The Fall of Assad is a Cautionary Tale of Blowback

Image: Berit Kessler/shutterstock.com

A regime built on terror, ruled by fear and sustained by foreign proxy forces crumbled in less than a fortnight. In the end, the foundations of the House of Assad (1970–2024) rested on the shifting sands of time. In the good ol’ days, despots could retire with their plundered loot into comfortable lifestyles in Europe’s pleasure haunts. No longer. The reverse damascene expulsion has seen the Assads scurry to safety to Moscow.

The beginning of the end of the Assad dynasty can be traced back to Hamas’s brutal attacks of 7 October 2023. Its objectives were to kill, rape, torture kidnap and subject to public humiliation on the streets of Gaza as many Israelis as possible.

Its political calculations sought to undermine Israelis’ confidence in their government’s ability to protect them; provoke retaliatory strikes on the densely populated Gaza strip that would kill large numbers of civilians held as involuntary human shields, and inflame the Arab street, enrage Muslims around the world and flood the streets of Western cities with massive crowds shouting pro-Palestinian/Hamas slogans; disrupt the process of normalisation of relations with Arab states; dismantle the Abraham Accords; and isolate Israel internationally.

It’s fair to say that Hamas has won the propaganda war. Israel has never before come under such sustained international censure in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, World Court and International Criminal Court. It’s also been heavily criticised in many previously supportive Western capitals, streets and campuses including Australia.

There are still some 100 hostages captive in Gaza. Israeli soldiers are still being killed and wounded. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis retain residual capacity to launch rockets and drones into Israel.

Yet, Israel has achieved impressive military successes in fighting throughout Gaza followed by Lebanon. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated as fighting forces, with their military commanders and leaders decapitated with targeted assassinations and improvised explosive devices placed in pagers and walkie talkies. Iran has been humiliated, lost its aura of invincibility and seen the destruction of its entire strategy of trying to bleed Israel to death through a thousand cuts inflicted by proxies.

The military outcome thus is a complete reset of the local balance of power to Israel’s advantage. The reason for this is strategic miscalculations by Hamas. It launched the attacks of 10/7 unilaterally, hoping to draw fraternal groups into the war. Only Hezbollah half did so by firing rockets but without committing ground troops.

The second strategic miscalculation by Hamas was to underestimate Israel’s will and determination. This is Israel’s longest war. Israel stayed steadfast on destroying Hamas as a capable military force and governing power in Gaza; relegated the rescue of hostages to a highly desirable but subordinate goal; destroyed Hezbollah and ejected it from southern Lebanon; and checkmated Iran as the over-the-horizon military threat to Israel via its two powerful proxies in Gaza and Lebanon.

A further consequence was to remove the props holding up the Assad regime in Damascus and leave it exposed and vulnerable to overthrow by the well-armed and strongly motivated jihadist rebels. PM Benjamin Netanyahu is right to claim that Israel’s ‘blows inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah’ helped to topple Assad.

The new strategic balance sees the Israeli centre emerging much stronger amidst the ruins of the anti-Israel axis of resistance. The underlying reason for this is precisely the scale, surprise factor and depraved brutality of October 7. This broke beyond repair the endless loop of Hamas and Israeli policies of attack, retaliate, rinse and repeat when desired. Only a new balance of power could restore deterrence-based truce resting on certain Israeli retaliation and Israeli dominance at every level of escalation.

International calls for immediate and unconditional ceasefire and urgings not to go into Rafah proved counterproductive, I believe, for two reasons. For one, given the monstrous scale of 10/7, to Israelis they separated true from fair-weather friends. For another, Western youth and countries, under the impact of changing electoral demographics with mass influxes of radicalised Middle Eastern Muslims, were deserting Israel and softening on fighting antisemitism in their own populations. This drove home the realisation that time was against Israel. Hamas and Hezbollah had to be removed as security threats now or never.

However, post-Assad Syria is highly combustible. Syria is not a nation-state but a tattered patchwork quilt of different sects with a blood-soaked history of feuding. The rebels are diverse in tribe, race and religion and backed by different foreign actors with their own agendas. The chances are that après victory will come the deluge of warring factions and Syria descends once more into killing fields.

The dominant rebel group is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose roots go back to al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Its leader is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani who has had a US $10 million FBI bounty on his head since 2017 as a terrorist. The HTS’s base is the 75 percent Sunni population, with the remaining one-fourth split between Shiites, Kurds, Christians, Druze, Ismailis, Armenians and Alawites.

Israelis cannot assume that Syrians are immune to the Jew hatred that animates many Muslims in the region. Guided by its own precautionary principle, Israel has pre-emptively destroyed much of Syria’s weaponry, chemical weapons infrastructure and arms-production facilities and taken control of the demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights.

The experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya after their humanitarian liberations into freedom and democracy in the 2001–11 decade should give Panglossian optimists on a ‘new Syria’ a reality check.

Other articles by this author:

Assad Flees Damascus for Moscow: Musings on Be Careful What You Wish For - an extended version of this article (10-minute read)

Turning the Gaza ceasefire into a circuit breaker (3-minute read)

Ramesh Thakur, a former UN assistant secretary-general, is emeritus professor at the Australian National University and Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is a former Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute and editor of The nuclear ban treaty: a transformational reframing of the global nuclear order.