What the Sino-Russian Declaration Exposes
Jordan Ryan
May 25, 2026
Image: Dmitriy Prayzel / shutterstock.com
The joint declaration issued by Russia and China on 20 May, Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations, has been read in sharply different ways. Some welcome its language of sovereign equality, multilateralism and a UN-centred international order. Others dismiss it as legal rhetoric deployed in bad faith. Both responses miss the more important point.
The declaration matters less for what it promises than for what it reveals. It shows how the language of the United Nations Charter has become a field of political struggle. Russia and China are challenging parts of the existing order in different ways. They are competing to shape the meaning of that order and to present themselves as its more authentic defenders.
That is why the declaration should be read closely. Its appeal to sovereign equality, indivisible security and the democratisation of international relations is not incidental. It is a claim to normative authority. The text seeks to occupy the language of legitimacy at a moment when the authority of the United Nations itself has weakened.
The gap between that language and the conduct of its authors is striking, though the two cases are not identical. Russia is waging a war in Ukraine in open violation of the principles it invokes. China presents a more complicated challenge. It should be criticised for internal repression, coercive pressure on Taiwan, its rejection of the 2016 arbitral ruling on the South China Sea, and its continuing support for Russia despite Moscow’s aggression. Yet China has also shown a degree of strategic restraint and continues to frame its global role in terms of sovereignty, non-interference and a state-based international order. That distinction does not absolve Beijing. It does suggest that any serious strategy for UN renewal should test China’s stated commitment to non-aggression and multilateral restraint against its actual conduct, especially in the South China Sea. None of this removes the hypocrisy. It makes the diplomacy more important.
Still, the erosion of the United Nations system cannot be laid only at the feet of Moscow and Beijing. Western governments have also weakened the authority of the rules they claim to defend. Broad unilateral sanctions on Venezuela were criticised by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures for their severe humanitarian impact and for undermining the principles they purported to uphold. In February 2026, the Secretary-General condemned the use of force by the United States and Israel against Iran, and the subsequent retaliation by Iran across the region, as a military escalation that undermined international peace and security. When major powers treat Charter constraints as optional, they invite others to do the same.
This matters because hypocrisy alone does not explain the moment. Great powers have always said one thing about rules and done another in practice. The deeper problem is that the authority to define legitimate state conduct has weakened. The Charter remains the best available foundation for international order, but the institutional machinery built around it no longer commands the same confidence or compliance.
That is what gives the Sino-Russian message traction beyond its authors. Its critique of Western hegemony resonates across much of the Global South because it draws on real grievances. Many states remain underrepresented in global decision-making, face conditionality in external partnerships and see an international economic order that has not delivered equitable development. Moscow and Beijing are exploiting those frustrations, though not always in the same way and not with identical records under the Charter.
At the same time, many governments are watching carefully what Sino-Russian partnership actually offers in practice. Some Belt and Road projects have generated concerns about debt sustainability and strategic dependency, with Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port frequently cited, even if interpretations of that case differ. In parts of Africa, Russia’s growing security footprint through Wagner’s legacy structures and successor arrangements has reinforced authoritarian partners while securing access to strategic resources. The language of emancipation can easily mask new forms of dependency.
For the United Nations, this is not just a messaging problem. It is a structural one. The Security Council veto produces paralysis in the crises where collective action is most needed. Financing depends on obligations that major powers treat as politically negotiable. The relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations remains uneven and vulnerable to manipulation. A system designed in 1945 for 51 member states has not adapted adequately to a far more plural and contested world.
That is why the next Secretary-General will need more than administrative skill. The task is not simply to defend the Charter against selective or cynical misuse. It is to rebuild political confidence that the institution can apply its principles with greater consistency, broader legitimacy and stronger operational capacity. That will require coalition-building across regions, especially with states that want reform, without abandoning multilateral restraint.
The Sino-Russian declaration therefore sets a test that extends well beyond Russia and China. The question is not whether its authors believe in the Charter in the same way or violate it in identical forms. They do not. The real question is whether the United Nations still has the political authority and institutional capacity to make the Charter matter.
Related articles from this author:
Governing the Ungovernable (3-minute read)
The Secretary-General This Moment Demands (10-minute read)
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century (10-minute read)
The UN’s Withering Vine: A US Retreat from Global Governance (3-minute read)
