf visited North Korea several times in the 1990s and 2000s on behalf of the UN Development Programme.

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Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.