The Concert of Europe: 
A Template for Multilateralism in the 21st Century?

Harald Müller

Introduction

Peace did not break out with the end of the Cold War. For a short time, it seemed that a movement towards eternal peace as envisaged by German Philosopher Immanuel Kant in the late 18th century might come true. After this brief breathing space in the nineties, disputes among the great powers and thereby geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry reemerged slowly but steadily. They became more and more the prevailing pattern of world politics, despite obvious common interests that should have pulled them together: fighting terrorism, stabilising the global economy, preserving a viable environment, controlling and subduing regional violence with global repercussions; and, after all, avoiding a catastrophic nuclear confrontation. Part of this dynamic has been a change of global power relations: new great powers have risen, notably China and, with some distance, India; established powers have not disappeared, but declined relatively, notably the United States but also Russia which struggles hard to preserve its place among the top powers.

This constellation contains obvious risks. Historically, major power shifts have not always led to wars, but sometimes they have. This risk must always be kept in mind. Nuclear bipolarism has been replaced by several interrelated groupings of nuclear rivalry – US versus Russia and China with the latter two hedging against each other, China versus India.

1 This policy brief is based on the findings of a project which was supported by the Europe and Global Challenges program of the Volkswagen Foundation, the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, and the Compagnia di San Paolo. It relies particularly on the two publications of this project, Harald Müller/Carsten Rauch (eds.), Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War. Debating a 21st Century Concert of Powers, New York, Routledge; and A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers – Promoting Great Power Multilateralism for the Post-Transatlantic Era. Frankfurt/M, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 2014, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/PolicyPaper_ATwentyFirstCenturyConcertofPowers.pdf. Recent research for this paper has been supported by Charles University Research Centre program UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague / Faculty of Social Sciences)
and India versus Pakistan; North Korea sits at the margin as a possible spoiler and catalyst. This constellation brings back on to the agenda the danger of a catastrophic nuclear cataclysm, almost forgotten after 1990. There is an urgent need to adapt great power interaction to this more and more salient problematique. Existing institutions, particularly the United Nations and their Security Council, continue to do useful work, but have been, by and large, unable to stop or regulate the competitive dynamics under way. This necessitates a look beyond existing institutional frameworks. Fresh and innovative approaches are required to get the great powers back on track to resume their function as guardians of international order rather than become its ultimate destroyers.

History supplies few examples of successful great power cooperation for preserving peace over long periods. Hegemonic systems (like that in East Asia which worked for centuries before the arrival of western imperialists) cannot serve as a model, since the emergence of a new overarching hegemon is not likely. Resources are spread too widely over the world, and innovations diffuse too quickly for a single state to achieve overwhelming relative power. For the emerging multipolar structure, one of the rare templates of successful peace-preserving collaboration has been the Concert of Europe (CoE), which emerged in the course of the Vienna Congress of 1815, the all-European conference which terminated the period of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. The CoE worked for a century; it prevented great power war for two long periods (1815 to 1854 and 1871 to 1914), and managed at least to avoid all-out war in the interim period of the Crimea War and the Wars of German and Italian unification (1854-1871).

The Concert of Europe

The CoE emerged from the practices of the four victorious powers of the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) during the Vienna Congress of 1815. Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia collaborated in directing and guiding this unprecedented all-European peace conference. They aimed to create a viable and stable order that would prevent a repetition of the scourge of almost permanent warfare that had characterised the preceding two decades. The Concert took first the form of an alliance against the resurgence of vanquished France. However, the four powers understood quickly and wisely that a dissatisfied and isolated France would develop into a permanent threat to stability. Therefore, France was co-opted into the Concert in 1818. The Ottoman empire (on issues concerning its vital interest) and Italy (after unification) were coopted later.

The CoE pursued two major objectives: to avoid a war among its members, and to keep spoilers among the minor powers from disrupting stability in Europe. The latter objective meant watching carefully domestic developments in the European states as well as their external behaviour. It was not forgotten that it was revolutionary change in France that had triggered the series of wars in the first place (though one can well argue that it was monarchical reaction to the French revolution that put the revolutionaries on the war path). Both goals were intimately related. Domestic unrest in smaller countries tend to attract the interested involvement of the big ones and draw them into clashes in the quest for securing

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2 This section draws on Matthias Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815-1860. München, Oldenbourg Verlag
influential positions in the regions shattered by upheaval. Pacifying this risky dynamic was one of the main concerns of the great powers in the enlightened self-interest of maintaining stability.

In other words, the CoE represented a self-appointed collaborative grouping of major states that had been at loggerheads for the better part of the time since the Westphalian state system had been established. It was born out of war weariness; permanent war had produced a desire to avoid a continuation of past conflicts and a sense of responsibility for securing a smoother and less risk- and violence-prone political environment. This has happened occasionally after major war. The Concert is distinct in that it succeeded for a long while, by and large, in realising this ambitious purpose.

**Dispelling Mis-readings of the Concert**

Over time, the CoE has fallen in disregard with many historians and political analysts. The perspective on the Concert has been distorted by a couple of mis-readings and misunderstandings. A very basic failure to understand the role of the concert consists of ascribing to it a much shorter duration than it actually had. Termination dates of 1830, 1848, 1854 have been proposed, but when we focus on political and institutional practice, it becomes obvious that it is only on the eve of World War I that the CoE ceased to function. In fact, it has been shown that concert meetings were most numerous in the period between 1849 and 1869 (Schulz 2018, 31), that is during the interim period of wars to the eve of the last of them, between France and the emerging Germany, simply because the members felt the urgency and risks of the situation and worked hard to prevent the eruption of military force, and, failing in that purpose, to contain the damage by keeping the number of warring states to the minimum. After the end of this period, the instrument of major joint conferences to solve salient disputes was revived, and the whole toolbox of mediation, persuasion and limited coercion to restore restraint of both CoE powers and smaller powers was put in action again, notably in the crises concerning the Balkans and on colonial disputes. Ironically, a certain complacency among elites and peoples shortly before the beginning of the Great War might be due to the efficiency of Concert diplomacy in the preceding period when each crisis ended, eventually, in diplomatically produced accommodation.

A second misreading is the confusion between the CoE and the "Holy Alliance", a grouping of the three conservative monarchies, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Prussia, who had agreed in 1815 to thwart new revolutions in Europe and to uphold the rule of established monarchies. Great Britain refused to accept this anti-change position as Concert objective and finally prevailed in 1823: unilateral intervention in public uprisings was no common goal of the CoE. This confusion has projected an image of the CoE as reactionary, monarchical and change-averse, anti-liberal and averse to the idea of self-determination. In fact, the CoE was far from homogeneous, it had from the beginning a (relatively) liberal member, namely the most powerful one, Great Britain. France, after 1830, switched into the liberal camp. As a consequence of the said prejudice, it is often overlooked how much the Concert was

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3 Matthias Schulz, The Concert of Europe and international security governance: how did it operate, what did it accomplish, what were its shortcomings, what can we learn? In Müller/Rauch (eds.), Great Power Multilateralism (Fn. 1), 26-45, p. 31
occupied with managing change, frequently in the form of the creation of new states (Greece, Belgium, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania etc.) most of which came free from occupation in the process.

It is also not true that the Concert was no more than a balance-of-power matter in which the great powers pursued their interests in unconstrained ways. To the contrary, at different points in time, the CoE set limits on the activities of some of its own members. Russia was even taken to war (1854) by two Concert members when it renounced restraint and pursued territorial expansion in the principalities of the lower Danube. Austria-Hungary, France and Prussia/Germany were also hindered occasionally to achieve goals they viewed as being in their national interest and could not prevail even over smaller opponents. A striking example was the mediation of concert powers in the dispute between Prussia and Switzerland over the fate of the province of Neuchatel, initially under Prussian rule but willing to join the Swiss federation. Eventually, through the involvement of France and Britain, the Swiss gained a new canton in exchange for rather symbolic concessions to the Prussian King.

Thus, while the Concert was certainly an exclusive institution in which the great powers took decisions on their own that affected the whole of Europe, these decisions supplied a public good for all: stability and the ensuing security. Small powers were occasionally consulted on matters concerning their vital interests, but they had no real say in systemic decisions. Nevertheless, they profited from the gain in stability which the CoE provided.

**Concert Methods**

The new start for great power relations followed a long period in which it had been deemed legitimate and conducive to national interests to pursue one’s own (territorial and economic) expansion in the mode of a zero-sum game. It was normal to beg one’s neighbours, to open war at opportunity, and to seek (territorial and economic) enrichment as the self-explanatory goal of using force across borders. This practice had come to a dead end, and the four, later five, powers set to reshape what counted as appropriate external behaviour of major states.

The CoE established over time a couple of norms guiding its members’ behaviour that deviated from the pure pursuit of narrow national interests, because the result, avoidance of major war, was certainly in the enlightened interest of all. Despite their distinct differences in power, the five states recognised each other as equals and were expected to be sensible to each other’s vital interests. Members agreed to show restraint in the pursuit of their political goals, to consult, deliberate and negotiate in all situations in which the risk of military contest was present, to renounce unilateral intervention without common or at least majority consent, and not to seek territorial gain as a consequence of such interventions. As for all norms, there were occasional violations, but by and large, CoE members observed them most of the time. Violations were answered by withdrawal of support by peers, or, in rare cases, active opposition as in the case of the Crimean war of 1854. Violations of the norms by minor powers provoked the use of pressure politics to bring the reluctant party into line. Joint demarches, mandated mediation, diplomatic correspondence, military
(frequently naval) demonstrations and, in extreme cases, joint or mandated military intervention constituted the CoE’s toolbox.

Institutionally, the Concert worked through occasional meetings of heads of state – the monarchs until France turned into a pure republic after 1871 – but mostly by ambassadorial or ministerial conferences. The multilateral practice socialised an increasingly professionalised diplomatic corps serving as the institutional memory. Diplomatic activity was much helped through the replacement of the traditional protocol of status-based hierarchy and courtly rituals by simpler, more functional rules reflecting a principle equality of the great powers. Joint communiques and protocols of meetings provided a corpus of codified norms, though not necessarily in legal form.

The Concert did not know a veto. It left open the option to opt out on issues where a power had divergent views but no overwhelming interests and thus was willing to leave the field to its peers without further involvement. The lack of veto enabled Concert majorities to exert peer pressure in different forms on CoE members violating some norms and to take decisions by majority, even though the preferred result was to act out of a consensus.

Thus, the CoE worked with a mixture of formality and informality. This permitted the necessary flexibility to address a great variety of different circumstances and constellations, and avoided stalemates and blockades which a strictly formal system of decision-making rules might have imposed. What remained obligatory in all situations was maintaining the steady flow of communication between Concert members.

**What the Concert Achieved**

As indicated, the CoE presided over the period of the largest absence of large-scale war in modern history. The first period (40 years) and the last period (43 years) witnessed no great power war at all, largely due to the observation of Concert norms or joint pressure on members threatening norm violation. Concert influence on minor powers helped to defuse, terminate and settle conflicts that otherwise might have eventually led to a conflagration between great powers on different sides of the dispute in question. In the interim period, as the statistics of the frequency of meetings show, the CoE remained highly active for prevention as well as containment. While prevention failed occasionally, the containment of violent conflict worked. The few wars that occurred did not spread into an all-continental war as it did at the end of the Concert history, in 1914.

This achievement is all the more impressive as the Concert had to struggle with significant change inside. Two major reforms transformed Great Britain from a oligarchic, semi-constitutional monarchy to a constitutional monarchy with parliamentarian rule. France switched its form of government not less than three times. Austria-Hungary moved into a double monarchy with federal traits. Prussia mutated into the key province of a new German monarchy with mixed constitutional, federal and autocratic elements. All the time, the industrial revolution and the ensuing social and societal reverberations marched forward at breathtaking speed. This change spread nationalism in all countries and threatened to explode the CoE and its smooth working. Yet, the CoE still did its work, managing the
consequences of nationalism in two ways: by opening the valve, where possible, to the creation of new states if and when national movements could not be contained any longer in multinational states ruled by a titular nation; or stopping wars and mediating settlements for military disputes driven by nationalist emotions, as in the Balkans.

Maintaining peace by preventing war, containing war from spreading into a wildfire, helping change in a midwife capacity and managing the tremendously destructive forces of nationalism for decades is no little achievement for a cooperative international institution.

The Concert’s Shortcomings

But of course, the CoE was not perfect. Deviant behaviour did happen, and sometimes with destructive consequences as in the Crimean war or the German-French war. The Concert was an exclusive club in which smaller powers had little or no say. The transparency of CoE decisions was almost nil, and meeting protocols took very long to be publicised. Naturally, that nurtured distrust and uncertainty among nonmembers. Where the desires of a people were not compatible with the interests of Concert powers, like in Poland, they were ignored and suppressed.

While the CoE did not cause imperialism and colonialism – they did well exist before the Concert was founded – it did nothing to constrain European expansionism abroad and the suppression of many millions of colonialised people. During the Berlin Conference of 1884, the Concert prevented the clash of European powers over colonies, but through dividing and distributing the spoils of colonial conquest, that is, at the costs of the people concerned. It helped establish and maintain the evil distinction between “civilised” and “uncivilised” people and the unequal standards established between these two groups.

The Concert found also no handle to deal with the increasingly dynamic arms race. Suggestions (by powerful, but technologically backwards Russia) to agree on some limits met resistance, notably by Great Britain which wanted to keep a free hand for its global adventures. Through the industrialisation process with its mass production and speed of technological innovation, state of the art armament became a rapidly moving target. Formidable population growth contributed to mass armies that were no longer the kings’ toys of the 18th century. This dynamic brought back, and sharpened, the security dilemma even under the circumstances of Concert collaboration. It contributed considerably to its demise in the run-up to World War I.

What can be Transferred to our Time?

Learning from history is tricky. As Greek philosopher Heraklit put it, “you cannot jump twice into the same river”. In the flow of historical time, circumstances change permanently, and no two situations with a time distance in between are equal. Taking lessons one by one from seemingly similar structures, processes, events and constellations can thus lead quickly into very blind alleys. It is necessary to scrutinise carefully which features of an historical example of an institution that supplied public goods, which we need as well in our time – stability between great powers in order to support a stable and peaceful international order –, are worth transferring, which ones are obsolete or dysfunctional, and which innovative
features are needed to adapt a concert to today's conditions and challenges. We have to look at the CoE not as a model, but as a template.

For sure, the set of norms which the CoE worked out, developed and practiced over a long time are valid today as well (and are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and thus, in fact, already binding for all UN members). Mutual recognition as equals, respect for the vital interests of the partners despite ideological and cultural diversity, restraint in external behavior, in particular in the pursuit of expansive territorial gains, refraining from the unilateral use of force, the duty to consult in matters of common concern and, most of all, in situations where peace is endangered, notably in crises, striving for agreed solutions, and common action to realise them – all this would be very conducive today to stabilise great power relations and to improve the impact of great power relations and policies on the global environment.

The degree of flexibility, adaptability and informality which characterised the proceedings of the CoE is equally interesting. It reminds one of the early days of the G-7 when it was an intimate meeting to permit leaders not only to get to know each other well but also to deliberate on problems and their solutions without the pressure of public commitments, strict protocol, and permanent observation. It seems that this working method was, by and large, more efficient than the sessions in the public limelight after G-7 meetings had become a media spectacle in the eighties.

The commonality of the positions worked out thoroughly and the pressure on third parties that was exercised jointly and not opposed by disinterested Concert members helped tremendously to achieve solutions for individual conflicts. In most cases the great powers did not stand at the side of the quarreling parties with a view to gaining geopolitically, but pursued, or at least did not hinder, achieving the common good of stability; this attitude was possibly the key to its success regarding the management, mediation, and settlement of third-party conflicts. At the same time, this practice was decisive for avoiding direct clashes between the great powers over regional conflicts. A change from the increasing geopolitical rivalry and ensuing partisanship by the great powers to the role of disinterested arbiter might be the greatest step forward to mitigating great power competition in today's world.

**Which Innovations are Needed?**

A great power concert for the 21st century cannot be regional, but must be global. Great power relations have ceased to be concentrated in the Western or Northern world, and the more globalisation continues its triumphant way forward, the more that great powers are distributed across the world. Likewise, the sources of political trouble and the interests of great powers are spread far around the globe, and events in one corner of the planet affect regions everywhere. The risk of antagonistic great power involvement has risen for each local and regional conflict, and solutions seem hardly possible without the involvement of the leading states in the various regions as well.

A contemporary concert of great powers has thus to be global both in reach and composition. While states like China, the United States, Russia, India (and the EU, if the EU would acquire the capability to act in an unitary way and speak with one voice rather than in cacophony)
are indispensable participants, the new concert should be sort of representative by giving the different regions and cultures a place at the table. That makes it necessarily larger than the CoE at some cost to efficiency, but this price has to be paid because the world is simply different from the 19th century. In today’s world, the G20 comes closest to what is needed, and it might be simply the most convenient way to deploy the G20 more and more for addressing salient issues of international security rather than keeping the focus on economic ones.

The degree of representativity notwithstanding, it does not eliminate the difference between “in” and “out”. Membership is still an exclusive private good, and dissatisfaction among those parties, that would have been the next ones on the list of candidates if only the number of members would be larger, cannot be completely avoided. As the failed attempts to enlarge the number of permanent UNSC members indicate, this is a problem. It cannot be avoided, but only mitigated. Close communication between the new concert and these middle powers, regular consultations at the regional level, bilateral consultations between concert members and those prominent outsiders close to them (without sleepwalking into the risky situation of opposing alliances of patrons/clients that would disrupt the concert’s cohesion), and open and transparent debates on concert positions and practices in the UNGA.

These measures would guarantee the minimum amount of transparency between the inner working of the new concert and the rest of the world. Lack of transparency was a permanent weakness of the CoE. It would be a serious handicap in a world in which information flows have reached unprecedented levels and in which leaders and citizens all over the world would request to be adequately briefed about deliberations and decisions that impact their own interests and lives. Of course, the necessity of having space for confidential talks and private exchanges among the leaders of great powers would continue to exist, and due time should be available for this purpose. To find a balance between this intimacy and transparency would be a permanent challenge. The solution of the CoE to keep transparency to a minimum, however, would not be possible.

As mentioned, one of the shortcomings of the CoE was the lack of efforts to regulate the arms dynamic. A contemporary concert would have to find ways to avoid this deficit. In an age of rapid technological development, the fear of hostile breakthroughs, and the fear of surprise aggression supported by combined arms operations including space and cyberwarfare exacerbates the basic security dilemma and is a showstopper for far-reaching security cooperation. A new concert could help overcome the present stagnation and regression in arms control. It could work towards a multilateral network of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreement. Such a network would accompany and support the peaceful consolidation of great power relations, but also help to enhance regional and transregional stability. A new institutional impetus is certainly needed in the light of the agony of established deliberation and negotiation venues like the Conference on Disarmament. It may also overcome the new trend – borne out of frustration and despair - to develop disarmament law without the great powers which may mark normative progress, but does not really respond to the key international challenge of our time, namely negative political dynamics among the most powerful countries.
To establish an agreed nuclear order would be a key ingredient of a concerted arms control regime. It would have to serve simultaneously three purposes: help stabilise the relationships among the nuclear armed states with a view to make escalation into nuclear war less probable; create the basis for reductions that may lead, eventually, to a nuclear weapon free world; satisfy the demands of non-nuclear weapon states sufficiently so that the nuclear non-proliferation regime could regain the stability that it is in the process of losing.

To come closer to realising these purposes, nuclear armed concert members would have to move from bilateral to multilateral nuclear arms control. They would have to establish a balance among themselves by agreeing to upper limits of deployed and nondeployed nuclear warheads for all of them and a process for future reductions; deployment and operational modes that make misperceptions, unwanted escalation, but also intentional first strikes less likely and feasible; and account for the ever more important interrelation between nuclear forces and long-range precise strike capabilities, offensive space capabilities, and cyberwar; and doctrinal changes that make these adaptations of capability possible. It is a huge agenda, but its realisation would be strongly facilitated by the fundamental improvement of the “security environment”, nowadays a much-heralded concept of nuclear weapon states and their allies, which the establishment of a new great power concert would engender. Political conditions and military postures interact, and concertation is meant to bring back this interaction to a stabilising and peaceful dynamic. Concert members not armed with nuclear weapons would keep their nuclear armed peers responsible and maintain pressure on them to move in the right direction.

**Fitting the Concert in Today’s Institutional Environment**

The CoE operated in an environment where international law was not very dense and international institutions and organisations were almost nil. Today, the world disposes of a dense network of international legal norms and abounds in international organisations some of which have quite far reaching competences. A new concert would have to find its place in this existing structure; it would certainly make little sense to compete with or weaken existing law and institutions that fulfill useful and indispensable functions. In addition, deciding on an exclusive group of powerful countries to substitute for the established organisations that are based on international law would certainly stimulate resentment and protest in the crowd of non-members. It would obviate any future attempt to create a concert image of serving the common good and providing public goods for all.

For this reason, the new concert should be conceived of as complement, not substitute, for existing institutions. It should commit to supporting these institutions, notably the UNSC and the UNGA, by careful deliberation and a good effort to narrow gaps and create consensus among its members (including veto powers) so that considerations and decisions in the law-based institutions would become faster, easier and more efficient.

The new concert would also not aspire to create new international law on its own, only to assist in setting new legal norms when the entire international community or a large

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4 This and the next paragraph draw on Nicola Leveringhaus/Andrew Hurrell, Great power accommodation, nuclear weapons, and concerts of power, in Müller/Rauch (Fn. 1), 225-243
majority see the need for it. Vice versa – and this should be a very important part of concert norms – its members would commit to strictly observing established international law in substance and procedure, naturally including, in particular, the Charter of the UN.

A related policy declaration early on in the new concert’s existence, and an ensuing practice heeding this commitment, would do a lot to mitigate concerns that a power oligopoly might be imposed on the many. It goes without saying that this would require a considerable reversal of extra- and antilegal practices which the biggest powers have become accustomed to applying in their external policies in recent times.

A Sober Look at the Weak Point: Leadership

When the classical European Concert was founded, it profited from a shared understanding of the enlightened leaders of participating states that nobody could pursue its national security interest without collaborating with its peers. This understanding included a common sense of responsibility for the fate of Europe as a whole, and an insight into the need to exercise restraint for the sake of the common good even in the pursuit of legitimate interests. This understanding was the result of a painful and bloody learning, but also of the good luck to have people at the top who were able to learn.

Establishing a new concert with the abovementioned functions requires the same insights; they need not necessarily be held by every single participant in the larger group that would make up a contemporary concert, but at least in the core, by the leaders of the most powerful states. It is here that skepticism takes over: the present crew of top leaders gives the impression of an orchestra playing a “march of folly”. President Trump destroys systematically established international institutions, sings hymns for nationalism, and dismantles what is left of the once seemingly solid arms control architecture. President Putin pursues policy with the horizon of a middle rank KGB officer with the double intention to stay in power and to keep Russia continuously in a place of the sun far “above its weight”, using instruments of deception, lies, illegal use of force, breach of international law, and principal support for whatever dictator wants to be protected. Chairman Xi has reversed one of the great learning successes of the Communist Party of China, the collective leadership and the limitation of the chair's tenure, and replaced it through his lifetime personal rule; under his leadership, China has moved towards an offensive neighborhood policy using military means to prevail in its territorial ambitions over vast maritime territories against the opinion of the Law of the Sea Tribunal. India's President Modi's nationalism is based on a religious ideology. These core leaders look like very unlikely founding fathers for a contemporary concert of powers built on the principles of multilateralism and self-restraint. Looking at other potential candidates, we see Prime Minister Johnson, President Erdogan, President Al Sissi, President Bolsonaro, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Ayatollah Khamenei. If the new concert would range between 15 and 20 members, half of them would be led by personalities ostensibly unfit to agree to the basic norms on which such an institution would have to rely.

Hence, alas, while establishing a new concert of powers – with all the necessary adaptations which today’s constellations would require – looks like an answer to contemporary international challenges worth considering, it is a potential structure in want of appropriate
agents. To change this situation would need either an earthquake-like change of leadership or a catastrophe of a dimension at least commensurate with the Napoleonic wars in order to shift the minds of current leaders. But a concert would be needed to prevent exactly such a catastrophe from happening; this is a catch-22 which could turn out to be very fatal for the world.
The Author

Harald Müller Senior Associate at PRIF and Supervisor of Peace Research Center Prague. He was Executive Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF, 1996-2016) and Professor for International Relations and Peace Studies, Goethe University Frankfurt (1999-2016). Dr. Müller served as Vice-president, EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, as Chair, UN Advisory Board on Disarmament and as Co-chair, Working Group on Peace and Conflict, Planning Staff of the German Foreign Office. He was member of the German delegation to Review Conferences of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty from 1995-2015. He is co-editor (with Carsten Rauch) of Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War. Debating a 21st Century Concert of Powers (2018).

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Contact Us
Toda Peace Institute
Samon Eleven Bldg. 5th Floor
3-1 Samon-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160-0017, Japan
Email: contact@toda.org