COP29: Keeping Climate Security Human-Centric

Image: Supplied by author 

Since its emergence nearly two decades ago, the concept of climate security has been an important avenue to uphold the place of human security within the international climate system. At COP29, human security and peace is on the agenda, with a thematic day on Peace, Relief and Recovery. This is the third consecutive COP to acknowledge the integral role of peace for climate action, albeit (rightly) keeping the theme outside of the formal negotiations.

Meanwhile, the defence community is also embedding climate security firmly within defence and security mandates. NATO has been a front runner amongst traditional security institutions in embracing the importance to both green its actions as well as be mission ready for the new and increasing climate-related security risks the alliance will face. At the Montréal Climate Security Summit,  29-30 October, two weeks ahead of COP, the NATO Climate Change Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) was officially launched. The mandate of the centre is to support NATO and its members tackle the challenges posed by climate change in traditional security architecture, such as current and future climate security threats and the role of NATO, resilience of military infrastructure, risk-mitigation strategies, greening defence, and military readiness.

As important as these issues are for defence institutions, so too are local and indigenous outlooks and human security. As those of us working on climate, peace and security know, it is when human security is undermined that grievances can turn to violence and stability can be undermined.

Decades of research have shown the various pathways through which climate crisis threatens human security, a framework which expands the concept of security to account for a broad spectrum of essential components of individual and community welfare. These impacts are particularly acute in regions already grappling with economic, political, and governance challenges, where authorities are unable (or unwilling) to protect people from the effects of climate change. These impacts are especially destabilising where there is inequity in adaptive capacity – where some parts of society are less able to adapt or cope with climate impacts than others by virtue of their identity (gender, age, ethnicity, religion) or geography. Climate change is thus even more lethal for populations living in conflict-affected regions, as we saw play out catastrophically during the Libya dam burst in October 2023.

Climate change typically undermines security through indirect pathways, by compromising livelihoods, forcing people to migrate, or by increasing competition for essential natural resources, e.g. water, fish stocks, arable land, etc. This is where the seeds of instability are sown. This is also the most effective intervention point for conflict prevention and stabilisation engagement – to prevent the escalation into widespread and seemingly intractable conflicts across regions as varied as Haiti, Yemen, Mali, Myanmar, Iraq, Colombia, the Lake Chad basin.  

Typically, such conflicts start at the local level between individuals or communities—not the spaces for traditional defence actors to engage—and while they can still result in significant casualties, the nature of intervention would fall firmly within the development realm rather than defence. This necessarily calls for addressing climate security in 3D – that is coordinating responses across development, defence and diplomacy.

Often, these climate-related conflicts occur in regions already affected by war. These conflict contexts also frame the way in which climate change interacts with security dynamics, exacerbating challenges or creating new ones. For example, war can devastate environmental infrastructure and directly pollute the environment, diminishing scarce natural resources. This can further drive competition, leading to more conflict among affected populations. Where armed groups are present, offering salaries and food, livelihood loss caused by drought, disasters, or other climate effects could increase vulnerability to recruitment.

At the same time, we shouldn’t be overly deterministic about the influence of climate change and environmental factors on violence. Despite fears preoccupying the climate security field in its early years, climate change has not led to extensive, inter-state wars. Frequently, cooperation is more the norm than conflict, even under circumstances of extreme duress. In areas affected by the dual impacts of climate change and conflict, climate and environmental considerations are even used as entry points in peace programming. For example, the Weathering Risk Peace Pillar works in five regions (Nigeria, Yemen, Bay of Bengal, Iraq) affected by climate and conflict risks, mainstreaming climate and environmental security to support sustainable peace.

Action is also increasing on the intersection of climate change, peace and security at the national and international levels. More research is being done, peacebuilding organisations are starting to integrate climate into operations, and international commitments are growing, e.g. the Climate Relief, Recovery, and Peace Declaration at COP28 last year. Regional and international institutions are increasingly integrating climate considerations into their core mandates, with climate security now featuring on the agendas of the African Union, European Union, OSCE, and others, in addition to NATO.

As the field expands and climate becomes more integrated into the security domain, the key priority of climate security must remain reducing the potential for climate change to undermine human security and trigger conflicts. Obviously, emissions reduction across the Global North and other high emitting regions is a crucial, particularly within the security sector, which accounts for more than 5% of global emissions at a low estimate.

Efforts in areas most vulnerable to climate-related security risks must be supported too. This requires financing and cooperation across levels, a key topic at COP 29. At the moment, conflict-affected regions face extremely high barriers to receiving climate finance, stopping funds from reaching the people who need them the most. More also needs to be done to guarantee that these individuals and groups most affected by the security implications of climate change are determining the agenda and designing strategies from the local to international levels.  This is particularly important as the climate and security sectors become further embedded and formalised.

These challenges will not be easy to overcome. The uptake in hard security interventions by the international community is a challenge, including unprecedented levels of military activities in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, and elsewhere, which contribute to emissions and environmental degradation, reduce capacities to adapt to climate change, and rearrange international climate security priorities with a risk of human security falling lower on the agenda. As this year’s COP takes place while much of the international community is reverting to the answers offered by traditional security institutions to combat threats, considering the real impacts of both climate change and security operations on people is more pertinent than ever. Not despite but especially as conflicts are rising all over the globe, a human-centric approach to climate security will be crucial to build a climate for peace.

Related articles:

The COP29 Climate Talks are About to Kick Off in Baku, Azerbaijan. Here’s What to Expect (3-minute read)

Pacific security: Whose strategy is it? (3-minute read) 

Climate isn’t a Distraction from the Military’s Job of War Fighting. It’s Front and Centre (3-minute read)

News from COP29

Sinéad Barry is an analyst at adelphi, and Janani Vivekananda is Head of Programme for Climate Diplomacy and Security at adelphi and Senior Research Fellow (Climate Change and Conflict) at Toda Peace Institute.