Towards a Eurobomb: The Costs of Nuclear Sovereignty

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This article was first published in Anadolu Ajansi on 11 March 2025 and is republished with permission.

Instead of investing in weapons of mass destruction, making EU defence more efficient should be the priority as well as integrating Russia into a larger collective security organization

The Trump administration’s recent isolationist statements, amid the talks of war in Europe, have revived discussions on Europeanizing French (and possibly British) nuclear weapons. After 75 years of NATO, concerns over US abandonment are increasingly shaping European foreign policy discussions. In the past, the French idea of a "dissuasion concertée” (concerted deterrence) was mostly met with silence, especially in Germany. This time around the conservative leader Friedrich Merz seems in favour despite the fact that NATO is still alive and the US still has 100,000 soldiers and 100 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons are stationed in Türkiye, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. If the soldiers or the tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn, the odds are that the Europeanization of the French (and maybe British) nuclear weapons in one way or another may indeed become reality.

There are different scenarios imaginable. The first step is for European nuclear states to declare that their "national interests" align with "European interests," a principle already reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. The latter, by the way, also contains a collective defence clause similar to NATO’s Article 5. Further steps could be imagined to make these statements more credible: information exchange, consultation, joint planning, joint exercises, and co-financing. Another step could involve deploying French dual-capable aircraft in Germany or Poland. A final step would be the creation of an EU nuclear bomb in a European Defense Union (EDU). It remains, however, still to be seen how the Ukraine war will accelerate the pace towards such an EDU.

What are the costs of Europeanization of nuclear weapons?

First of all, the assumption that nuclear deterrence works is uncertain. Advocates of nuclear weapons believe that it works. They forget that in history many nuclear weapon states (including Israel, India, the UK) have been attacked by non-nuclear weapon states. In theory, it is very hard to make it work as it assumes for instance a rational enemy. It also assumes that the possessor is really prepared to use them. However, if used on a massive scale, it means the annihilation of the planet. In the war in Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron for that reason stated that even if Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, France would not retaliate with nuclear weapons.

Secondly, emerging and disruptive technologies (like AI) and weapon systems (like hypersonic missiles) will further undermine the so-called nuclear stability. Ideally, conventional deterrence (using hypersonic missiles) could and should replace nuclear deterrence on the condition that all nuclear states agree.

Thirdly, extended nuclear deterrence, read the atomic umbrella, is even more incredible. As early as the 1970s, Henry Kissinger cautioned Europeans against assuming that the US would employ nuclear weapons for their defence. That is also the reason why France did not want to shelter under the US umbrella, and why it built its own nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. Ironically, France now offers its umbrella to its European partners.

Fourthly, as long as there is no EDU, the question will be whose finger will be on the button. Macron is very clear: it will be his finger. The question then becomes whether German taxpayers would be interested in co-financing a strategic weapon system that they cannot control in times of war.

Fifthly, by Europeanizing the French nuclear weapons, the EU legitimizes nuclear weapons. This complicates the fight against proliferation. How sustainable is it to ask Iran not to produce nuclear weapons when the EU itself is setting up a nuclear arsenal?

There are also concerns about whether Europeanization aligns with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly if Germany and Poland were to develop their own nuclear capabilities. Both ideas also go against the spirit and the letter of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017) that in the meantime has been signed by more or less 100 states.

Sixthly and lastly, it would be much better if the leaders of the EU spend as much time on diplomacy with Russia than in building up European defence. It is high time that the war in Ukraine ends, not only for humanitarian but also economic reasons. A peace agreement ideally includes a beginning of a restructuring of the European collective security architecture that includes both Russia and Ukraine, either in a transformed NATO or an upgraded Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). If such an agreement is reached, there would be little justification for further fragmenting European defence into over 25 separate, small-scale military forces. Nowadays already the European NATO member states spend $485 billion on defence, much more than Russia ($120 billion). The primary challenge for EU defence today is not the absence of a Eurobomb but the lack of coordination in pooling, sharing, and specialization. Instead of investing in weapons of mass destruction, making EU defence more efficient should be the priority as well as integrating Russia into a larger collective security organization.

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Tom Sauer is a professor in International Politics at the University of Antwerp in Belgium.