Nuclear Futures: (Non)Proliferation, Dangerous Doctrines, and Arms Control Perspectives

Nuclear Futures: (Non)Proliferation, Dangerous Doctrines, and Arms Control Perspectives

30–31 October 2025

Geneva, Switzerland

The American-Russian relationship, and along with it the nuclear arms control regime and treaties, is in tatters. Existing agreements (New Start) are set to expire in February 2026, and nothing concrete is on the horizon. In addition, nuclear sabre rattling, doctrinal shifts and potential weapons developments and deployments (including in space) are the order of the day. Proliferation concerns (North Korea, Iran, etc.) cloud the horizon, while discussions of the necessity to rethink non-nuclear postures in Europe and Asia are becoming more prominent, threatening the future of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty regime.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist’s doomsday clock is now at 89 seconds to midnight – “the closest it has ever been to catastrophe.” The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has been ratified by 73 states parties and entered into force in 2021, is a powerful statement of a desire to move creatively and concretely towards a nuclear-free world, highlighting the lack of progress on this oft-made promise. While the “nuclear taboo” still holds, and the firebreak between convention and nuclear war has not been breached, many other technological, doctrinal and political developments are cause for great concern.

Against this backdrop, what are the perspectives for (and preconditions for) even incremental progress on such things as arms control, risk reduction and/or confidence building measures, and can these pave the way for renewed movement on nuclear arms control? Is the prospect of nuclear disarmament still realistic or worth pursuing as an ideal end state, and what other avenues for progress exist?

This two-day conference will bring together experts and scholars to take stock of the current trends and developments, with the overall objective of identifying potential entry points for innovative global, regional or national engagements on the wider (nuclear) arms control and disarmament agenda. These can include practical negotiating steps and processes, new or renewed multilateral or minilateral forums, and the potential for civil society or coalitions of the willing to push more forward-looking or ambitious agendas. Its main objective will be to bring together two often distinct communities (“arms controllers” and “disarmers”, to caricature somewhat), in order to foster a healthy dialogue around the threats that we all face, and potentially to build bridges for practical action and communication across divides in the years to come.

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