What Stands in the Way of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World?

This article was first published by The Japan Times on 6 August 2024 and is republished with permission.

Image: max325/shutterstock.com

Stronger treaties are needed more than ever as Hiroshima marks A-bomb anniversary.

The Hiroshima Round Table has been held annually since 2013, except for two years owing to pandemic-related travel restrictions. Convened by Hiroshima Gov. Hidehiko Yuzaki, the roundtable comprises a small group of international nuclear policy experts who meet to discuss how best to support the Hiroshima for Global Peace plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

This year’s meeting was held last month. The highlight was the announcement of a new annual report called Hiroshima Watch, released on Monday.

In my view, there are four tensions with respect to the normative architecture of nuclear governance and three agenda items to be addressed with urgency in the near term.

The first structural shortcoming is the collapse of the nuclear arms control and disarmament architecture. One by one, the various pillars of the structure have crumbled, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaties and Open Skies Agreements.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is fully functioning but not legally operational due to a uniquely self-sabotaging entry into force formula. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START, has been extended until Feb. 4, 2026, but no meaningful negotiations are underway for a follow-up treaty to regulate the nuclear stockpiles and deployments of Russia and the United States — which together account for 90% of nuclear warheads worldwide.

In part this reflects the rising distrust between the two major nuclear powers and heightened geopolitical tensions.

But the biggest issue, in my view, is that the existing arms control architecture reflects the bipolar world order of the Cold War, while the reality is that the global nuclear landscape is increasingly multipolar.

In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not in good health. Signed in 1968 and in force since 1970, the NPT functioned as the cornerstone of the global nuclear order for approximately half a century. However, it has exhausted its normative potential. The failure of the last two five-yearly review conferences to produce an agreed outcome document is symptomatic of the treaty’s woes.

The inadequacy of the NPT as the dominant regulatory framework is captured by the reality that four of the nine states that possess nuclear weapons—Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea (in the order in which they acquired them)—are outside of the treaty. The first three never signed and the latter is the only example thus far of an NPT defector state, although, if matters do not improve soon, it may be joined by others in the Middle East and Asia.

This means that nearly half of all nuclear-armed countries cannot attend NPT meetings, take part in discussions and therefore have no reason to feel bound by its decisions. Nor do they feel morally obligated to abide by United Nations Security Council strictures since its five permanent members are also the five nuclear powers that are party to the NPT.

The final structural flaw in the world's nuclear order is that the international community—which consists overwhelmingly of countries that do not possess nuclear weapons—has recognized the limits of the NPT in achieving nuclear disarmament and seized the agenda, negotiating a U.N. nuclear ban treaty in 2017 that came into force in 2021.

The nine nuclear countries are backed by a large group of nations, including Japan and Australia, that is sheltered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella: Together, these have formed a united rejectionist bloc. Therefore, the United Nations' Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has had zero practical results even while serving to delegitimize the possession of the A-bomb by any state. The two sides have been unable to make any headway in reconciling the tension between the NPT and the ban treaty, even though, in theory, the two should be complementary and mutually reinforcing.

Moving on to the policy agenda, the most important item is to ensure the continuation of the moratorium on any use of nuclear weapons. This is literally the final defense against a repetition of the nightmares of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

To that end, two steps are urgently required. All states must cease and desist from talking about and threatening the use of nuclear weapons, as all such instances serve to normalize both the possession of these arms and talk of their use. The normative barrier would be further reinforced if possessor countries were to negotiate a “no first use” treaty.

A draft paper was introduced by China under NPT auspices (which, as said, exclude four nuclear states) on July 12. Beijing is uncompromising in holding the line against the explicit or implicit recognition of non-NPT states possessing nuclear arms. How China believes this is helpful with respect to reducing a possible first use in the context of tensions between itself and India, India and Pakistan, and in the Korean Peninsula is for Beijing to explain.

Secondly, it is fair to argue that the risk of actual use has been increasing in the last few years given loose talk to this effect, alongside growing numbers, types and deployments of nuclear weapons. For example, last year—in peacetime—China is thought to have deployed 24 nuclear warheads to launchers, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, therefore potentially undermining its commitment to its own no first use doctrine. Furthermore, Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.

For its part, the U.S. has deployed nonstrategic weapons in several nonnuclear NATO states and is developing a new nuclear-armed tactical sea-launched cruise missile to be installed on attack submarines and surface ships. This would reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to the Pacific for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

The Biden administration proposed canceling the program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and issued a formal statement in October that year strongly opposing it. But Congress, with a Republican-controlled House, mandated the program in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

The final risk that must be urgently addressed is the resumption of nuclear testing. Again, various nuclear-armed countries are under public, scientific and military pressure domestically and have hinted at the possibility of resuming testing.

Any new test by one state could produce a cascade effect, causing a breakdown of the de facto moratorium and a new multipolar arms race in violation both of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Article 6 of the NPT, in which parties commit to good faith negotiations toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Hiroshima is the symbol of the development of the A-bomb and the horrors of its use. Yet, in rebuilding their beautiful and thriving city, its citizens have consecrated Hiroshima as a testimonial to resilience, solidarity and nuclear abolition.

To visit Hiroshima is to be reminded afresh of the three principles of death, destruction and, inspiringly, resurrection.

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