

Peace Research – An Uncertain Future¹

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Introduction

To say that peace research has fallen on hard times may seem an absurd overstatement. Yet, it is difficult to conclude otherwise if the report on the international workshop convened by the Toda Peace Institute in Tokyo late last year, entitled *A Peace Research Agenda for the 21st Century*, is any guide.² The lofty aspiration indicated by the title stands in sharp contrast to the humdrum tenor of the conversation that brought together ‘the world’s major research institutes’. It could be that the report does not do justice to the richness of the discussion or the diversity of views expressed over the course of the two-day meeting. And it is also the case that a good many other institutes, projects and publications, not to mention individual scholars, that regard themselves as part of the peace research family, did not participate in the workshop. This said, it is safe to assume that the report offers a reasonably reliable

¹ This Policy Brief draws from and builds upon two other publications: an online essay (Joseph Camilleri, 'Dialogical Citizenship: Dancing Toward Solidarity', *Great Transition Initiative: Toward Transformative Vision and Praxis*, April 2015 <https://greattransition.org/publication/dialogical-citizenship-dancing-toward-solidarity>) and a chapter in a forthcoming edited volume (Joseph Camilleri, 'A Just and Ecologically Sustainable Peace: Navigating the Great Transition', in *Towards a Just and Ecologically Sustainable Peace: Navigating the Great Transition*, edited by Joseph Camilleri and Deborah Guess. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

² Hugh Miall, 'A Peace Research Agenda for the 21st Century: Report on the International Workshop held in Tokyo, 6-8 December 2019'. Toda Peace Institute, Policy Brief No. 69, February 2020.

barometer of current peace research discourse – an assumption supported by the conceptual and empirical drift that typifies much of the recent peace research literature, some notable exceptions notwithstanding.³

What, then, are the most troubling aspects of the peace research agenda as described in the report? Four closely related failings merit particular attention. The first of these is the lack of contextual analysis and, its corollary, a preoccupation with the symptoms rather than causes of conflict and violence and a corresponding neglect of the profound social, economic and geopolitical changes which signal a transition of epochal proportions. The second is the seeming reluctance to reopen the conversation on what is meant by peace and what are the values or principles that can best enable the peace research enterprise to navigate the turbulent seas ahead. The third is a virtual silence on the complex and contentious question of governance, which reflects the increasing porosity of state and other geographical boundaries and the diminishing utility and even viability of the principle of state sovereignty. All of which helps to explain yet another shortcoming, namely the failure to focus at all systematically on the agents and strategies for change, even though how this question is addressed in both theory and practice will largely determine the long-term success or failure of future peacemaking, peacebuilding and disarmament efforts

This policy brief analyses these four closely interrelated failings and their far-reaching implications. The intention here is not to belittle the importance or usefulness of a good deal of current peace research, but to suggest the need for—and modestly contribute to—a more ambitious and insightful agenda than is presently the case.

Epochal Transition

What, according to the report, are the key issues we should expect peace research to address in the coming years? The answer to the question is outlined primarily in the section entitled ‘Mapping the Field’, which provides a long list of fairly broad areas, notably conflict resolution, prevention and transformation, nonviolence, violence reduction and prevention, arms control and disarmament and development and peacebuilding. The most challenging areas of research are said to be climate change and conflict, emerging technologies, nuclear weapons, the rise of populism and authoritarianism, and identity politics and inequality. All of these are crucially important subjects, but the unanswered question is: how are we to diagnose these ailments, let alone devise remedies that speak to the vastly altered circumstances of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries?

There is little in the report which gives any hint that the institutes represented in the workshop had a sense of the profound transformation now under way. Yet, as many writers have argued, we are in the throes of a transition to a post-Modern world. If this is the case, it would seem imperative that we reflect on the trajectory of the Modern epoch as it has

³ Nils Petter Gelditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle, Håvard Strand, ‘Peace Research – Just the Study of War?’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2), March 2014, 145-158.

unfolded over the best part of eight centuries. Arguably, the first tentative steps towards modernity were taken as early as the latter part of the 11th century. In the ensuing period, which we may designate as 'Pro Modern', a series of interconnected developments ushered in Europe's reawakening, culminating in the Renaissance, the voyages of exploration, the expansion of trade, and the emergence of centralised monarchies.

It is, however, the early Modern period from the middle of the 16th century to the late 18th century that confers on modernity many of its distinguishing characteristics. The European states system, aptly described as the institutional centrepiece of modernity, had as its foundational principles state sovereignty, nationalism (more benignly expressed as national self-determination), empire building (premised on western dominance of the non-Western world), the ever-widening application of the scientific method, and capital accumulation. When compared to the tribal systems, chiefdoms, kingdoms, city states and even imperial states of earlier periods, the modern state would give rise to rapidly accelerating levels of social and institutional complexity. The dense web of technological and economic innovations we associate with the industrial revolution made possible, and in a sense necessitated, substantial population growth, increasing urbanisation, more functionally differentiated political systems, more centralised forms of government, more extensive legal codification and more comprehensive taxation systems. By the nineteenth century these trends were on the way to becoming global in scope and inspiration.

A good deal of evidence now suggests that the Modern epoch has reached its limits. In *Worlds in Transition*,⁴ five limits are identified as critical to an understanding of the current transition which has been gathering pace since the Second World War: limits to state sovereignty, limits to empire building, limits to national identity as a legitimising norm of governance, limits to economic growth, and limits to science and technology. Technological innovation will no doubt continue to stimulate the senses and the imagination, but modernity, as we have known it, appears to have reached the limits of its intellectual coherence and organisational efficacy.

The cumulative impact of these limits is reflected in the cataclysmic events that punctuated the first half of the twentieth century and the accelerating possibility of geostrategic, environmental, economic and humanitarian breakdown that has become a distinctive trait of our times. There is now good reason to posit a sixth limit, which connects and amplifies the other five, namely the limit to violence. Apart from two world wars, the Holocaust and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the last hundred years have seen the spread of nuclear weapons and a succession of bloody conflicts and genocides. The long list includes the Russian and Chinese civil wars, the Spanish civil war, the First Indochina war, the periodic Arab-Israeli hostilities, the Korean War, the French-Algerian war, the Vietnam war, the devastating wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, and countless armed conflicts in different parts of Africa and Latin America. The death toll resulting from war in the 20th century has been estimated at 187 million, and is probably higher.⁵ The number of

⁴ Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *Worlds in Transition: Evolving Governance Across a Stressed Planet*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009.

⁵ Milton Leitenberg, 'Deaths in War and Conflicts in the 20th Century'. 3rd edition, Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, Occasional Paper 29, 2006. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20060800_

armed conflicts in the world has risen steadily since 1946 and now stands at 50 or more in any one year.

Equally revealing is the trendline in forcible displacements. UNHCR's annual *Global Trends Report*—released on 19 June 2019—shows that nearly 70.8 million people were displaced at the end of 2018, with the internally displaced accounting for 41.3 million, refugees 25.9 million, and asylum seekers 3.5 million. Of these, some 13.6 million people were newly displaced during the course of the year.

Armed conflict and physical displacement and the wholesale suffering and destruction they bring in their wake are the outward manifestations of the deeper tensions and contradictions that reflect the five aforementioned limits. Yet, the peace research report seems oblivious to these limits or their far-reaching implications. For reasons of space it is not possible to analyse the implications of each of these mutually reinforcing limits. But we can get a sense of the powerful currents at work by considering three highly revealing trends that merit the close attention of peace researchers. The first relates to unfettered globalisation, or to be more precise the spiralling turbulence that has become a feature of the neoliberal order. The second, closely linked to the first, is the growing governance deficit,⁶ that is, the increasing disparity between the challenges we face and the capacity of our institutions to address them. The third relates to the global power and civilisational shift that is now in full swing and the associated danger of new and more destructive rivalries.

This first trend, which is central to our current predicament, has to do with the unprecedented volume, speed and intensity of cross-border flows – flows of goods and services, technology, money, arms, pathogens, greenhouse gases, people, images and information. These flows affect virtually every facet of human activity, including finance, commerce and trade, diplomatic relations, human rights, environment, scientific and cultural relations, information and communication, health and education, transport, operations at sea and in space, and much else. Under the neo-liberal order, the lowering of barriers to international trade and financial transactions became an article of faith for most national governments. To this end, trade unions had to be cut down to size, at times simply crushed, for union muscle kept wages high and made it harder to hire and fire as profit margins required. The task of governments everywhere was to make the economy as hospitable as possible to relentless profit seeking. This meant keeping wages low, severely curtailing labour and environmental standards, privatising industries and services, redefining citizens as consumers, and reducing politics to just another form of marketing.

In a largely unfettered market, cross-border flows are continuously transforming the way we trade, work, produce, consume, travel, learn and communicate, often in ways that are highly injurious to the environment, human dignity, health and education, social equity and cultural literacy. Climate change, pandemics, the threat posed by nuclear weapons, periodic financial crises, rising income and wealth inequalities within and between countries, the

cdsp_occ_leitenberg.pdf. Accessed 25 October 2018.

⁶ Richard Falk, 'Changing the Political Climate: A Transitional Imperative'. Great Transition Initiative. September 2014. <https://www.greattransition.org/publication/changing-the-political-climate-a-transitional-imperative>. Accessed 12 September 2014.

slow but steady erosion of the quality of public health and education services, resurgent child poverty, the breakdown of ecosystems, the rise of populism, forced displacement and mass surveillance of the Internet are just some of the more troubling direct or indirect outcomes.

The second trend points to the diminishing capacity of the national state to provide effective protection in the face of high and ultimately unsustainable levels of insecurity. Few national governments (including European governments) come even close to fulfilling the EU's official commitment to human security, which includes 'reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity'.⁷ Nor have governments, and the bureaucracies and political party systems on which they are based, been particularly effective in setting and enforcing stringent environmental standards or delivering quality social services. The deficit is even greater when it comes to the security needs of persons understood as members of the diverse communities, both subnational and transnational, that make up the nation. Simply put, they have failed to reconcile the diverse national, subnational and increasingly transnational identities of their respective populations.

Despite their promise, global multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, have not fared much better. Powerful states and corporate interests, often working in tandem, have actively resisted the advent of well-functioning cross-border regulatory institutions and processes. The fiasco of international climate change and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences are but the most glaring examples of this trend. These days, UN reform, though urgently needed, barely rates a mention in diplomatic circles. As for civil society organisations, notwithstanding good intentions, they are often lacking in resources, organisational capacity, and even imagination. Few of them have grasped the extent or significance of the governance deficit of our times, let alone sought to collaborate across their respective areas of engagement to develop creative responses to the deficit.

A third and complicating factor is the far-reaching geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural shift that has been under way for some time. Yet, it remains poorly understood in the West, and nowhere more conspicuously than in the United States and some of its English-speaking allies. The failure to appreciate this shift, let alone deal constructively with it, carries immense risks for the future.

Experts and commentators have rightly focused on China's rise. The scale of the Chinese economic miracle is indeed remarkable. Since the introduction of market reforms in 1979, China's real annual gross domestic product (GDP) has averaged an annual growth rate of 9.5%; its GDP has doubled every eight years; its manufacturing output overtook that of Japan in 2007 and that of the United States in 2010. China's GDP growth rate, it is true, has

⁷ *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World*. Brussels: December 2008. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf

slowed substantially in recent years, from 14.2% in 2007 to 6.1% in 2019, and a further decline is expected this year, especially in the aftermath of the Covid 19 pandemic. Yet there is no denying that, in the space of a few decades, China has achieved what the World Bank has described as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.”

Important as it is, China’s renewed capacity to flex economic muscle does not fully capture the profound changes now sweeping across the globe and reshaping the social and political fabric of many countries. In 2000, the U.S. accounted for 24% of the world’s total GDP. This declined to just over 20% in 2010. By 2018, it was a little over 15%. The financial crisis and the faster-paced growth of emerging economies were no doubt contributing factors in America’s diminishing share of global GDP.

The steady decline of US hegemonic power is equally evident when it comes to the projection of military power. Taken at face value, US military capabilities radiate power, but that power has often proved illusory. Technological prowess, high levels of military spending culminating in a record military budget of \$716 billion for FY2019, and the flexing of military muscle on a global scale have not translated into military victory on the ground or enabled the United States to impose its will. The costly and less than successful war on terror, the disastrous war in Iraq, the protracted and punishing conflict in Afghanistan, and the unholy mess in Libya and Syria are all signs of the fragility of US power. And in the meantime, we have seen under Putin the reassertion of Russian strategic interests.

Economics and geopolitics are no doubt at the heart of the seismic shift now under way. In this sense a multi-centric world is rapidly emerging in which several major centres of wealth and diplomatic and organisational clout—some rising, others declining—are furiously competing to continue their ascent or arrest their decline.

There is, however, another dimension, often overlooked yet crucial to the shape of things to come. Economic and geopolitical trends assume their full significance when placed in a wider cultural and civilisational, indeed planetary context. We are inexorably moving towards a multi-civilisational world. The West-centric world, in which first Europe and then the United States held sway, is slowly but steadily giving way to a new world in which other civilisational centres are emerging or re-emerging.

Three such centres, the Sinic, Indian and Islamic cultural spheres, each with its uniquely rich and long history, have made a dramatic reappearance on the world stage. The intense intersection of civilisational currents is fast becoming a reality, which brings with it new forms of interaction. Analysing and managing the cross-civilisational traffic of intellectual currents, cultural preferences and economic expectations will be one of the more demanding tasks of the next few decades, and require the close attention of peace research.

Revisiting the Question of ‘Peace’

Perhaps the most troubling aspects of the report is the shallowness of what purports to be a discussion of norms and values. The main conclusion to emerge from the workshop appears to be that peace research institutes, while they have a normative commitment to peace, do not agree on what they understand by peace. Some are still drawn to the idea of

'positive peace', which is left undefined, while others have a preference for security, which, one assumes, refers to different forms of armed conflict. This is no doubt an accurate enough statement of the current state of play, but one which reveals an unwillingness to reflect at all seriously on the confronting normative dilemmas posed by the predicament we presently face. It is as if institutes and individual researchers can each choose from a long list of putative values the ones to which they are drawn, whether by convention, temperament or methodological convenience. Any appetite for mature engagement with the difficult ethical and philosophical foundations of peace research is conspicuously absent.

What we understand by peace and how it connects with notions of the common good must surely continue to inform both scholarly analysis and practical prescription. The question is: where to begin? Violence remains perhaps the natural starting point to any conceptualisation of peace. Johan Galtung argued as far back as the 1960s that violence had both direct and indirect manifestations.⁸ He distinguished between direct or physical violence and social or structural violence. Direct violence, which we associate with the battlefield and other forms of organised conflict, involves the piercing, crushing, tearing, poisoning, burning, exploding, evaporating, starving, torturing of human bodies. Invariably, the physical injury inflicted on a person also carries an important mental or emotional dimension. Indirect or social violence, which we associate with the slum or ghetto, preventable diseases or hunger, involves inequality, poverty, discrimination, social constraints and lifelong division of labour.

Immensely useful though it is, Galtung's typology needs to be widened to include another form of violence that is in a category of its own, namely ecological violence. Physical and social violence are understood primarily as inflicting harm (be it death or injury) on human beings, whereas ecological violence is directed primarily at other forms of life. This is a critically important distinction, for it points to the accelerating decline of the Earth's natural life-support systems, which in turn places human society in jeopardy.

These different forms of violence are closely interconnected. Direct and indirect violence, distinct though they are in their symptoms and underlying logic, are nonetheless closely interconnected in both their causes and consequences. Exploitation of the poor and discrimination against minorities sooner or later create conditions conducive to communal and international tensions. Similarly, protracted armed conflict imposes a heavy psychological and emotional burden on both combatants and civilians – not only over the duration of the conflict but often for decades to come. As a succession of recent conflicts have shown—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and many parts of Africa—the cost to public health, education, social and economic infrastructure, and political institutions is immense and prolonged.

The same mutually reinforcing dynamic connects physical and structural violence with ecological violence. War and peacetime military activity can have a hugely detrimental

⁸ Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 1969, 167–191.

impact on the natural environment. Water pollution resulting from the use of depleted uranium, release of toxic dust and carbon emissions associated with heavy military operations, extensive damage done to natural habitats by bombing campaigns, and the likely catastrophic effects of a nuclear war on climate change and ecosystems are a few obvious examples. The converse is equally true. We now understand more clearly how environmental degradation can provoke armed conflict. Soil erosion, desertification, air and water pollution often lead to sudden and inevitably destabilising mass migrations, as we have already seen in Darfur and Syria, and are likely to see in the South Pacific as island nations prepare for humanitarian catastrophes resulting from increased extreme weather events and rising sea levels.

However, the interconnections go much deeper. Physical, structural and ecological violence are closely entwined not just by virtue of the cause and effect, action-reaction feedback loop. They are also connected, perhaps in more fundamental ways, by the underlying logic of exploitation, of which they are the outward expression. As liberation theologian, Leonardo Boff, puts it:

The same logic of the ruling system, based on profit and social manipulation, that leads to the exploitation of workers also leads to the spoliation of entire nations and eventually to the depredation of nature itself.⁹

Exploitation, whether of people or the environment, inevitably rests on the apparatus of exclusion. Weapons of mass destruction and human-driven deforestation are best understood as the outcome of exclusionist attitudes, policies and institutions. People and nature, especially future generations, are routinely excluded from the decisions likely to adversely affect them. Potentially critical voices are marginalised, for fear that giving them due consideration would threaten the rewards of exploitation, whether it be wealth, power or privilege. Indefinite exclusion serves to entrench continued domination of the political, economic and cultural levers of society, and to function at all effectively, exclusion has to institutionalise indifference to the harm and suffering such domination inevitably leaves in its train. This has prompted Pope Francis to label the process as the 'globalisation of indifference'. Once the economy, politics and culture, and with them the patterns of consumption and production, are governed by the dual mechanism of exclusion and indifference, violence, be it physical, structural or ecological, or some combination of the three, becomes the inevitable outcome.

Given the ubiquity and destructiveness of violence in the Modern period, we may be fast approaching the limit to indifference, which is in part why many have been looking for new ways of approaching the future – some from a secular, others from a religious standpoint.

⁹ Leonardo Boff, 'Liberation Theology and Ecology: Alternative, Confrontation or Complementarity', in Leonardo Boff and Virgil Elizondo (eds), *Ecology and Poverty: Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995.

The notion of 'just peace' represents a significant step in this direction.¹⁰ Linking peace and justice is not in itself a new idea. It was an important element in Johan Galtung's notion of positive peace, which envisaged the transcendence of both physical and social violence. Others have advanced a more pragmatic approach that focuses on the role of national and international institutions in reducing or containing levels of physical and social violence both nationally and internationally. This perspective has coloured much of the theorising and practical work in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Since the Second World War, lawyers, scholars, diplomats and others have sought to develop a legal and organisational framework that recognises the interests of different parties and enshrines a wide range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights as well as the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation. The UN system itself constitutes the most ambitious effort to date to develop a programme that combines economic and social development, human rights, peacemaking and peacekeeping. A further step in this direction came with the unanimous adoption in 2015 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Though it may well fall short of expectations, the initiative, officially described as a 'shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future' can nevertheless be seen as an embryonic attempt to forge a just peace agenda.

In somewhat different vein, one of the more fascinating contributions to the theory and praxis of just peace has come from a number of religious traditions. In recent decades, many Christian voices have called on their churches to move away from notions of 'just war' in favour of a just peace framework.¹¹ In 1985, the United Church of Christ in the United States, at its 15th General Synod, issued a pronouncement affirming the Church to be a Just Peace Church. It defined 'just peace' as 'the interrelation of friendship, justice, and common security from violence' and placed 'the United Church of Christ General Synod in opposition to the institution of war.' Numerous congregations have since committed themselves to witnessing for just peace, making use of a wide range of study and other resources produced for the purpose. Several other protestant churches in the United States, Germany and elsewhere have since taken comparable initiatives. In this, the World Council of Churches (WCC) has played a pivotal role. Building on its work for peace, justice and human rights in the Middle East and South Africa in the 1970s and its Restorative Justice programme in the 1990s, the WCC initiated the Decade to Overcome Violence (2001-2010). This was quickly followed by the International Ecumenical Peace Convocation (IEPC) in 2011 which issued *An Ecumenical Call to Just Peace*:

¹⁰Mary Kaldor, 'From Just War to Just Peace'. In C. Reed, D. Ryal (eds). *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty First Century*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 255-274.

¹¹ See Gerald W. Schlabach, 'What is "Just Peace"? A Collation and Synthesis based on Catholic and Ecumenical Christian Sources'. February 2018. <http://www.geraldschlabach.net/documents/justpeacecollation.pdf>. Accessed 5 May 2019.

... a collective and dynamic yet grounded process of freeing human beings from fear and want, of overcoming enmity, discrimination and oppression, and of establishing conditions for just relationships that privilege the experience of the most vulnerable. and respect the integrity of creation.

Similar trends have been at work within the Catholic church, culminating In April 2016 in a conference convened by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace and other Catholic organisations. It proposed that the Church abandon 'just war theory', initiate a global conversation on nonviolence and just peace, call 'unjust world powers' to account, and support those engaged in nonviolence. These sentiments were echoed a few months later in Pope Francis's message for the 2017 World Day of Peace, entitled *Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace*. The just peace ethic has become a recurring theme of his pontificate. His address on nuclear weapons, delivered in Nagasaki in November 2019, reaffirmed the fundamental principle that international peace and stability

can be achieved only on the basis of a global ethic of solidarity and cooperation in the service of a future shaped by interdependence and shared responsibility in the whole human family of today and tomorrow.

Scholars and religious leaders in other faith traditions have voiced similar sentiments. In Islam, leading thinkers have begun to articulate new ways of responding to the defining issues of the current period of transition.¹² Some have called for the reformulation of Islamic concepts, notably those that have universal applicability, including rejection of racism, the equality of human beings and global citizenship. In a sense, the Umma of Islam is being extended to the Umma of humanity. Drawing on the Qur'an and the Prophet's teachings and practice, not least the Medina Charter, which he negotiated and promulgated for the multi-religious city-state of Medina in 622 CE, Islamic scholars have highlighted the many insights that can inspire and guide the just and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Though the modalities and language are different, similar trends are in evidence in Buddhism (especially Engaged Buddhism inspired by the life and work of Thich Nhat Hanh in the 1970s) and Confucianism (especially neo-Confucianism greatly enriched by the unique contribution of Chinese born American scholar Tu Weiming).¹³ Complementing these developments is the series of interfaith initiatives that have sought to highlight the shared commitment to an integrated vision of justice and peace. A particularly revealing example is the historic declaration jointly signed by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Ahmad Al-Tayyeb, head of Sunni Islam's most prestigious seat of learning and Pope Francis during the latter's visit to the Arabian Peninsula in March 2019.¹⁴ The declaration called for peace between nations,

¹² See Mohammed Abu-Nimer, 'A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam', *Journal of Law and Religion*, 15(1-2), 217-265; Altwajiri, Abdulaziz Othman, 'Towards a Renewal of Islamic Thought', *Islam Today*, 31, 2015, 13-34.

¹³ See Tu Weiming, 'Confucianism and Civilization', in Majid Tehranian and David W. Chappell (eds), *Dialogue of Civilizations: A New Peace Agenda for a New Millennium*. London: I.B Tauris, 2002, pp. 83-90).

¹⁴ 'A Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together'. Abu Dhabi, 4 February 2019. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/2019/outside/documents/papa-francesco_20190204_documento-fratellanza-umana.html. Accessed 28 May 2019.

religions and races based on 'full citizenship' understood as respect for the rights of all, in particular the victims of war, injustice and persecution.

One other development, that has gathered pace in recent years but has been long in the making, is the acknowledgement that just peace must take full account of the accelerating ecological crisis. Justice, peace and ecology are increasingly seen as the three constitutive principles of a new inclusive global ethic and the necessary antidote to the logic of exclusion.¹⁵ A good many statements and declarations by both formal institutions and civil society organisations have articulated the need for an ethic that transcends the violence unleashed by the exploitation of people and nature. *The Earth Charter*, issued in 2000 after a decade long multicultural and multi-sectoral global dialogue, and Pope Francis's encyclical *Laudato Si'* are two milestones in the development of such an ethic.

It would be fair to say that the transdisciplinary examination of the ethical issues involved in this paradigmatic shift is still in its infancy. Peace researchers everywhere, whether attached to institutes, universities or other seats of learning, have a responsibility to consider these profoundly important ethical questions and their implications for all areas of intellectual inquiry from grand theory to highly specific empirical studies. The notion of a just and ecologically sustainable peace understood in its communal and cosmic sense goes well beyond abstraction. It offers a powerful lever and tool to think through the institutional, policy and personal implications for the journey ahead. Here we can do no more than touch on the implications for three entwined fields of engagement, namely governance, citizenship and dialogue.

Governance

The report has little to say about the governance deficit even though it looms as one of the major barriers to significant progress in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and even peacekeeping. Governance, it need hardly be said, is not a static phenomenon. The emerging pattern of governance points to a number of clearly discernible trends, especially in normative, legal and institutional architecture. Across such diverse policy areas as security, environment, economic development, health and human rights, we discern the same trend line: a discursive shift towards universalist principles and ideas, including 'universal human rights', 'international citizenship', 'health for all', the 'global commons', and the 'responsibility to protect'.

As a general proposition, it is fair to say that since the Second World War international discourse has adopted progressively more inclusive frameworks of analysis. Scientists, lawyers, doctors, public intellectuals, environmentalists, insurers and public policy specialists have been drawn to longer time frames in their calculus of social and economic risk taking. Importantly, over the last hundred or more years, an expanding body of international law has sought to prevent or at least reduce the destructive effects of modern warfare and trade rivalries. At the same time development, diplomacy, human rights, health,

¹⁵ C. G. Weeramantry, *Tread Lightly on the Earth: Religion, the Environment and the Human Future*. Colombo: Stamford Lake, 2009.

scientific and cultural relations as well as technology transfers and financial and atmospheric flows have been subjected, at times cosmetically and often erratically, to some degree of international regulation.

We have also seen a rising consciousness of the need to recast the temporal and spatial frame of reference, with a view to facilitating holistic diagnosis and management of the rising volume, speed and intensity of flows, hence the expanded and refined data gathering, analytical and planning systems. However, this is but a tendency which has to contend with a number of countertendencies. The virtual paralysis of international climate change negotiations over the last two decades is but one striking example of the sway of entrenched interests and mindsets. Another is the self-defeating propensity to great power military intervention as a way of resolving complex social, political, economic and cultural conflicts. In short, the scorecard thus far points to a patchwork of responses that are unlikely to stave off the likelihood of societal or environmental breakdown of one kind or another.

While the principles, mechanisms and processes of governance have received periodic scholarly attention, this has occurred primarily within the confines of a few relatively small intellectual circles. Insofar as governments and legislatures, and regional and global organisations have reviewed institutional arrangements, they have done this largely within the confines of their respective jurisdictions, be it at the local, provincial, national, regional or global level. Nowhere has enough attention been directed to how the different tiers of governance interact, or how policy formulation and implementation can be coordinated across these different tiers. Nor indeed has serious thought been given to how different players operating in different arenas, be it the states system, the market or civil society, can engage in a sustained and productive dialogue.

The unavoidable conclusion is that, while universalism made some headway in the second half of the twentieth century, it has had to coexist with identity structures and emotional attachments to symbolically marked groups operating on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, ideology or intellectual convention. In more recent years, these structures and attachments have been co-opted by disgruntled minorities and vested economic, political or military interests, ready to exploit them where these could be turned to their advantage. In short, we are still far from developing the cognitive, attitudinal and behavioural responses that can reconcile the needs of humanity as a whole with those of its constituent parts. Such reconciliation is unlikely to materialise unless it is grounded in institutional forms as well as in the intellectual and experiential dimensions of life. If it is to remain faithful to its foundational purpose, peace research has no option but to give the governance deficit the attention it deserves.

Strategies and Agents of Change

The preceding analysis points to the centrality of change and how it is to be steered. Much follows from this. First, the priorities identified and the pathways to be pursued need to engage not just a small minority but a sizeable and reasonably representative cross-section of society. Secondly, a strategy that is predicated on the need to connect justice, peace and ecological flourishing, not just in its conception but in all aspects of its execution, must

somehow be integrated into the cultural and institutional fabric of the community at all levels, locally, nationally, regionally and globally. Last but not least is the identity of the interlocutors. With some notable exceptions (and peace research is at best a partial exception), much of the literature features Western voices and non-Western voices schooled primarily in Western academies, explicitly or implicitly addressing Western audiences, thereby limiting the efficacy, some might say authenticity, of the enterprise. Any strategy that is informed, primarily if not exclusively, by Western currents of thought and geared to the experiences and preferences of Western institutions cannot realistically expect to have global traction. A strategy seeking to advance a just and ecologically sustainable peace must of necessity be cognisant of and sensitive to the priorities and perspectives of diverse cultures and civilisations.

Perhaps for the first time in the human story, we are tasked with thinking through how we can reconcile the needs of the human family (universalism) with those of its constituent parts (pluralism) as well as those of the other members of the Earth community (ecologism).¹⁶ As we have seen, such reconciliation must of necessity have as its foundation the ethic of inclusion, in contradistinction to the logic of exclusion that underlies much of contemporary violence. Here lies the key to the much needed reconceptualisation of citizenship.

The notion of citizenship, though it has a long history and is widely regarded as a core element of the Western democratic tradition, has fallen on hard times. What we mean by citizenship has become a subject of contention. Interpretations of democratic citizenship, which place the accent on active participation in the life of the community, have been dismissed as anachronistic or unworkable. The affairs of government are said to be so complex as to be beyond the intellectual or organisational competence of most citizens, and therefore best left in the hands of periodically elected elites. The task of the citizen is simply to choose between competing political elites, with private interests as the principal guide to the exercise of choice.

Others have gone so far as to question whether an idea rooted in the history of the territorially bound state, be it the city-state, imperial state, feudal state or nation-state, still has relevance in the era of globalisation. Others still fear that breathing new life into the concept may simply give renewed impetus to the nationalisms of an earlier age. These questions and uncertainties make it imperative that we revisit the theory and practice of citizenship. Rethinking the meaning, purpose and institutional modalities of citizenship must therefore be seen as a critically important task of contemporary peace research.

Citizenship has to be rethought, if for no other reason than that the state itself, to which citizenship has been linked in theory and practice, is undergoing profound change. The state, as political and legal institution, is buffeted by forces unleashed by three interconnected currents, all of which lie beyond its effective control: transnational interconnectedness

¹⁶ See Brian Baxter, *Ecologism: An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999; Mark J. Smith, *Ecologism: Towards Ecological Citizenship*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

(hence the porosity of national boundaries), supranational fusion (which calls into question traditional notions of sovereignty), and subnational fission (which undermines national cohesion). As a consequence, the national state can no longer be considered the exclusive ordering principle in human governance or the exclusive form of cultural identification and political allegiance.

It follows that citizenship, just like governance which it sustains and from which it derives meaning and content, needs to relate to an increasingly complex environment. It needs to take account of the variable rights and responsibilities that correspond to multiple and shifting loyalties and forms of belonging. Unavoidably, this means a period of prolonged tension and uncertainty. Simply put, citizenship can no longer be conceived as a territorially bound concept. A particular space or community remains a valid object of attachment, but such attachment can no longer constitute the exclusive focus of citizenship. Citizenship has to function within a multi-spatial, multidimensional frame of reference. While citizens may wish to give expression to a range of identities and solidarities, they must be disposed and equipped to negotiate differences so as to maximise mutual benefit. In one sense, this is not a new idea. It retains the widely accepted principle that citizens stand in a 'civic' relationship with one another, which requires them to act in ways consistent with the common good. What is new is the understanding that the common good extends not just to a strictly delineated political community, but to the international common good, and beyond that to the good of the entire Earth community, which some have helpfully designated as the 'Commonwealth of life'.

To distinguish it from nationally based citizenship, some have labelled the emerging forms of citizenship 'post-national' or 'global'. Each label does convey an important element of the new reality, but there is a case for a label that is more attuned to the vastly altered circumstances of the 21st century. 'Dialogical citizenship' offers a more promising bridge between the plural and the universal, a more insightful response to the complex realities of ethnic, racial, cultural and civilizational difference, and greater awareness of our interconnectedness with other inhabitants of the biosphere and their respective life support systems. Specifically, it is better able to encompass the wide range of identities and solidarities that have come to the fore as a reaction to rising levels of discontent, marginalisation or simply homelessness. Many find in religious, tribal, ethnic, racial, civilizational and increasingly ecological solidarities more convivial ways of living in time and space, or simply the promise of a new home. As a result of the 'deterritorialization' of identity, to which the large-scale dispersal of peoples and the communications revolution have been potent contributing factors, most societies constitute a complex mosaic of communities. As a consequence, hybrid and interacting identities, fuelled by globalising currents that show no sign of abating, are giving rise to new and complex forms of cultural, religious and political pluralism.

Dialogue is a particularly useful communicative model in that it can accommodate both difference and commonality. The world's major ethical traditions share a deep sense of the dignity of human life, a commitment to human fulfilment, and a concern for standards of 'rightness' in human conduct. Here we include not only religiously based cosmologies, notably Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, Christianity among others, but also those that have no place for the 'divine', including Confucianism, western secular humanism, and importantly the traditions of indigenous peoples. There is enough common ground between

these ethical worldviews to make possible a respectful and on-going conversation about ethics in general and social and ecological ethics in particular.

At the same time dialogue acknowledges the importance of difference. Each tradition has its own texts, distinctive ethos and symbolism, languages and customs, artistic and intellectual achievements, its own perspectives on ethical conduct, its own understanding of personal and social relationships.¹⁷ Such differences need not stand in the way of meaningful dialogue either across political, linguistic, cultural or religious boundaries.¹⁸ Dialogue is enriched as much by diversity as by commonality. In a profound sense, diversity and commonality are not antithetical but complementary. Commonality makes dialogue possible, while diversity makes it essential.

Dialogue, it need hardly be said, is no easy undertaking, and nowhere is it more demanding than in situations of conflict or tension. To be at all effective, cross-cultural dialogue requires interlocutors to listen to one another, and become open, sensitive, even vulnerable to the perspectives, concerns and grievances of others. In the process, they embark on a journey as much of 'self-discovery' as of 'discovery of the other'.

It follows that in dialogue, citizens, both in their personal capacities and as representatives of different identity groups, are ready to hold their respective traditions and political preferences up to critical examination, and consider ways of adapting them to the new circumstances of our epoch. Dialogue works best when it fosters profound soul-searching, however painful it may be, within and between communities, faiths, cultures and civilisations. In dialogue, participants share their narratives, listen to one another's experience of pain, acknowledge past wrongs, and accept collective responsibility for righting the wrongs of the past.

Such dialogue can prove immensely valuable in diverse settings, but a few are worth highlighting: situations where communities have been subjected to longstanding oppression or marginalisation by dominant majorities or minorities; troubled relationships between the West and the non-West, whose far-reaching and often poorly understood consequences are still with us; and policy debates in relation to globalisation and the multifaceted ecological crisis that now exercises every level of governance. In parenthesis, it is worth noting that thinkers from different religious and spiritual traditions have initiated a far-reaching dialogue that challenges longstanding attitudes to nature by recovering marginalised elements of their respective traditions. In the process, they are giving shape to new visions of the divine, the sacred, the Earth, and human beings. In these and other highly contested contexts, formal and informal dialogues are making it possible to review existing entitlements and obligations and a more appropriate balance to be struck between prudence and risk taking. The dialogue of analysis is soon complemented by the dialogue of action.

In dialogical citizenship there is a place for both individual and collective agency. Needless to say, complex questions arise as to how collective entities may participate in dialogue.

¹⁷ Fred Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices*. New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's Press, 2002.

¹⁸ Hereafter referred to as cross-cultural dialogue

Who can legitimately speak for Russophone Ukrainians, Palestinians, Kurds in Turkey or Tamils in Sri Lanka, let alone for Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or the Earth's other species? Differences within communities and groups are an apt reminder that dialogue involves more than an exchange between two clearly identifiable groups. Dialogue is often especially useful within groups and movements – within faith traditions; within Islam or Christianity; within the Sunni and Shi'a traditions; within the environmental and human rights movements. Dialogue, we should remember, is a tender plant in need of constant and patient nurturing. Issues of participation, procedure and facilitation are themselves fitting subjects of dialogue.

Opportunities and responsibilities in dialogue necessarily vary with the backgrounds, experiences, skills and professional role of the participants. Those in influential roles, including those holding public office (whether elected or appointed), industrialists, financiers, lawyers, doctors, architects, town planners, religious and community leaders, have an obligation to listen and give voice to those whose voices are less easily heard. Philosophers, religious scholars, intellectuals of one kind or another as well as poets, novelists, artists, journalists and publicists have a similar but distinctive responsibility to shed light on the nature and magnitude of the contemporary predicament and suggest possible remedies and ways to facilitate and enrich the ensuing dialogue.

Given the pre-eminent role of the market in resource allocation and in shaping economic activity generally, dialogical citizenship requires also the engagement of those who occupy the corporate centres of decision making. As a general proposition, dialogical interaction is especially needed between institutions, both public and private, and the stakeholders affected by their decisions. The 'environmental impact statement' mechanism now widely used by provincial and national jurisdictions, to the extent that it is predicated on the stakeholder principle, embryonically at least, points in this direction. The consultative status accorded by the UN system to a range of civil society organisations and their inclusion, at least at the periphery of international negotiations—more centrally when it comes to responding to pandemics and humanitarian emergencies—is suggestive of the same trend.

Identifying the sites where dialogical engagement can effectively flourish is a large subject which has yet to receive the attention it deserves. The insights and methodologies of peace research could do much to fill this gap. If citizens are to relate in substantive ways to the different tiers of governance and at the same time take advantage of opportunities for engagement in civil society and for fruitful dialogue with the business sector, ways must be found to devise sustainable connections between the different sites of engagement.

Even if it is to engage only a sizeable minority—let's say between 10 and 15 per cent of the world's population—a major cultural shift will be necessary, and education will be integral to this transformative process. This is too large a subject to be addressed within the confines of this policy brief. A few observations may nevertheless help to convey something of the magnitude of the educational task ahead. First, while formal institutions—from kindergartens to universities—will play a critical role, they will need to be complemented by less formal programmes in lifelong education, for the needs of dialogical citizenship will continue to evolve and grow in line with the far-reaching technological, socio-economic,

political and environmental changes still to come.¹⁹ Secondly, the purpose of education will have to be rethought. Education for dialogical citizenship will need to occupy centre stage, and not be seen as a mere appendage to the serious business of vocational training dictated largely by the needs of industry.²⁰ The challenges posed by the 'great transition' and the opportunities offered by dialogical discourse and practice will need to inform the reworking of curriculum and learning materials as well as teacher education reform. Effective implementation will require sustained policy support from all tiers of governance, pedagogical guidance from educationalists, intellectuals, artists and practitioners, and innovative use of both traditional and social media. Thirdly, both the content and method of the teaching-learning process will need to be cross-national, cross-cultural and planetary in scope and inspiration. Finally, a priority for the new pedagogy will be the fostering of formal and informal dialogical encounters among educators and students and between them, parents and the wider community.

In all of this, peace research, building on substantial work already done around the broad theme of peace education, can contribute much, provided it takes full account of the complex challenges and uncertainties of these turbulent times, and the far-reaching implications for both governance and citizenship. The task is no doubt daunting, the terrain not always fertile, and the level of inertia and at times outright resistance in intellectual, bureaucratic and corporate circles far from negligible. Yet, it is difficult to imagine us navigating the 'great transition' at all safely in the absence of a transnational intellectual project conscious of the tension between singularity and plurality, and willing to explore in imaginative and transdisciplinary ways the potential of dialogue for reconciling these conflicting tendencies.

¹⁹ Sobhi Tawi, 'Education for "Global Citizenship": A Framework for Discussion'. UNESCO, Education Foresight and Research, Working Papers, August 2013. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000223784>. Accessed 9 May 2016.

²⁰ Greg Mannion, Gert Biesta, Mark Priestley and Hamish Ross, 'The Global Dimension in Education and Education for Global Citizenship: Genealogy and Critique', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 9(3-4), September-November 2011, 443-456.

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