Arms Control and World Order:
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Abstract

Sweeping changes in the world order over the last two decades have contributed to the unravelling of the arms control regime, concluded an international workshop of experts and diplomats. The shift from a bipolar to a polycentric distribution of power, together with dramatic changes in technology, have undermined the basis of traditional arms control. In a time of turbulent change, what are the prospects for checking the dangerous dynamics now under way? Technical modernisation of nuclear weapons is driving a new phase in the arms race. It risks instability by broadening the spectrum of capabilities and widening the options of nuclear weapon use, blurring the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, and reducing decision times. The workshop examined three historical precedents for managing international security and arms control cooperatively – the Concert of Europe, the detente of the 1960s and 1970s, and the development of confidence-building measures through the Stockholm process in the 1980s. The workshop drew a number of lessons for the present day. The case of the Concert of Europe suggests that a managed system of international security could prevent war over a long period. The case of the detente period suggests that improvements in arms control and in world order are mutually reinforcing. The case of the Stockholm process suggests that limited, step-by-step measures are a means for making progress in an unpromising environment. The workshop considered how multilateral institutions could counter the growth of resurgent nationalism and instead promote global order and cooperative security. It also heard more radical criticisms of existing institutions and proposals for change in the global order.

The workshop brought together representatives of the arms control communities in the United States, Russia, Europe, China, India, Pakistan, Japan and the Middle East. It was convened by the Toda Peace Institute, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and
the University of Otago and held at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation between 13 and 15 October 2019.

**Changes in the World Order**

World orders can be thought of as successive configurations in the structure, rules and distribution of power of the international system. In the past, new orders typically followed major wars, although significant transitions have taken place recently in the absence of systemic war.

Since 1945, world order has been based on the principles of the UN Charter: state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity. International law prohibited wars of aggression. A dense architecture of multilateral organisations developed to manage international relations, based around the Bretton Woods institutions. This was a rules-based order, though the rules were contested and contradictory. A key element of the order was the effort to manage strategic competition in arms, which lasted for almost 50 years from the 1960s to 2010.

The nuclear arms control regime was built around the bipolar order, but this began to crumble at the end of the Cold War, and a polycentric system evolved in its place. The United States remained overwhelmingly the most powerful state, but it was in relative decline. China overtook the US economy in the 2010s. Russia remained a great power and others were jockeying for great power status. After the brief period of hope when a new world order seemed in prospect after the Cold War, the great powers failed to agree on new rules. They disagreed over the legality of interventions in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, the Crimea and the South China Sea. Russian proposals for a new European security architecture were rejected. The US, supported by the EU, considered that Russia and China were breaching the rules of the international order. The Security Council found itself at loggerheads.

The decline of multilateralism gathered pace as a new Administration in Washington decided to pursue an ‘America First’ programme and withdrew from trade, climate and security agreements. Sovereign states re-asserted themselves. The US and EU had conflicting agendas. The great powers began to handle international relations bilaterally, rather than through multilateral bodies. International norms and agreements were under threat. Sanctions and trade wars replaced efforts at multilateral cooperation. The rise of China and the fears this caused in the US led some to see their rivalry in Thucydidean terms.

Is the present phase an anomaly that will be followed by the restoration of the liberal international order in due course? Or is the world in transition between different orders? Nationalism and populism have become widespread, not only in the more peripheral countries of the world order but also in the countries which founded the post-war order. The trends underlying the changing order seem to be deeper than a mere change of leaders could remedy. Rapid changes are under way in the world economy, in technology, in the distribution of power, and in cultures and beliefs. We are living through a transitional period and it is not yet clear what the new order will be. But the legitimacy of the liberal order and of US leadership is contested, and it is clear that the new distribution of power calls for rules and institutions which go beyond those of the post-1945 world.
Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament

During the Cold War, the high risks of nuclear confrontation led the US and Soviet Union to cooperate in managing their strategic rivalry through arms control. This resulted in a series of agreements to limit strategic armaments, starting with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972 and leading to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) of 2010. The effect of these agreements was to cut deployed US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons from 10,000 to 1,550 on each side. Under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of the 1990s, the US and Soviet Union also withdrew almost all their tactical nuclear weapons from European soil. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement of 1990 put a cap on heavy conventional weapons, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Agreement (ABM) of 1972 banned strategic missile defences. Meanwhile the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 committed all states to share nuclear technology and pursue nuclear disarmament, while seeking to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This arms control architecture, which developed in the period of bipolarity, is now unravelling. This began in 2002 with the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the INF Treaty. The CFE Treaty has not been renewed. Talks on the New START Treaty have stalled. Arms control, together with the associated arrangements for on-site verification and nuclear safeguarding agreements, appeared to be coming to an end. The NPT remains in force, but it is threatened by the failure of the existing powers to fulfil the terms of Article VI by pursuing disarmament negotiations. The outcome of the 1920 NPT Review Conference is uncertain.

The hiatus in arms control is linked with the transition in world order and the breakdown in norms and multilateral institutions. Two new challenges are contributing to the breakdown of the bilateral arms regime. The first is the shift from bipolarity to multiple nuclear powers, with asymmetric nuclear forces. This raises difficult questions about how to extend the existing arms control template to new actors. Second, the great powers are pursuing technological advances that are deemed provocative as well as intractable; that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons; and that therefore endanger strategic stability.

Different Views of World Order and the Arms Control Regime

Existing arms control agreements clearly need adapting for multiple nuclear states, but the lack of enthusiasm for arms control, together with the unwillingness of additional states to be included in existing agreements, make this difficult.

These differences are part of a larger contest of views about the world order. In the United States, the Administration pursues American national interests and sees world order in terms of national powers pursuing their own interests, while its domestic opponents prefer to return to American leadership of a liberal rules-based order exercised through multilateral institutions. The US Nuclear Posture Review probably speaks for both groups when it sees Russia and China as contesting international norms and order.
In Russia, the perspective is that the United States is posing the biggest challenge to the architecture of world institutions and arms control. European states are regarded as failing to act as independent actors and contributing to instability. Blocked in its efforts to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions, Russia sees its future as a Euro-Pacific state giving more attention to Asian affairs. The issue for Russia is not the order, but Russia’s place in the order. Russia seeks to maintain military parity with the US, but expresses no qualms about China acquiring a similar number of warheads.

China’s view of the world order is that the post-World War II international system based on international law is still functioning, and that economic interdependence and integrated technical developments require globalisation and multilateralism. Beijing supports win-win arrangements and international cooperation, rather than ‘might makes right’ policies. Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly mentioned the principle of ‘cooperative security’ in his speech to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia in 2014. The Chinese perspective is that Western efforts to incorporate China into nuclear arms control serve Western interests in preventing China’s rise. China has ruled out participating in a trilateral nuclear disarmament agreement with the US and Russia, since its arsenal is so much smaller than theirs. China will continue to focus on enhancing its material capabilities.

India traditionally pursued the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and after acquiring a nuclear capability in 1998, pursued a policy of minimal deterrence and no first use. Nuclear arms control was seen to be a matter for the US and Russia, and not relevant for India. Since China is unwilling to adopt nuclear arms control, India did not expect to do so either. However, views are changing in favour of arms control in India, particularly as a debate begins about whether India will be sucked into a technological arms race. If India is obliged to develop tactical nuclear weapons and to put multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRV) on its weapons, then arms control to manage technological proliferation may be necessary.

In summary, the additional nuclear states do not yet wish to enter an arms control framework, and do not use multilateral institutions to manage their security relationships. However, it is thought that these countries could see the benefit of adopting nuclear risk reduction measures.

**Technology, Arms Control and World Order**

In addition to the problems posed by multiple nuclear states, adapting arms control to new technological developments raised formidable challenges. Technology is a powerful driver of the nuclear arms race. Modernisation leads to more modernisation and results in states perceiving each other as seeking superiority rather than acting defensively.

The US perceives China’s nuclear modernisation as an effort to secure a second-strike capability, while China sees US modernisation as an attempt to develop a war-fighting capability. The development of low yield nuclear weapons has fuelled this perception. The US is seeking these weapons to deter Russia, but China sees US actions as intentionally lowering the threshold of nuclear war. These mismatched perceptions are a source of
insecurity. In order to overcome them, the US and China need to develop more nuanced perceptions of each other’s thinking.

China developed its strategic nuclear submarines and its hypersonic glide missile programme and dual-capable weapons in order to avoid being left behind. The development of the technology preceded a strategic rationale. There has not been a proper appreciation of the strategic risks of these deployments. Joint dialogues and technical studies are desirable to foster better perceptions. They could avoid the conflicting perceptions over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) in Korea, for example.

The development of new types of weapons, including nuclear cruise missiles, trans-oceanic nuclear torpedoes, cyber capabilities, autonomous weapons and space-based sensors greatly complicates the task of arms control. However, if they are not addressed, technical developments end up widening security differences and undermining trust.

Successful technological revolutions have led to drastic reductions in delivery times for nuclear weapons. For example, subsonic bombers with a 5,000km range took six hours to reach their targets. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with a 10,000 km range reduced the flight time to 30 minutes. Hypersonic cruise missiles of 1,500 km range reduced it to 15 minutes. Forward-based Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) reduced it to 10 minutes. And cyberattacks strike virtually instantaneously, giving only seconds for decision-making. The trend is towards shorter decision times which may encourage decision-makers in the future to consider automated reaction systems. The US, Russia and China are all racing forward in this area, risking destabilising consequences. There are alarming implications if artificial intelligence becomes fused with nuclear command and control.

Strategic stability requires going in the reverse direction: lengthening decision times, de-alerting nuclear weapons, and banning space weapons. A ban on autonomous weapons would be a first step, and this may be feasible to negotiate at Geneva.

The US spends two-thirds of the global military Research and Development budget, far outstripping all other countries. It is clear that the US provides the main impetus to this technological arms race, and this suggests that domestic restraint as well as international agreement is necessary to regulate it.

**Historical Experiences**

The workshop next turned to examine three examples of international cooperation over security from the past: the Concert of Europe, the Detente of the 1970s, and the Stockholm process in the late 1980s. Do they suggest lessons for the situation today?

**(1) The Concert of Europe: Lessons for Cooperative Security**

There are few examples of successful cooperation between great powers in keeping the peace, but the Concert of Europe, which came out of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and lasted, with interruptions, until almost 1914, is a remarkable exception. The great powers
used it to avoid wars between themselves from 1815 until the Crimean War in 1854, and again from after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 up to the First World War. It succeeded in these periods despite the diversity of its members – it included Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox powers, and autocracies as well as democracies.

It operated on a set of principles which have survived to inform subsequent international cooperation. The most important were that its members recognised each other as equals, they were sensitive to the vital interests of other states, they accepted a duty to consult, they practised restraint, and they renounced unilateral interventions and territorial gains.

The Concert operated through lengthy conferences, and its flexibility and adaptability helped it to work. By the end, however, it lost its flexibility as rigid alliances developed, and the Concert struggled to manage the growing imbalance of power between Germany and other states. It failed to prevent the First World War. By then, Concert members had begun to violate its norms.

Could a similar structure be developed now? The closest current institution is the G20, which represents the widest and most significant group of powers. However, it is not clear that the G20 could have a useful role in nuclear arms control. It is not possible now to disregard small states, and the G20 is insufficiently representative. The Concert of Europe was based on a shared system of legitimacy: in today’s world, the UN plays this legitimising role. The lessons to be drawn are the importance of consultation, transparency, and accommodation of interests, including those of non-members. It might be possible to borrow the principle of consultation by developing Track one-and-a-half meetings for all the nuclear weapon states.

(2) The Detente of the 1970s and US-Soviet Arms Control

Arms control goes back a long way, to before the period of detente. It started with the establishment of the IAEA in 1957, the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1960 and the formulation of the notion of enhanced strategic stability by Schelling and Halperin in 1961. In conceptual underpinnings and purpose, it differed from detente. Arms control aimed to regulate the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, not to resolve it. It was not designed to change the Cold War international system, only to make it safer. Indeed, arms control can be seen as an effort to sustain the Cold War system.

The first main pillar of US-Soviet arms control in the 1970s was the preservation of strategic equality between the superpowers, based on mutual deterrence. The second pillar was the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which started with the Irish resolution of 1961 and became a major area of US-Soviet cooperation. The third pillar was the negotiation of reductions in conventional forces in Europe (the Mutually Balanced Force Reductions, MBFR). Its logic was partly to prevent conventional war by regulating conventional weapons, but also to regulate the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons. The overall goal of arms control was to reduce the likelihood of either superpower winning a nuclear war. It was, and remains, a tool to regulate nuclear deterrence and to make it safer – not a means to bring about disarmament.
Detente began in 1969 and was a response to a changing balance of power. It was also a recognition of strategic parity and of the territorial status quo in Europe. On the US side it served to distract attention from Vietnam and to avoid the risk of a Soviet-Chinese alignment. On the Soviet side it consolidated the place of the Soviet Union in the international system, recognising its superpower status and establishing a stable if competitive international order. Detente, of course, facilitated arms control, but it can be argued that detente was not necessary to arms control.

In a sense, that has a positive lesson for the situation today: it might suggest that arms control can progress even if the political conflicts between Russia and the West remain unresolved. Russia is more likely to cling to its nuclear weapons than the United States, because it is inferior in conventional weapons. But resumption of serious arms control is possible.

However, detente was not unrelated to arms control. Both detente and arms control were attempts to freeze the status quo. In the late 1970s the US lost interest in detente and the Second Cold War saw a renewed increase in nuclear competition. The end of detente undermined arms control – President Carter did not send the SALT II Treaty to Congress after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – but both sides decided to keep it going by continuing to observe SALT II limits.

If strategic parity was a condition for detente and arms control, it is not clear how this would apply today, when the balance between nuclear arsenals is more asymmetric. Dialogue is essential to secure arms control and arms control can be both a result and a tool of improved political relationships. A question for today's more complex political environment is how to make arms control once more a part of a positive action-reaction cycle with improvements in political relations.

(3) CSBMs and Arms Control in the late 1980s: lessons for cooperative security

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe took place between 1984 and 1986. It formed part of a chain of events whose significance was not realised until later, when it became one of the strands making possible the new security thinking that helped to end the Cold War. The Stockholm process highlights the importance of ‘associated measures’ which may have only an indirect connection with nuclear arms control, but which nevertheless facilitated a step-by-step process with benign results.

Negotiators started the conference in a mood of great pessimism. The relations between the superpowers had deteriorated in the course of the ‘second Cold War’. The MBFR talks had stalled. A serious nuclear false alarm incident took place in 1983. Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Schultz had clashed at the 1983 CSCE Follow-up Meeting. Nevertheless, Gromyko decided that the Stockholm process was important and should be kept going, even though progress at first was halting and exchanges sometimes confrontational. The military participants were extremely unwilling to share information on military deployments. Despite that, the conference managed to make progress. The procedural agreement of 1985
focused the negotiations on verifiable and military significant activities. The final agreement of 1986 included provisions for notification, observation and inspection of military activities. The implementation period from 1987 saw observers from the opposing blocs monitoring each other’s large-scale exercises.

A direct connection with the end of the Cold War is hard to establish. Many significant streams of events came together in parallel. However, by giving a basis for trust-building, and confidence in inspections and verification, the process contributed to the climate in which common security thinking became established. Changes in threat perceptions due to the CSBMs may have influenced the Soviets to shift towards a more defensive posture for the Warsaw Pact in 1987 and 1988, which was a significant act of de-escalation. There are many theories of why Gorbachev acted as he did, but the result was the end of the Cold War, an 85% reduction in nuclear weapons, and an enormous, largely unilateral disarmament process.

The Stockholm process suggests a number of lessons that may be applicable to the present day.

First, it was necessary to see the big picture, realising that progress in conventional weapons could unlock progress on nuclear arms control. While the Stockholm process was not mandated to deal with nuclear issues, it was significant that there were thousands of tactical nuclear weapons behind the conventional military formations that the CSBMs were intended to regulate. It was also necessary for military leaders to grasp that the overall benefits in greater security and confidence could outweigh the military disadvantages of openness about particular deployments. Gorbachev was decisive here, ordering Soviet commanders to accept on-site inspections in 1986.

Second, the process highlighted the importance of step-by-step procedures. The role these small steps took in diminishing threat perceptions, establishing trust and creating a credible atmosphere for negotiations was crucial. Agreements on general principles were important, but they could not substitute for carefully crafted measures. The clarity of definitions agreed in the Stockholm talks were important in a situation of minimal trust.

Third, it was crucial that leading figures changed their perceptions and their cognitive frames. The realisation on the part of both President Reagan and Gorbachev that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’ enabled them to prevail over their military advisers. Besides these changes at the elite level, the process led to the formation of an epistemic community committed to negotiating arms control across the participating countries.

Applying these lessons to today’s world, threat perceptions seem to be lower now than they were then. It is important to make people aware of the threats, and then to take action to lower them.

Step by step procedures seem to be applicable to nuclear risk reduction today.
Big-picture thinking is vital, but when it is not forthcoming from today’s political leaders, civil society, think tanks and non-nuclear states may have to take the lead.

The Stockholm process suggests the importance of clarity and a step-by-step approach in fostering predictability and thus mutual confidence.

**Multilateral Institutions and the Restoration of Global Stability**

The workshop then turned to examine the viability of the regional and multilateral institutions, and the need for new institutional arrangements, along the lines of a 21st Concert.

The international institutions that developed after the Second World War were able to function successfully in the Cold War because they fulfilled important public functions. They had to be transparent, to create rules, and to resolve disputes. They also had private functions in maintaining the contacts which laid the groundwork for subsequent public action. It is the capacity to fulfil these private functions that is being lost in the present environment. States are failing to understand each other’s concerns and failing to seek compromise through international organisations.

The previously discussed trends towards nationalism and greater assertiveness of states are having an adverse impact on international organisations. Nothing undermines their functioning more than the loss of regular communication and coordination among the key players. An epistemic community that can be built through patient negotiation, can equally be lost through unwillingness to negotiate.

It is clear that leading states are failing to use the existing international institutions, which are easily deadlocked as a result. Nevertheless, most international organisations, multilateral and regional institutions are still functioning. Keeping them going is worthwhile, even if they are unable to function as they should.

International organisations are important facilitators of dialogue. In this respect, several institutions can be identified.

The P-5 process (the conference of the Permanent Five Security Council members on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament) aims to work on nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures. It has had meagre results, but it is the only forum through which the first five nuclear weapon states can hold consultations on issues of strategic stability, risk reduction and similar issues. It is worth keeping alive.

The idea of a Nuclear Security Summit offers a better model than the G20 for a body that could work on risk reduction, with the aim of facilitating discussions among the nuclear powers. It needs a well-prepared and manageable agenda. A high-level process facilitated by sherpas could be effective.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sustains a useful ongoing dialogue and oversees the CSBMs. This is worth keeping. Its new format of Structured Dialogue is a step forward.
In terms of regional instruments, there is an absence of similar arrangements. Perhaps the Argentine Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is an exception. The Asia Pacific region lacks a structured dialogue on nuclear arms issues. ASEAN is limited by its scope, but it is an important institution for the East Asian peace.

In the Middle East, there are no comprehensive regional organisations which conduct a structured regional dialogue. The Arab League has its group of wise men on security and disarmament issues, and has observer status with the UN. It faces foreign interventions and internal disagreements. Israel continues to shield its nuclear arsenal from international negotiations. As a result, the Middle East lacks a suitable forum for promoting CBMs or cooperative security. Arab demands for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East have fallen on stony ground. From an Arab League perspective, Israel and the Arab countries should simultaneously accede to all the treaties restricting weapons of mass destruction.

The EU member states mostly hold on to their belief in global governance, multilateralism and respect for international law. They regret the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty and from the JCPOA. They want to avoid a new arms race and practise restraint. But they are not undertaking any bold initiatives on nuclear risk reductions or safer nuclear postures. Only Austria, Lichtenstein and the Holy See have ratified the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. France is pursuing closer defence cooperation at the European level, but the role of French nuclear weapons in this regard is not discussed. NATO member countries continue to support the NATO alliance and extended deterrence, despite uneasiness about the direction of US policy.

The workshop concluded that it is important to preserve the multilateral institutions, since they provide fora for consultations and side meetings. The UN, the Committee on Disarmament and the NPT processes are important even if, for the time being, they lack substantive results. New START and Open Skies meetings are valuable for continuing to bring military officials together. Such bodies can preserve institutional memories and epistemic communities.

A number of limited and specific steps forwards were recommended. Coalitions of the willing could be important in nuclear arms control, pursuing non-binding small steps. Track II meetings with retired nuclear commanders such as those held at Stanford could keep a dialogue going. Training for diplomats and arms control experts is needed, for example in the Middle East. A regional training programme for the Asia Pacific region would also be useful.

**Changing Mind-Sets and Changing World Orders**

Given the lack of momentum in arms control talks, how can the paralysis that has descended on this area be broken, at the elite level, at the level of public opinion, and in the work of the arms control and disarmament community? How can mind-sets be changed? What kind of dialogues might be effective, and what kind of research is needed?
Three answers were offered during the workshop. First, an empathic approach is required to change minds, both within the nuclear states and between them. Mind-sets are changeable and can be shaped. This is important because, at least in the case of the US resistance to arms control goes wider than the current Administration. In the area of new technology, soft law is needed before hard law, and Codes of Ethics can be helpful. Interdisciplinary studies are needed to address the question of how to manage the risks of new technologies. Verification technologies should be developed alongside the new military technologies they monitor and should not be left until treaties are agreed. Track one-and-a-half and Track II meetings and military to military communications can help to get people on to the same page.

Nuclear weapons are unusable as weapons of war, but the US public lacks a sense of nuclear risk. In the US community, the key need is to change the perception that arms control measures are concessions rather than shared interests. In this, individuals and personalities are important. Negotiators can set a tone of trust and empathy, which can carry them through difficult negotiations. To make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy, not with your friend. Patience, persistence, respect and speaking to reason rather than emotion are essentials for changing mindsets and step by step measures are needed to overcome the nuclear dangers.

If empathic engagement with adversaries is one response, another is to advocate a more critical stance towards the nuclear powers. For example, in Europe, the EU is teetering between a ‘hard power’ approach based on defence cooperation and arms exports, and its ‘softer’ role as a civil power and a conflict mediator. Critical voices are needed to challenge current policies and hold responsible those who are driving up military expenditure. Europeans could make a difference by ceasing to host US nuclear weapons and improving relations with Russia.

A third approach is to call for a transformational approach to world order. It was argued that the whole paradigm of nuclear deterrence is problematic in this view and needs to be replaced by a human security perspective. Civil society actors and developing countries should play a much bigger role in international security issues. A new world order should reflect our shared vulnerabilities. The world order is global in impact, but participation in the decisions which affect people everywhere remains highly restricted.

**Conclusion**

The workshop identified a clear pattern of threats from the inter-linked changes in world order and the unravelling of arms control. The proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries and the rapid developments in technology call for a new approach to arms control. Historical precedents suggest the importance of agreeing principles to manage an international security order, fostering better international relations to make arms control possible, and building trust through step-by-step processes. Multilateral organisations are important, particularly for the opportunities they provide for epistemic communities to form across national lines. Mind-sets are malleable, and opportunities must be created for them to change.
The large questions raised about the direction of world order clearly call for further exploration. There may not be agreement on a shared view of the future, but there was agreement that we have to share the future. This has consequences for how we act. In the immediate future, the priority remains to preserve as much as possible from past arms control initiatives – to extend New START, to develop risk reduction and nuclear safety talks, and to sustain the NPT. This may require widening the discussion of disarmament from the few who are currently involved in nuclear weapons decisions to the many who are vulnerable to their consequences. A fundamental shift is needed, away from a narrow and self-defeating pursuit of unilateral military security, towards cooperative security for the benefit of all.
The Author

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