Russia's Mercenary Diplomacy in Africa

Image: Clément Di Roma/VOA, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Far away from Russia's aggression in Europe, its influence in Africa seemed to grow continuously. The government is pursuing foreign policy and economic goals with the use of mercenaries, especially in the Sahel region. But Russia is reaching its limits here.

Non-state actors such as companies, but also mercenaries, warlords, militias or armed separatists operate worldwide in a legal gray area and often undermine the state's monopoly on the use of force. International law only applies to them to a limited extent because they are neither classified as soldiers nor as civilians under the Geneva Convention. It is not always easy to distinguish between those who work on behalf of the state (and under state control) and those who act independently and with private profit interests on their own initiative and possibly even in opposition to the government.

Many of these companies and groups have a bad reputation, and rightly so, because they often behaved scandalously and are trigger-happy – see the example of Wagner in Ukraine, which used prison inmates as cannon fodder, or earlier the American company CACI Systems in the notorious interrogations of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, Iraq.

Russia has learned from the experiences of the United States and other countries and has been deliberately using such companies since the 2010s. The Wagner Group in particular made headlines in the Ukraine war. But their role in Africa is also important. Russia is active in many African countries where the armed forces have seized power in recent years. Since 2020, there have been coups in Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sudan and São Tomé and Príncipe - in some of these countries several times.

There is a direct link between these military coups and Russia's growing influence in the Sahel region: the rebellious militaries seek protection and support, and they receive it from Russia. The Wagner Group, which has now been restructured, stood out in particular. Thousands of Wagner soldiers fought not only in Ukraine, but also in Syria. In Africa, they supported the military regime in Mali and supplied weapons, they trained Sudanese armed forces and were present with over 1000 fighters in the Central African Republic. For almost a decade, Wagner mercenaries fought in Libya to support Khalifa Haftar, who rules in the east of the country, in his fight against the government in Tripoli.

An estimated 30 major military companies exist in Russia, used by the Russian government primarily outside the country. The so-called "little green men" who appeared in Crimea in 2014 and supported the separatists in the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine fall also in this category of irregular troops and military companies.

Russian military companies copied the business model of the scandal-ridden companies of the 2000s – both their profiteering in conflicts and the brutal operations that violated international humanitarian law. What is new, however, is that these companies are being used specifically to support state foreign policy. For a long time, the Russian government played a political game of hide-and-seek by tolerating, registering, sponsoring these companies, supplying them with weapons, but at the same time claiming that it was not responsible for their actions. The privately run troops had developed as a kind of army within the army. The Ministry of Defense tried to regain control of the companies when individual companies became too powerful and too independent.

The Wagner Group has now been relabeled as the “Africa Corps” and is largely subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. The restructuring is intended to avoid the mistakes of the past. Wagner's failed march on Moscow last year was rightly seen as a challenge by the establishment of the armed forces. Therefore, the companies are now clearly subordinated to foreign policy ideology, pushing for Russian influence in Africa. This kind of "mercenary diplomacy" is a combination of the greed of the companies that see war as a business and the ideological agenda of the Russian state.

By supporting autocratic regimes against internal opponents, Russia gains access to scarce raw materials. But Russia is also helping to lead the fight against separatists and jihadists. Wagner and the Russian state did not create the environment for the coups, but they benefit from it. They are a guarantee for the juntas by offering them a "regime survival package". Russia capitalizes on autocratic tendencies and the juntas are facilitated by partners who do not care about human rights.

With its engagement in Africa, Russia offers an alternative to the West and takes advantage of the anti-French, anti-colonial sentiment. The brutal French colonial history in the Sahel is a burden for the EU's attempts to enter into a relationship on an equal footing. It is not entirely without reason that the EU countries are accused of pursuing mainly their own interests, especially when it comes to stopping refugees from the region. The position of Western states is weakened. France had to withdraw its troops from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The United States withdrew troops from Niger, and Chad demanded US troop withdrawal in May. At the same time, the Russian presence in the region is increasing.

The military coups of the recent past are only the tip of the iceberg of a general trend of militarization. The military played an important role in the political process in the past. France, the United States and the EU must critically examine why their declared goal of democratizing these armed forces has failed. Instead, they are staging coups. The reasons are obvious: economic stagnation in one of the poorest regions of the world, internal violence, threats by separatists and jihadist and drought as a result of climate change determine daily lives of many people.

In addition to anti-French sentiment, there is often a deep mistrust of civilian governments that have not been able to initiate development. Several international programs failed, including the United Nations peace and stabilization program MINUSMA in Mali. The internationally supported G5 programme of 2014 to combat poverty in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad has not been able to halt the disintegration of democracy in this region.

In July, more than 80 fighters of the Wagner Group were killed in a battle in northern Mali by separatist Tuareg rebels. Russia's government is certainly not keen of seeing pictures from Africa of dead compatriots. What's next for Russia's involvement in Africa? Western troops have largely withdrawn, and Russian mercenaries are involved in bloody conflicts in several places. Will the incident in Mali remain an isolated case or will there also be complications in other countries?

Russia will probably not withdraw from Africa so easily. It competes for Africa's natural resources and for influence. From a geopolitical point of view, the 54 African votes in the UN General Assembly are also significant. But now Russia is also experiencing that it is reaching its limits with its mercenary diplomacy.

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Their business is force: The Wagner Festival is cancelled (3-minute read)

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.