The Climate Change – Security Nexus

A Critical Security Studies Perspective

Matt McDonald

Summary

Climate change is increasingly recognised as a security issue. It has been discussed at the UN Security Council, it features in national security strategy documents of more than half of the world's states, and a wide range of think tank and academic publications point to the intersection between climate change and security.

This does not mean, however, that there is consensus about the climate - security relationship or the desirability of linking the two. Some theorists working in the broad tradition of critical security studies were important voices in pointing to the security implications of climate change, while others (perhaps paradoxically) urged caution in linking climate and security. In this sense it's fair to say there's no single 'critical security studies' perspective on the climate - security nexus, just as there is no single 'critical security studies' perspective in general.

Critical security studies can be defined (broadly) as scholarship concerned with developing a critique of traditional approaches to security; examining the politics of security; and exploring the ethical assumptions and implications of particular security discourses and practices (see Browning and McDonald 2013).

This brief provides an introduction to what Critical Security Studies has to offer in understanding and guiding practice on the climate change - security nexus. It suggests that analysis consistent with the critical security studies tradition can be (and has been) brought to bear on the climate change - security nexus by examining the scope of security threats; exploring the contested meanings of 'climate security'; and engaging key questions and dilemmas associated with linking the two, in theory and practice. It also provides a brief illustration of the utility of a critical security studies

perspective when approaching the relationship between climate change and armed conflict, and concludes with policy recommendations.

Broadening Security to Include Climate Change

Critical approaches to security were at the heart of attempts in international relations thought to challenge dominant accounts of security that focused on the territorial preservation of the nation-state from external military threat. This dominant conception of security was advanced by Realists, with security - defined as state survival - in turn seen as the central goal and ambition of states. For Realists, the international system was defined by the absence of a higher authority than states. This anarchic environment encouraged states to concern themselves with their own survival, and encouraged them to view the motives and actions of other states with suspicion. With no higher authority to prevent conflict or regulate the international system, conflict was seen as an inevitable feature of world politics, and preparation for conflict through maximising the state's relative power was necessary to ensure the state's survival. In this context, security was viewed in terms of the state and its survival, and security studies was viewed as 'the study of the threat and use of force' (Walt 1991).

Critical security studies developed critiques of this narrow view of security. The association of security and the state assumed that states were the best means of providing for the welfare of their citizens. But for some critics this account was challenged by the scale of poverty and suffering throughout the world (eg Galtung 1969), including suffering generated in many instances by governments themselves (see McSweeney 1999). Feminist scholars, meanwhile, noted that the Realist conception of security arose out of a gendered understanding of security, sovereignty and the state (see, eg Tickner 1988). Among other accounts of the limitations of traditional approaches to security, these critiques challenged the exclusive focus on state security and encouraged attention to non-traditional security threats and the welfare of people themselves.

For many advocates of redefining security, it made little sense to exclude existential threats to human survival. In this sense, they argued for including environmental change in an expanded definition of security (Mathews 1989; Renner 1996). And while it was at face value an analytical claim about the scope of threats to security, there was also a normative and political element to this position - if environmental issues could be elevated to the 'high politics' of security, they would receive the funding, attention and priority they deserved (see McDonald 2012). More recently, a range of analysts and practitioners have advocated including climate change on states' security agendas for similar reasons.

In the process, advocates for approaching climate change as a security issue have to engage with both the politics and ethics of security. For them, greater political attention to climate change would be desirable (ethics), and elevating the issue to the realm of security would help mobilize a response to the issue by injecting the issue with urgency and priority associated with high politics.

Few would argue with the sentiment here, though the political implications of approaching an issue as a security issue divides critical security theorists. This applies as much to climate change as any other issue.

For critics of this move within the critical security studies tradition, two (related) objections have been articulated. The first is that at the heart of the meaning of 'security', we find an association with defence, the military and the state. For most, climate change is ill suited to this agenda, and indeed it may be the case that states and the defence establishment more specifically are embracing this agenda precisely to secure resources and underscore their own legitimacy (see Marzec 2015; Buxton and Hayes 2015). While this objection suggests the *meaning* of security is inevitably tied to the state and defence, the second objection suggests security has a particular *logic* - that defining an issue as a security issue serves to take it out of the realm of deliberation and discussion, instead enabling it to be dealt with via secrecy and illiberal means (Wæver 1995). These related concerns encourage some critical security studies scholars - especially those informed by post-structural thought or employing the 'securitization' framework - to suggest that climate change would benefit from being de-coupled from security. In the process they echo some of the concerns originally advanced by Daniel Deudney in 1990, when he warned of the militarization of the environment.

For others in the critical security studies tradition, however, the linkage between security and climate change is not *inherently* problematic. For Ken Booth (1991; 2007) for example, the issue here is not with 'security', but with a dominant conception of security tied to the nation-state and its preservation from external threat. Once we escape this definition we can imagine alternative and more progressive practices to follow, especially if security is oriented to the emancipation of vulnerable populations. Indeed for Booth and others, it is precisely because security is high politics that it is important not to give up on it as a site of progressive practice, but instead try to shift the way political communities conceive and approach security.

The above accounts clearly have very different implications for conceiving an issue like climate change as a security threat. But both approaches recognise the need to engage with the politics and ethics of security, rather than treat it simply as an abstract analytical category. And both suggest that security is *constructed*, with different communities prioritising different threats and responses to them. The following section expands on these issues through analysing different climate security *discourses*, with their different sets of assumptions and implications.

Climate Change and Discourses of Security

What do those working in critical security studies mean when they talk about *discourses* of security? Simply put, a security discourse is a framework of meaning that conditions the way political communities conceive and approach what is to be protected, by whom, from what threats and by what means (see McDonald 2012). When looking at the way states, practitioners, analysts and academics

engage with the climate change - security relationship, we can identify a number of different discourses, each with a different emphasis on whose security is important.

The first, and arguably most dominant, discourse of climate security is that of national security. Here, a range of analysts and policy practitioners point out that climate change may pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states. Some of the possibilities envisaged here include the potential for state sovereignty to be challenged by large-scale migration of people from other countries displaced by manifestations of climate change, including natural disasters or rising sea levels. Others include interstate competition and even conflict over shared or common resources like freshwater or ocean fisheries, as climate change decreases supply of such resources. Joshua Busby (2018), for example, sees the potential for tension and future conflict over access to the waters of the Indus, the Mekong and the Nile, and over a scramble for resources in the Arctic. Traditional concerns ultimately remain dominant - the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state from (external) threat.

It is telling in this discourse, embraced by states and think tanks in particular (e.g. Busby 2007; 2008), that measures to respond to these challenges are focused on managing manifestations of climate change rather than causes of the problem; are focused on adaptation rather than mitigation; and conceive of the traditional agent of national security - the state and in particular the military - as the central agent for providing security. Climate change becomes simply another potential cause of instability, violence and warfare with which the state is primarily concerned.

In one extreme example, a 2003 Pentagon report on the national security implications of an abrupt climate scenario for the US suggested that states such as the US may consider building more effective boundaries to prevent those displaced by climate change from entering US territory (Schwartz and Randall 2003). Here, the causes of climate change are neither acknowledged nor addressed through mitigation efforts; states and their militaries retain their position as central security providers; and victims of climate change are presented as threats to national security. In this sense, not least as this is such a prominent discourse of climate security, the concerns of those critical security theorists cautioning against linking climate change and security seem well founded.

Another prominent discourse of climate security is that of international security. This focus was apparent in UN Security Council deliberations on the security implications of climate change in 2007 and 2011 (Conca et al 2017), and arguably better captures the inherently transnational nature of the issue. In this discourse, the focus is on the way in which the international system itself may be challenged through instability caused by climate change. While the focus remains on similar issues to the national security discourse - population movements and (associated) possibility for conflict - the means of addressing these issues extend to cooperative mitigation efforts and conflict prevention involving the UN system, for example (see Smith and Vivekananda 2007; Purvis and Busby 2004).

While this discourse encourages international cooperation in the face of climate change, there are still limitations. In presenting the international status quo as that in need of protection, such an approach fails to systematically engage with the conditions in which climate change itself has become possible. There is a danger here of focusing on large-scale disruption associated with climate change - mass population movements, regional instability and conflict - rather than the everyday implications for health and economic wellbeing for those vulnerable populations affected by climate change throughout the world. For those working in the tradition of critical security studies, the international security discourse insufficiently reorients our focus to the key drivers of climate change and its main victims.

An obvious response to the above is a focus on human security, which has become a prominent frame for analysing climate security (see Matthew et al eds. 2010). Human Security is a discourse advanced principally by NGOs and academics and focuses primarily on the need for cooperative and significant mitigation efforts to minimize harm experienced by vulnerable populations.

Some have gone still further in recognizing and endorsing a focus on ecological security. In this discourse, the referent objects are ecosystems themselves and their resilience in the face of climate change. This focus enables attention not only to vulnerable populations, but also to other living beings and future generations (see McDonald 2018). Here, radical mitigation efforts oriented to the most vulnerable are most imperative.

Two particular points are worth noting with these latter two discourses. First, while theorists working in the critical security studies tradition have noted the importance of identifying climate security discourses and their effects, some have gone further in specifically *advocating* a focus on human security or ecological security as an appropriate ethical focus. In this sense, they implicitly reject the idea that securitization is necessarily a bad thing, suggesting progressive practices may follow if our security lens is oriented to the wellbeing of vulnerable beings.

Second, however, both confront dilemmas. While perhaps more ethically defensible, these discourses have limited political purchase among and within the key institutions of world politics - states. They require radical practices that orient towards vulnerable outsiders, and in this sense do not appear to have an obvious constituency in the halls of power of key national and international institutions. In advocating such a reconceptualization of security, then, critical security scholars may be confronted with a dilemma - to what extent should we engage key institutions on their own terms to pursue meaningful change (and risk these institutions focusing predominantly on their own survival), and to what extent should we outline radical alternatives even in the face of the apparently contradictory interests of powerful actors (and risk political irrelevance)?

Climate Change and Security: Key (Critical) Questions

The above analysis suggests significant points of disagreement between scholars working within the broad tradition of critical security studies. But it also suggests key questions in engaging the climate - security relationship.

The first of these, following from the above discussion of climate security discourses, is 'How exactly is security understood, and in particular whose security is presented as threatened by climate change?' A critical approach to the climate - security relationship recognises the constructed nature of security, and the political choices involved in prioritizing certain sets of threats and downplaying others, for example. In this context, examining exactly how this relationship is understood and approached is important, especially if we accept the view that these choices have important implications for approaching climate change in practice.

Three further key questions arise from this.

1) First, 'what are the effects of the securitization of climate change for policy and practice?'.
   As noted, the securitization framework suggests that constructing climate change as a security issue will usher in 'panic politics' and forms of extraordinary practices inconsistent with political deliberation and debate (Buzan et al 1998; Wæver 1995). While not all critical security studies scholars would embrace this view, all recognise the importance of engaging with the effects of representing and approaching climate change as a security issue. For them this isn't simply an abstract analytical exercise - it has practical significance.

2) Second, 'how *should* we define and approach the relationship between climate change and security?'.
   Again, scholars working across the critical security studies tradition advance very different answers to this question. These range from the imperative of escaping a security frame to the need to recognise climate change as the most pressing global and ecological security threat. But all identify the need to engage with this normative/ ethical question about the climate - security relationship, recognising that ethical questions are fundamental to both the study and practice of security.

3) Third, 'why do different political communities understand and approach the climate change - security relationship in particular ways?'.
   Simply put, how do we make sense of the construction of climate security in particular contexts and of the way particular approaches to this relationship have 'won out' over others. A quick analysis of UN Security Council debates over the international security implications of climate change in 2007 and 2011, for example, reveals significant disagreement over whether it is appropriate to discuss climate change in the Security Council at all, and if so how the relationship between international security and climate change should be understood (see Scott 2008; Conca et al 2017). The same is arguably true within states, with dif-

ferent actors advancing alternative accounts of whose security is in need of protection and how it should be protected. For critical approaches, security itself is a site of contestation. While an important analytical point, this is also an important question for normative and political reasons. Understanding how certain ideas about the climate change - security relationship (and associated practical responses to climate change) come to prominence in certain settings can provide us with insights into the conditions in which alternative approaches might come to prominence.

Beyond these questions, feminist theorists have drawn our attention to the role of gender in conditioning how we think about the relationship between climate change and security   (e.g. Detraz 2009); critical political geographers to the role of representations of space in climate security discourses (e.g. Dalby 2009); and postcolonial scholars to the centrality of Western thought and experience to existing (dominant) accounts of the climate change - security relationship (e.g. Grove 2010). While by no means an exhaustive list, these accounts all draw attention to neglected dimensions of the climate change - security relationship, raising important questions about how we view this approach in theory and in practice. And in combination with the preceding questions, those working in the critical security studies tradition compel us to reflect on the limits and implications of traditional approaches to climate change and security, the politics of linking climate and security, and the ethical assumptions and implications associated with this linkage.

Case study: Climate Change and Conflict

Much of the above account suggests the need to step back and consider the relationship between climate change and security in fundamental terms. But how would scholars working in this tradition engage a substantive issue like the relationship between climate change and conflict? This is potentially challenging in the sense that this concerns an issue central to the traditional security agenda: armed conflict. This has been a broader issue for critical security theorists, with Ken Booth (1991) among others making the case that we need to bring the resources of this tradition to bear to better understand conflict, and guide more appropriate and effective responses to it. War, he argues, is too important to be left to strategists.

A range of analysts have suggested recently that climate change could serve as a driver of conflict, or has already played a role in triggering armed conflict in different settings (see Smith and Vivekananda 2007 or Busby 2018, for example). Three arguments have been made here - three envisaged pathways between climate change and armed conflict.

1) In the first argument, changes in rainfall pattern, increasing temperatures and desertification associated with climate change may change previously arable land into land that cannot support local communities. In response to this we may see population movements, with groups of people coming into contact and ultimately conflict with other groups. This argument was invoked in the case of conflict in Darfur, with then UN Secretary-General Ban

Ki Moon (2007) and the UN Environmental Program (2007) both pointing to the role of climate change in contributing to this conflict. We also see a similar logic in arguments suggesting the possibility of future conflict as populations are displaced by rising sea levels or natural disasters linked to climate change.

2) The second argument is one that suggests that some of the same manifestations of climate change - changing rainfall, loss of arable land and desertification - may trigger political unrest within states. The argument here is that a population struggling with insufficient access to food, freshwater or means to make a living will be more likely to confront their government for a greater or more equitable share of national resources, especially if there are existing grievances, weak institutions or social/ political tensions. This argument has been applied to civil war in Syria, the wider Arab Spring and violence in Mali (see CNA 2014; Selby et al 2017; Dunlop and Spratt 2017:13).

3) The third argument suggests that a climate-induced increase in demand and decrease in supply for a resource (like freshwater, for example) will lead to accelerated resource extraction and/ or manipulation, triggering contestation and even conflict. This pathway has been linked to future transboundary water wars, and conflict over access to resources found in the global 'commons', such as fish stocks in oceans (see Busby 2018; Gleick 1993; Miller 2000).

So what would scholars working in the critical security tradition have to say about the above conflicts and arguments, and what would they contribute to allow us to better understand and respond to these instances of violence and/ or climate-related stress? I would identify four key contributions that analysts working in this tradition could bring to bear on the climate - conflict relationship.

1) *Avoid simplistic accounts of causation*. Critical approaches would discourage simple associations between (climate induced) stress and violence. In theoretical terms, their rejection of reductionist and parsimonious accounts of security extends to the question of why actors engage in violence. While Realists would suggest that competition over resources will inevitably drive conflict, analysts working in the critical tradition would be more likely to acknowledge the possibility of cooperation and/or the wide range of factors that create conditions for conflict. At best, climate change serves in this context as a 'threat multiplier': creating contexts in which conflict is more likely, but not in and of itself *causing* conflict (CNA 2014). This conclusion is one found in many more nuanced accounts of the complex relationship between climate change and violence (e.g. Boege 2018; Nordas and Gleditsch 2007; CNA 2014; Wolf 1999).

2) *Avoid simplistic accounts of actors' motives*. Following from the above, critical approaches discourage assumptions about why actors will behave in certain ways. While some Realists make sweeping claims about the motives of states - suggesting they will always act to maximise power relative to others, with little to prevent the use of force in the process - critical

approaches suggest the need for a richer and more nuanced appreciation of the drivers' of actors behaviour, including that of states. This can range from domestic constraints to international expectations to alternative calculations of their national interests. This, for critical approaches, allows us to recognise that different communities will respond to climate stress in different ways, and allows us to focus on the circumstances in which stress can be met with cooperation and movements towards resilient communities, for example.

3) *Address mitigation as a response*. Traditional approaches to security tend to focus on managing and responding to conflict, less on the circumstances in which conflict becomes possible. While Joshua Busby (2007; 2008) argued that a national security response to climate change should prioritise adaptive measures, critical approaches are far more likely to suggest the need to focus on mitigation. While this is a focus oriented towards the rights and needs of vulnerable populations who will suffer disproportionately from effects of climate change regardless of the likelihood of violence, one effect of this focus is that it orients towards preventing conflict before it occurs rather than responding to it or preparing militarily for managing manifestations of climate stress.

4) *Recognise climate conflict isn't the only climate security threat, nor the most important*. With its focus on the territorial preservation of the nation-state from military threat, traditional approaches to security focus our attention on climate-induced conflict as the key threat posed by climate change. Critical approaches, by contrast, suggest that war is not the only nor most important security threat, especially when our attention turns to the impact of climate change on vulnerable populations, future generations or other living beings. Critical approaches to security remind us that the implications of livelihood loss, disease, insufficient food and water or displacement associated with climate change are more immediate, more direct and more pressing threats to the security of people themselves than the danger of armed conflict (See Barnett and Adger 2007).

Ultimately, a critical approach to the climate - conflict relationship is one that calls for caution and nuance in linking climate change and warfare, and recognizes that linking the two can potentially draw our attention away from both other causes of conflict and other (more immediately pressing) manifestations of climate change.

Conclusion

Critical approaches to security have much to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between climate change and security. While there is no single 'critical security approach', the range of scholarship in this broad tradition encourages us to reflect on the politics and the ethics of security, in the process adding much to our understanding of the choices made in conceiving and approaching the relationship between climate and security in particular ways. It also provides us with resources for reimagining and redefining not only the way we approach this relationship, but how we approach the existential threat of climate change itself.

Policy Recommendations

While much of the above brief applies to academic analysis, insights drawing on critical security studies scholarship can also inform practical responses to climate change and security implications associated with it. Key recommendations would include the need for policy practitioners to:

- Develop assessments of climate security risks that are interdisciplinary in nature;
- Develop integrated and holistic responses to climate security threats that promote:
    - Mitigation and adaptation;
    - Action at the level of international cooperation, national policy and sub-national/ community policy and practices;
    - Action from traditional security practitioners (e.g. defence forces) along with the wider range of agents able to promote action on mitigation, adaptation and resilience-building.

References

Ashley, Richard (1981) 'Political Realism and Human Interests', *International Studies Quarterly*, 25 (2):.204-36.

Barnett, Jon and Neil Adger (2007) 'Climate change, human security and violent conflict', *Political Geography*, 26(6): 639-655.

Boege, Volker (2018) 'Climate Change and Conflict in Oceania', *TODA Peace Institute Policy Brief 17,* July. Available at: http://toda.org/files/policy_briefs/T-PB-17_Volker%20Boege_Climate%20Change%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Oceania.pdf

Booth, Ken (1991) 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17:4, 313-26.

Booth, Ken (2007) *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).

Browning, Christopher S. and Matt McDonald (2013) 'The Future of Critical Security Studies', *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(2): 235-55.

Busby, Joshua (2007) *Climate Change and National Security* (Washington DC: Council of Foreign Relations). Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/14862.

Busby, Joshua (2008), 'Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and US National Security', *Security Studies*, 17 (3):.468-504.

Busby, Joshua (2018) 'Warming World', *Foreign Affairs*, 97(4):49-55.

Buxton, Nick and Ben Hayes (2015) 'Introduction: Security for Whom in a Time of Climate Crisis' in Buxton and Hayes (eds.), *The Secure and the Dispossessed* (London: Pluto).

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).

CNA (2014) *National Security Risks and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change*. Available at: https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/MAB_5-8-14.pdf

Conca, Ken, Joe Thwaites and Goueun Lee (2017) 'Climate Change and the UN Security Council', *Global Environmental Politics*, 17 (2): 1-20.

Dalby, Simon (2009), *Security and Environmental Change* (Cambridge: Polity).

Detraz, Nicole (2009), 'Environmental Security and Gender: Necessary Shifts in an Evolving Debate', *Security Studies*, 18 (2): 345-69.

Deudney, Daniel (1990), 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security', *Millennium*, 19(3): 461-73.

Dunlop, Ian and David Spratt (2017), *Disaster Alley: Climate Change, Conflict and Risk* (Melbourne: Breakthrough). Available at https://www.breakthroughonline.org.au/disasteralley

Galtung, Johan (1969) 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3): 167–191.

Gleick, Peter (1993) 'Water and conflict', *International Security*, 18(1): 79-112

Grove, Kevin (2010) ''Insuring our Common Future?', *Geopolitics*, 15(3): 536-63.

Marzec, Robert P. (2015), *Militarizing the Environment: Climate Change and the Security State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Mathews, Jessica (1989), 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs,* 68 (2): 162-177.

Matthew, Richard A., et al eds. (2010), *Global Environmental Change and Human Security* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010).

McDonald, Matt (2018) 'Climate Change and Security: Towards an Ecological Security Discourse?', *International Theory*, 10 (2): 153-80.

McDonald, Matt (2013) 'Discourses of Climate Security', *Political Geography*, 33: 42-51.McDonald, Matt (2012) *Security, the Environment and Emancipation* (London: Routledge).

McSweeney, Bill (1999) *Security, Identity and Interests* (Cambridge: Cambridge U).

Miller, Kathleen (2000) 'Pacific Salmon Fisheries', *Climatic Change*, 45(1): 37-61.

Moon, Ban-Ki (2007), 'A climate culprit in Darfur', *Washington Post*, 16 June, 2007.

Nordas, Ragnhild and Nils Gleditsch (2007) 'Climate change and conflict', *Political Geography*, 26(6): 627-38.

Purvis, Nigel and Joshua Busby (2004), 'The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System', *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, 10,.67-73.

Renner, Michael (1996) *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity* (New York: WW Norton).

Schwartz, Peter and Doug Randall (2003), *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security*. Available at: http://www.edf.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf.

Scott, Shirley (2008), 'Securitizing Climate Change: International legal implications and obstacles', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21 (4): 603-19.

Selby, Jan et al (2017), 'Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited', *Political Geography*, 60: 232-44.

Smith, Dan and Janani Vivekananda (2007), *A Climate of Conflict: The Links between Climate Change, Peace and War* (London: International Alert).

Tickner, J.Ann (1988) 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist. Reformulation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 17 (3): 429-40.

UNEP (2007) *Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment* (Nairobi: UNEP).

Wæver, Ole (1995), 'Securitization and de-securitization' in R. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*

(New York: Columbia UP): 46-87.

Walt, Stephen (1991), 'Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (2): 211-39.

Wendt, Alexander (1992) 'Anarchy is what States Make of It', *International Organization*,

46 (2): 391-425.

Wolf, Aaron T. (1999) "Water Wars' and Water Reality: Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways', in Steve Lonergan (ed.), *Environmental Change, Adaptation and Human Security* (Dodrecht: Kluwer): 251-65.

The Author

Matt McDonald is Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of Political Science and International Studies at University of Queensland. His research is in the area of critical approaches to security, and in particular the relationship between security and environmental change. He has published on these themes in journals such as *European Journal of International Relations*, *Security Dialogue*, *International Theory*, *International Political Sociology*, *Review of International Studies* and *Journal of Global Security Studies*. He is the author of *Security, the Environment and Emancipation* (Routledge, 2012), co-author of *Ethics and Global Security*(Routledge, 2014), and is co-editor of *Australian Journal of Politics and History*.

Toda Peace Institute

The **Toda Peace Institute** is an independent, nonpartisan institute committed to advancing a more just and peaceful world through policy-oriented peace research and practice. The Institute commissions evidence-based research, convenes multi-track and multi-disciplinary problem-solving workshops and seminars, and promotes dialogue across ethnic, cultural, religious and political divides. It catalyzes practical, policy-oriented conversations between theoretical experts, practitioners, policymakers and civil society leaders in order to discern innovative and creative solutions to the major problems confronting the world in the twenty-first century (see www.toda.org for more information).

Contact Us

Toda Peace Institute
Samon Eleven Bldg. 5th Floor
3-1 Samon-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160-0017, Japan
Email: contact@toda.org