Reconstructing the China–India Climate Diplomacy

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How China and India address climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions will have a significant impact on the planet's future, given their growing economic and demographic weight. China and India are among the top emitters; recent estimates put their shares at roughly 33.9 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. Climate cooperation between the two neighbouring Asian giants will not only be mutually beneficial but also have the significant effect in blunting impacts of climate change in the region. However, for such a cooperative agenda to materialise and sustain, there must be a discursive reconstruction of the issue of climate change, which transcends realist preoccupations with strategic advantage, relative power, and enduring rivalry. Drawing from the constructivist school in International Relations, this article presents the merits of such an approach and how it may be realised.

Driven by shared vulnerabilities to climate change, China and India initiated a cautious but promising climate diplomacy in 2009 by signing the Agreement on Cooperation in Addressing Climate Change. The agreement established the China–India Working Group on Climate Change to deliberate on domestic policy measures and international climate negotiations through secretary-level meetings. The agreement facilitated collaborative scientific engagement including meteorological data sharing and joint research on climate change. A 2015 joint statement by Xi and Modi acknowledged the climate agreement as "mutually beneficial and contributes to the global efforts to address Climate Change". However, the nascent China–India climate diplomacy was short-lived as it was incumbent upon favourable geopolitical conditions. As border tensions escalated from 2017, bilateral climate engagement stalled and has yet to resume.

A civilisational threat

For climate diplomacy to be sustainable and effective, it needs to be insulated from the vagaries of everyday geopolitics. Climate change must be constructed as a collective threat, the redress of which requires placing it above the constraints of narrow geopolitical common sense. China and India can facilitate such a reconstruction of the climate question by drawing upon their shared conception of themselves as civilisational states. Their political thought, moral order, and legitimacy are grounded in longstanding philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and Dharmic pluralism—broadly encompassing Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and related traditions, respectively, under which the state is viewed as a custodian of civilisation, not just a modern bureaucratic apparatus. In contrast, the post-Westphalian modern nation-state, which holds sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundation of the modern international order, has promoted the idea of homogeneous nationhood characterized by bounded identities, actively ‘othering’ those outside its territorial boundaries. This has made universal cooperation on even the most pressing transnational issues such as climate change, difficult, if not improbable. China and India, too, disregarding their civilizational characteristics, behave like post-Westphalian nation-states in their relations with each other, placing strategic competitiveness, territorial integrity, and relative advantage above all else. Climate cooperation has been a casualty of this disregard for civilisational values.

China and India could found a strong, enduring, and effective climate cooperation if they were to position themselves first as civilisational states, with unique ways of governance, complex histories, and value systems informed by principles such as Tianxia (天下)—'all under heaven’ and Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—'the world is one family’. These values encompass holism and interconnectedness of all beings on the planet, transcending the narrow Eurocentric categories of bounded nationhood, territorial sovereignty, borders, and relative power. Such a worldview would enable them to perceive issues like climate change for what they are—a shared threat to both (and humanity), which needs to be addressed in concert, setting aside constraints imposed by strategic dictates.

Of course, framing China or India as civilisational states can translate into competing moral or cultural claims to leadership aimed at justifying hierarchical regional orders. The leaders of both states have invoked civilisational identity to legitimise power claims and expansionist ambitions, as seen in Xi Jinping’s ‘national rejuvenation’ based on civilisational pride, and in Modi’s ‘Vishwa Guru’ narrative embedded in cultural nationalism. However, in the face of an overarching transnational threat such as climate change, with adequate political will and foresight, China and India could choose to consciously construct their civilisational heritage and beliefs as a responsibility toward the planet and humanity. The Chinese concept of ‘Tianxia’ can be interpreted as an ecological cosmopolitanism, while India’s ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ offers a parallel ideal for global ecological stewardship.

Thus, climate change must be constructed as a civilisational threat for China and India. It is not merely an ecological, socio‑economic, political, or security threat; it also imperils their civilisational cores. Both must recognise climate change for the potential it has to eliminate their long-held civilisational heritage, complex history, diverse knowledge and value systems, and unique worldviews. The need is to perceive this collective problem from a shared civilizational standpoint, which is far older and more complex than that of modern nation-states. This reframing can seed norms that promote resilient and enduring climate cooperation to take root.

Towards a revitalised climate cooperation

Reframing climate change as a civilizational threat is pivotal for several reasons. Firstly, it redefines precarity—the impending impacts of climate change are not only limited to existing socio-ecological and economic aspects of the society as we know it. It threatens the very traditional, socio-historical, and cultural roots of these civilisations. Secondly, this reconstruction of climate change augments urgency—there is an urgent need to muster all efforts to address the crisis, including cooperation with neighbouring states, especially those with shared historical and civilizational narratives. Thirdly, it places responsibility on leaders not only to protect the current and future generations, but also safeguard the rich past from obliteration. Fourthly, such a reconceptualization of climate change elevates the climate agenda above everyday geopolitics, making room for lasting cooperative mechanisms and policies that could withstand strategic shifts. Further, this understanding of climate change justifies and necessitates closer cooperation and privileges de-politicised cooperation insulated from day‑to‑day geopolitical fluctuations.

A discursive reconstruction of climate change can pave the way for a resilient climate cooperation between China and India that is multi-dimensional and holistic. Politically, the two can negotiate an all-weather climate cooperation framework by revisiting their 2009 agreement, situating it on a normative foundation of shared civilisational risk, and anchoring it in a clause that insulates climate collaboration from geopolitical fluctuations. This would ensure a steady exchange of resources, knowledge, and technology despite geopolitical uncertainties; spur green growth and resilient development; and help them attain global climate leadership amid inconsistent US leadership. Such a cooperative framework could become a template for regional and even global cooperation on climate change. Economically, the two can innovate a green trade agreement with built-in structural safeguards against bilateral or regional political tensions. Such an agreement would prioritize environmental sustainability, decarbonization, and clean energy, facilitating commerce on electric vehicles (EVs), battery production, smart grids, renewable energy technologies, and energy-saving technologies. They can become global climate leaders by 'doing' through innovation and sharing clean technologies, energy, and critical minerals, without being hindered by strategic competition. Furthermore, China and India can coordinate their stands at international climate negotiations, continue to champion the interests of developing countries and small island developing states including on climate finance and loss and damage, and leverage their growing economies to demand accountability and responsibility from developed countries.

The two countries can also look to engage in the climate security domain, where they can promote resilience and sustainability in military infrastructure, equipment, deployment, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) by sharing information, knowledge, technology, best practices, and ecological vulnerability data. They can institute bold trust-building exercises such as joint disaster simulations in the Himalayas, for instance; and invest in collaborative climate security research and development for mutual gains. The role of civil society and non-state actors in a civilisational climate change-based cooperation will be enormous. Track-two diplomacy, which brings together diverse civil society groups, including local activists, youth and women's groups, scientists, and students, can facilitate a free exchange of ideas, knowledge, and best practices informed by lived experiences. University consortia, collaborative research programs, and academic events such as conferences, symposia, and workshops on climate-related topics can be fruitful in deepening regional knowledge, methodologies, and strategies.

Thus, basing climate cooperation on deeper civilizational values and identity holds the promise of an enduring, resilient, and effective climate engagement between China and India. Drawing on their unique civilizational positions, rather than the dominant modern nation-state considerations, would enable China and India to actualize a robust, stable, ongoing, mutually beneficial fight against climate change. The prospects of such a cooperative endeavour, which will foster the revival of the idea of ‘Chindia’—the imagined joint rise of China and India, are within reach.

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Robert Mizo is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delhi, India. He holds a PhD in Climate Policy studies. His research interests include Climate Change and Security, Climate Politics, Environmental Security, and International Environmental Politics. He has published and presented on the above topics at both national and international platforms. Robert has recently been a Japan Foundation Indo-Pacific Partnership (JFIPP) Research Fellow based at the Toda Peace Institute, Tokyo.