First Vietnam, Then Afghanistan: Is Ukraine Next?

Image: US and Taliban representatives sign the agreement in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020
US Department of State/Wikicommons

The ongoing war in Ukraine has raised difficult questions for U.S. foreign policy. With U.S. and Russian leaders engaged in direct talks in Saudi Arabia over the future of the conflict, many are left wondering whether the Ukraine crisis could become another Afghanistan or Vietnam—two conflicts where the U.S. pursued peace talks with its adversaries while sidelining local governments, leading to catastrophic outcomes. Drawing lessons from these past negotiations and the eventual collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 and the Republic regime in Afghanistan in 2021, one cannot help but wonder whether Ukraine could face a similar fate unless the U.S. carefully navigates these talks with a more inclusive approach.

Ukraine’s situation is distinct in many ways from Afghanistan and Vietnam, including the fact that Ukraine is located in Europe, which has a vested interest in its security and sovereignty, and that Ukraine is under a direct invasion by a foreign country and so its leader has broader national support—South Vietnam and Afghan Republic were dealing with proxies. The question, however, is whether these differences set Ukraine off the course that Afghanistan and Vietnam journeyed. Bear in mind that Afghanistan’s war differed from Vietnam's, as much as Ukraine's case differed from both. Therefore, what makes the three cases similar is not necessarily their socio-political settings or geopolitics but how peace settlements are handled regarding these countries. Seemingly, the ongoing negotiations on Ukraine are following the same pattern as those that sealed the fate of Vietnam in 1975 and Afghanistan in 2021. These patterns include the following:

• The absence of the legitimate governments of the negotiated states from the peace talks
• The rise of a new narrative that delegitimizes local governments as weak, corrupt, and anti-peace, elevating adversaries as reliable negotiating partners.
• A pledge that the local governments will get their turn in Peace Talks down the road, a promise that did not materialize in at least the two cases of Vietnam and Afghanistan.

These deals usually involve or accompany a swap of prisoners against the wishes of the local government and the end of financial and military support to the same regime. While labeled peace deals, these accords did not prevent local governments' collapse after the U.S. withdrawal and instead created power vacuums that the adversaries quickly exploited. Could Ukraine, with its sovereignty at stake, face a similar outcome?

Crossed-lateral peace deals: A pattern of excluding the most legitimate stakeholders of peace

These usually bilateral deals can better be termed crossed-lateral peace agreements as they are negotiated and concluded in the absence and defiance of the most legitimate stakeholder. For example, the Paris Peace Accord in 1973 was primarily between the U.S. and North Vietnam, with the South Vietnamese government largely excluded from direct talks. The Nixon administration justified this exclusion under the belief that South Vietnam was the primary obstacle to peace and that bypassing the South Vietnamese government would expedite a resolution. The administration pledged that they would ensure that an intra-Vietnam peace talk would take place. However, the exclusion of South Vietnam from the main accord ultimately contributed to the fall of Saigon in 1975, as the North Vietnamese took control after the U.S. withdrawal.

In Afghanistan, the Doha Peace Agreement in 2020 followed a similar pattern. The U.S. negotiated directly with the Taliban, sidelining the Afghan government in peace talks. The agreement promised a U.S. troop withdrawal in exchange for the Taliban’s commitment to preventing terrorism from Afghan soil. While it was framed as a path to peace, the Afghan government, led by President Ashraf Ghani, was not involved at all. The resulting agreement failed to prevent the collapse of the Afghan government, which fell to the Taliban in 2021, just months after the U.S. withdrawal.

One of the striking aspects of both the Paris Peace Accords and the Doha Peace Agreement was the protest and outright rejection of the peace deals by the local governments of South Vietnam and Afghanistan. South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu rejected the Paris Peace Accords, feeling that the agreement compromised his government’s position and led to an unfavorable peace. Similarly, in Afghanistan, President Ashraf Ghani was deeply critical of the Doha Peace Agreement for excluding his government and undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan leadership. These protests highlighted how the local governments felt abandoned by the U.S. and viewed the negotiations as leading to unjust compromises that did not consider their legitimate needs. In both cases, U.S. officials accused the local governments of corruption, divisiveness, and incompetence to justify their direct negotiation with the enemy. Sounds familiar?

As the U.S. seeks to negotiate with Russia over Ukraine, it is crucial to note the dangers of accusing the Ukrainian government of incompetence or corruption and bypassing its authority. These accusations further elevate the adversaries' assertions that the local governments lacked legitimacy from the outset. In both the Vietnam and Afghanistan cases, the local governments were left vulnerable, delegitimized, and unsupported before the onslaught of adversaries who could not care less about the peace deals. Interestingly, after the collapse of the allied power, the administrations blamed the opposition party at home and the sidelined government abroad, absolving themselves of any wrongdoing.

Is Ukraine the next episode in the same drama?

The U.S. and Russia have already begun rounds of talks, with the Ukrainian government sidelined. This dynamic bears some resemblance to the earlier peace talks with North Vietnam and the Taliban, where the U.S. preferred negotiating with adversaries in the absence of a legitimate government.

Will Ukraine be the next episode in this tragic drama? The answer lies in two factors, perhaps. First, is Ukraine psychologically and militarily prepared to continue its struggle without the United States' support? Second, whether Europe proactively seeks to maintain its vested interest in Ukraine, which increasingly diverges from the U.S., or follows the U.S.’s lead as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan’s cases.

Ukraine is the doorstep between Russia and Europe, and Russia’s entry—even with a warrant from the U.S.—is an alarm bell to the rest of Europe. Europe was never concerned about the adverse consequences of negotiation deals in Vietnam and Afghanistan. However, they do not seem to have the same feelings toward U.S.-Russia negotiations on Ukraine. The stability of the region is a matter of direct concern to Europe. For Europe, ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is not just a matter of geopolitical interest but crucial to European security. Their recent summit in Paris indicates that.

Other articles by this author:

Exposing the emerging Orientalist narrative for peace and security in Afghanistan: Part II (3 minute read)

Exposing the emerging Orientalist narrative for peace and security in Afghanistan: Part I (3 minute read)

The unholy alliance of Orientalism, ethnocentrism, misogynism, and terrorism: Understanding Taliban apologism Part I (3-minute read)

The unholy alliance of Orientalism, ethnocentrism, misogynism, and terrorism: Understanding Taliban apologism Part II  (3-minute read)

Dr. Bashir Mobasher teaches at the American University (DC) Department of Sociology, New York University DC, and the American University of Afghanistan Departments of Political Science. Dr. Bashir is the current President of Afghanistan Law and Political Science Association (in Exile). He is an expert in comparative constitutional law, identity politics, and human rights. He has authored, reviewed, and supervised numerous research projects on constitutional law, electoral systems, and identity politics. His recent research projects are centered around decentralization, social justice, and orientalism. Bashir obtained his B.A. (2007) from the School of Law and Political Science at Kabul University and his LLM (2010) and PhD (2017) from the University of Washington School of Law.