Donald Trump 2.0

Image: Schager/shutterstock.com

In January 2025, Donald Trump will take office at a time when the GOP sweep of the House and Senate and a super-majority in the Supreme Court has severely weakened the institutional guardrails built into the United States constitution.  Civil society, to be sure, remains robust, and oppositions can still exert some political influence at the state and local levels. But we should be very worried about the future of American democracy.  The incoming president will be coming back to power surrounded by a far more unified group of loyalists, shielded by Supreme Court guarantees of immunity for presidential acts, and faced with an opposition that is far weaker than it was during his first term.   

Going forward—at least for the next few years—the most direct constraints on Trump’s presidency might well come from divisions within his own coalition.  Trump himself seems primarily interested in “retribution” against his political opponents and in advancing his personal wealth and power; this concern is most evident in the nominations for the principal law enforcement positions in the incoming government – most notably, the Department of Justice and the FBI. 

But beyond these immediate personal interests, Trump and his associates will have to juggle a broader coalition of forces. And although the interests within this broader coalition are not necessarily in conflict, they are not fully aligned either.  The effects of Trump’s second time around may well depend on how he manages the trade-offs. 

One source of pressure will come from influential ideological voices within the broader MAGA movement itself. Important MAGA ideologues—including Vice President JD Vance—appear highly committed to purging the “deep state,” and to advancing a vision of economic and political nationalism.  This vision combines the goal of staffing the bureaucracy with political loyalists, with tough talk on tariffs and military power, and a deep aversion to international cooperation on trade and defence.  To some extent, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and a few other appointments in high-level economic positions can be expected to push against these extreme views.  Still the ascendency of the ultra-nationalists can have a profoundly destabilizing impact, both on the effectiveness of the state bureaucracy and on the international political and economic systems.      

Outside the MAGA core, two other components of the Trump coalition—his business supporters and his voters—have different agendas. 

Big business clearly likes Trump’s plan to extend and deepen the tax breaks initiated during his first term; and it is likely to be reassured as well by his plans to retain Jerome Powell at the Central Bank and to appoint relatively mainstream officials for the other top economic posts.  But as implied above, there might be substantial conflicts with the MAGA core over questions of economic predictability, trade, and the rule-of-law.  Trade restrictions promised by the incoming administration are certain to generate losers as well as winners, and this division will be compounded by the insecurity of having to curry favour with a politicized and incompetent bureaucracy.   

More broadly, there is a deep tension between preferences of most business groups for predictability and rule-of-law and the transactional demands for loyalty made by Trump and his inner circle.  Business leaders who “play the game” can benefit, but their status is invariably uncertain and conditional.  Economists have long held that strong economies depend on the maintenance of a “level playing field” for investors; this vision is deeply at odds with the kinds of crony capitalism we can expect to see under Trump.      

Trump’s voters themselves, in turn, appear to have very different priorities from either the MAGA extremists or big business. They share MAGA’s aversion to immigration, but they seem most interested in bread-and-butter issues.  And they care far less about the lower taxes pursued by the business elites than about lower prices and secure employment.  The outcome of the 2024 elections shows that Trump’s promises to deliver on these bread-and-butter goals have considerable attraction for both his white working-class base and for an increasing number of young Black and Latino men.  But it remains to be seen whether his ability to fulfil these promises can be successfully reconciled with the interests of other parts of his coalition.   

Potential intra-coalitional conflicts are most likely to surface over three sets of issues. The most immediate flash points are likely to be over tariffs and immigration – the major themes of the MAGA movement.  Although the tough talk on these issues played well during the election campaign, the promises will almost certainly raise prices and lower employment if they are implemented.  Trump may well use carve-outs and exceptions to shield some his business supporters from these effects.  But the overall effects of these policies—again if fully implemented—can have devasting consequences for Trump’s electoral base.

A pursuit of further tax reductions constitutes a second potential source of division.  The preferences of Trump voters on tax policy are generally at odds with those of the economic elite, but this issue is not at the top of their list of concerns.  However, voters do care a great deal about Social Security, Medicare, and other social services that constitute a huge portion of government spending.  MAGA extremists appear willing to run high fiscal deficits in order to reconcile the conflict between meeting demands for social services and keeping its commitment to lower taxes. But at some point, escalating deficits risk higher inflation and/or an economic slowdown.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Trump will face challenges emanating both from his own foreign policy choices and from international forces that his government cannot fully control.  Trump’s aggressive tariff initiatives would provoke counter-measures that will negatively affect the American economy.  And the combination of belligerence and withdrawal championed by the MAGA movement can seriously undermine national security.  Turbulence in the international system can be expected to feed back on the homeland and impact the support from the business elites and voters in   Trump’s coalition.   

We cannot know the way these contradictory forces will play out over the next four years.  One scenario is that Trump will make symbolic gestures that minimize economic disruptions that might alienate his voters and business supporters.  To mollify the MAGA movement, he might implement limited cutbacks in the civil service, selective tariffs, and some well-publicized immigrant sweeps, while at the same time claiming credit through the right-wing media for significant economic advances initiated under Biden.  This option bears some similarity to the approach adopted during the first term, at least prior to the advent of Covid.  On the other hand, as implied above, Trump could go “full MAGA” this time around, with devasting consequences both for his voters and his business supporters.   Most likely—given the intra-coalitional conflicts I have outlined—his choices will be erratic and unpredictable, leading to chaotic changes in policy approach and personnel.  

The political opposition—both Democrats and non-Trump Republicans—will have very little leverage over these choices, at least in the short- and medium run.  But in an electorate that is still very closely divided, the fallout from the MAGA movement, together with Trump’s erratic behavior, increases the chance that the opposition can prevail in the coming congressional elections and in the 2028 presidential race.  The critical question is whether they can fight back in civil society and in state and local governments against efforts to rig the electoral system.   But this is a topic for another day. 

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Robert R. Kaufman is an Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University.  He is co-author of Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press, 2021.