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Cheng Li-wen’s Mainland Visit: Implications for Cross-Strait Stability

Shao Yuqun

April 4, 2026

Image: KOKUYO / Wiki Commons

At the invitation of the CPC (Communist Party of China) Central Committee and General Secretary Xi Jinping, newly elected KMT (The Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party) Chair Cheng Li-wen will visit Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing from April 7 to 12. This will be the first mainland visit by a KMT chair in a decade. At a time when cross‑Strait relations have encountered difficulties due to the policies of the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) authorities, the trip has naturally drawn considerable public attention. The visit is expected not only to generate positive momentum in cross-Strait relations but also to contribute constructively to peace and stability across the Asia–Pacific region.

Possible outcomes of Cheng Li-wen’s visit to the mainland

Although the detailed itinerary of Cheng Li-wen’s visit has not yet been released, based on the three cities she will visit and the themes discussed at the CPC–KMT think tank forum in early February, one can roughly predict the potential outcomes of the trip. Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu Province, is likely to be a stop where Cheng, following the pattern set by former KMT chairs Lien Chan, Wu Poh-hsiung, Hung Hsiu-chu, and Ma Ying-jeou, pays respects at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum—signaling that today’s Kuomintang has not forgotten Dr. Sun’s teachings on saving China and remains committed to the rejuvenation and prosperity of the Chinese nation. Jiangsu is also a key hub for Taiwan businesses, making it a logical place for Cheng to demonstrate the KMT’s dedication to protecting the interests of Taiwan investors on the mainland.

Shanghai, as the mainland’s top economic and financial hub, provides a platform for more forward-looking discussions. Considering the city’s concentration of Taiwanese companies and its role in emerging industries, Cheng is likely to emphasize pragmatic cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence, tourism, and agriculture—fields that align with both sides’ economic priorities and could help stabilize cross-Strait exchanges amid broader political tensions.

Beijing will be the most important stop on the visit, and a meeting with General Secretary Xi Jinping is highly anticipated. A meeting between leaders of the KMT and the CPC would send a clear message: commitment to the ‘1992 Consensus’ and recognition that both sides of the Strait are part of one China are vital for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

Implications of this visit for cross‑strait relations

First, strengthening dialogue between the CPC and the KMT promotes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and will significantly influence the peaceful progress of cross-strait relations. As the newly elected party chair, Cheng Li-wen’s visit will help the mainland better understand her political views and policy direction, potentially boosting mutual trust between the two parties. Their shared opposition to ‘Taiwan independence’ acts as a stabilizing factor for the Strait; the more effectively this stance lowers tensions, the higher the chances of maintaining peaceful cross-strait development.

Second, the visit could strengthen the KMT’s role as a more effective opposition party in Taiwan, allowing it to counter the DPP more strongly. Cheng faces several internal challenges as the new leader—balancing the expectations of party officials and grassroots members, preparing for local elections at the end of this year, and building consensus on issues like US arms sales. A successful visit might help her unify support within the party, boost internal cohesion, and enhance the KMT’s ability to respond to the DPP’s policy initiatives.

Third, although the KMT remains in opposition and Cheng’s visit will not immediately change the DPP administration’s policies, it could still promote practical cross-Strait industrial cooperation and safeguard Taiwan business people’s interests on the mainland. Such developments might benefit people in Taiwan and help increase public understanding of the mainland’s policies and conditions, possibly reducing information barriers.

Fourth, the visit may lead more people in Taiwan to reassess the role of the ‘1992 Consensus’ in maintaining stable cross-Strait relations. Since 2016, the DPP authorities have neither endorsed the consensus nor proposed an alternative framework acceptable to the mainland, while promoting the idea that the two sides are “not subordinate to each other,” which has contributed to increased tensions. Cheng has consistently expressed support for the ‘1992 Consensus’ and has publicly affirmed her identity as Chinese. Her visit, rooted in these positions, may highlight the tangible benefits of cross-Strait cooperation for the people of Taiwan and reinforce perceptions among some that recognizing the consensus could help safeguard dignity and stability for Taiwan.

Implications of this visit for the AsiaPacific region

Building stronger mutual trust and communication between the CPC and the KMT can help reduce the risk of miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait and support ongoing peace and stability—an outcome that benefits all countries in the region, including Japan.

Additionally, the visit indicates that the CPC and the Chinese government remain committed to engaging with political forces in Taiwan that support the ‘1992 Consensus’. By focusing on practical issues to build trust and continuing to promote a policy of ‘peaceful reunification’, the mainland seeks to show consistency in its strategy. Regional actors might see this as a reason to stay confident in the prospects for peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Amid rising conflicts in Eurasia and the Middle East, increasing global tensions, the relative stability of the Asia–Pacific region has become even more important. Over the past few decades, the region has experienced a long period of peace, partly due to China’s domestic and foreign policies focused on peaceful development. The longstanding consistency of the mainland’s ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘one country, two systems’ framework has been a key part of this strategy, and Cheng Li-wen’s visit further demonstrates this ongoing commitment.

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